PERSONS AND CAUSES: BEYOND ARISTOTLE

Josef Seifert*

Abstract: While Aristotle does not consider (as Libet) the physical universe causally closed, his understanding of causality is insufficient: 1. Aristotle does not grasp the indispensable role of persons for the "four causes" he distinguishes: Physical efficient causality can neither explain itself nor the entire chain of physical events, nor is it the primary form of causality, nor sufficient to explain personal agency. Also formal and final causality are inexplicable without persons. Without the essential relation to persons efficient, formal, and final causes are impossible and unintelligible. Moreover, Aristotle attributes wrongly fundamental traits (to be the source of individual being and the ultimate subject of form and change) to material causality as such, which is incorrect, because these traits belong more perfectly to spiritual persons. 2. There are entirely new causes of human acts that cannot be subsumed under the four causes encountered in intentionality, cognitive relations to objects, human motivation and behavior etc., which, when reduced to efficient causes (let alone to mere brain-causes) are entirely misconstrued. If such a reductionist causal theory were true, its truth would destroy the cognitive value of the theory itself which advances such a causal reductionism. Therefore a personalist rethinking of causality is necessary.

THE FOLLOWING paper has grown out of an extended research project I have directed[1] dedicated to the thesis of Benjamin Libet and some other brain scientists who deny positive free will but maintain that we do possess some negative free will of vetoing voluntary movements or actions. Libet and many other far more deterministic brain scientists and many philosophers assume that, if freedom exists at all in a causally completely or well-nigh completely closed physical universe, it can do so only in a tiny corner of the universe, and in a restricted, almost unnoticeable, negative and secondary way. In other words, the underlying framework of such a philosophy is that causality exists only or at least primarily in the physical nature and mental events and realities are effects of physical causes, brain causes and others initiating in a big Bang or in evolutionary processes which produced what we call "persons" and keep producing mental events through physical causes.

One possible way to criticize Libet's and other scientists' view and challenge to free will is to show that it contains a complete reversal of the order of causality and that it suffers from a "forgetfulness of the person" and of her crucial role in the order of causes. But before showing this in relation to the merely implicit philosophy of brain scientists, I thought it wise and necessary to tackle this question by a pure return to things themselves, and in dialogue with an incomparably greater philosopher, the

*Dr. JOSEF SEIFERT, Professor, International Academy of Philosophy Spain–Instituto de Filosofía Edith Stein Granada, Spain. Email: jseifert@iap.li.

[1]For the financial support of this project (2010-2012) I am indebted to Fondecyt, the National Chilean Endowment of Science and the Humanities.

intellectual giant Aristotle, whose philosophy of causality I will critically examine in this paper. In a later paper I will address the theory of Libet under this aspect.

I. Subject and Purpose of This Paper

In the history of a philosophy of causality Aristotle is no question a giant, if not even the single most important philosopher of causality, in particular by his enlarging the concept of causality and by his having shown that all thinkers that preceded him, upon asking why a thing comes to be or exists, what its cause is, have referred only to one or two of its causes, not to the entirety of four quite distinct causes that account for the being and becoming of things and all of which have to be known in order to answer the question why a thing is and whence it came from. Aristotle gives an equally simple and beautiful illustration of these four different causes - a sculptor who makes a statue: the artist (a) uses a certain matter; (b) must give it a certain form; (c) must engage in activities through which the form is given to matter; (d) must have a purpose for the sake of which he makes it (for example to be used in worship in a temple or simply for the sake of its beauty). Particularly if the statue is a portrait or represents a great hero or god, we can (e) identify the exemplar which the statue imitates as a fifth cause (exemplary cause, which plays hardly any role in Aristotle but a huge role in Plato and in the whole Platonic tradition of philosophy up to the present).

Now while Aristotle, already through the example by which he illustrates the four causes, the sculptor who makes a statue, has taken into account many aspects of the relation between persons and causes, he has had a limited understanding of the central significance persons play for all and particularly for some causes. Taking the classical Aristotelian discovery of the four causes as my starting point, I will attempt to show initially the essential connection of these causes to persons. Above and beyond this, I intend to show that in the world of human consciousness and of volitional acts there are a variety of other causes that cannot be reduced to the four, thus showing still more the insufficiency of the Aristotelian discussion of causes when it comes to the explanation of causality in the world of persons.

The question about the first principles and causes of being and change in the world plays an overriding role in Aristotle's and in most subsequent metaphysics.[2] The Aristotelian concept of cause is far more extensive than the modern one, which tends to reduce the complexity of causes to efficient causality alone and to a small part thereof. It might therefore be better to use, besides the term "cause," expressions such as ground, principle, element, condition, etc., in order to do justice to the breadth of the Aristotelian quest for the *aitía* and *arché* of things.[3] Aristotle means with "cause" nothing more and nothing less than all those factors which are decisive for the coming about and the being of a thing. Turning to "things themselves", he makes

[2]See Reale 1976: 23 ff., where one finds a brief but important summary presentation of this theme in Aristotelian metaphysics.
[3]Reale 1976: 31 ff.

the tremendous discovery of four fundamentally different sorts of causes of being and becoming: a) the formal cause or essence (whatness) of things; b) the material cause out of which or in which change occurs or form is received; c) the efficient cause, through the power of which a change is effected or a being is; and d) the final cause, for the sake of which something is or is done. Following Plato, later thinkers added the exemplary cause as a fifth cause, while others subordinated the exemplary cause – the model, ideal or paradigm – to the category of a (transcendent) formal cause.

In this paper, I will try to show mainly the following things:

1) Aristotle, with most of the subsequent tradition of philosophy, does not sufficiently realize the essential connections between the four causes discovered by him and persons; without such an understanding, however, these four causes can only be understood very imperfectly. An investigation into the relation between persons and causes will show, among other things, that specifically personal acts, in particular knowledge and free actions, can so little be explained through physical causes that on the contrary the whole order of causality in nature and in human affairs can solely be appropriately understood if we recognize first that none of the classical Aristotelian causes, and in particular efficient and final causality, can be understood without understanding their various relationships to, and ultimate dependence on, persons.

2) Aristotle mistakenly believes that there are only these four causes of being and becoming, while on the level of persons we find many other and fundamentally different *kinds of causes* which are totally irreducible to the four causes.

II. Persons and the Four Traditional Causes

A) Some Reflections on Aristotle's philosophy of the four causes.

a) *Formal Cause:* According to Aristotle, the most important *aitía* (I often will use this Greek term for cause because we are too much used to employing the term cause solely for efficient causes) is the *ousía*, which term, understood as cause, does not refer to *substance* (another meaning of '*ousia'* in Aristotle) but to the formal cause, i.e., the essence[4]. Aristotle believes that it is possible to reduce all other ultimate grounds of the explanation of a being to its formal cause, which he calls the "first cause",[5] speaking of it as the primary ground, highest and ultimate cause of all beings, such that in the last analysis Aristotle holds that also the final cause, for the sake of which something is or a person acts, coincides with the formal cause.[6]

[4]The "formal cause" can also be called the *morphé* and *eidos*, the *tí eînai* or the *tò tí ên eînai*. See Reale 1976: 23, 34, 37 ff., 54, fn. 104. See also Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z 17, 1041 b 27-28, H 3, 1043 b 13-4.

[5]Reale 1976 rightly sees in the primacy of the formal cause in the *Metaphysics* a certain influence of Platonic philosophy on Aristotle, in particular because Aristotle also uses the expression „paradigm'.

[6]See Reale 1976: 23 ff., 31 ff. Given that with the word *ousía* Aristotle means not only the formal cause, but also substance, one may have some doubts about whether Aristotle means just a primacy of substance or one of the formal cause as such.

If "formal cause" is to encompass the essence and intelligible structure of a being, the formal cause undoubtedly is an absolutely elementary principle of all being and becoming.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle sees the formal cause almost exclusively in terms of the form *in things*, rejecting the timeless Platonic forms. While Aristotle, who calls the forms eternal and seems to hold that they exist in the immovable 'active intellect', can hardly be interpreted in the sense of *entirely* immanentizing the formal cause in things and denying any forms transcendent to things, he nevertheless moves in this direction.[7] Now, we fully acknowledge, with Aristotle, the primacy and character of reality which is attributable only to the essence *in individual things*. Still, concrete individual things remain subjected to the "*rationes aeternae"*, the "eternal reasons" which contain the essential foundations and timelessly valid and unchangeable necessary 'essential plans', rules, and laws for them.

Thus there are significant reasons which would compel us to carry out a critique of the thesis suggested in Aristotle's sharp criticism of the Platonic doctrine of eternal forms, that the formal cause can only exist *in real particular* things as their immanent essential form.

b) *Material Cause or the 'in which' of change–source of individuality?* Aristotle also acknowledges the material cause (*hyle, hypokeimenon*), for example, bronze for a bronze statue, which is according to him particularly, or even exclusively,[8] necessary for sensible things.

There is certainly an evident and objective distinction between the form or the essence and the material of which a physical thing consists. Matter in this sense is not a subject but a constituent element of material things.

Very different is the distinction between the subject that undergoes change and essential or accidental essential determinations and changes which a given entity undergoes, found in most every process of becoming,[9] not only in one that occurs in the material world.

At closer inspection, Aristotle uses two entirely different notions of "material cause": one simply refers to the ultimate *subject* of essential determinations and change, that which underlies change and *in which* change occurs (the *hypokeimenon*); the other is the pure principle of 'stuff', of "matter", the *physical* substratum *out of which* material entities are made or by which they are, together with their form,

[7]Particularly his critique of the Platonic doctrine of the Ideas. On the need for recognizing, in addition to the formal cause as essential form *in* concretely existing beings themselves, essence as *eidos*, as the essential intelligible *ratio*, which precedes all contingent beings because of its timeless and eternal intelligible unity and necessity, see Seifert 1996: ch. 1. With his rehabilitation of *eidetic* causes, Seifert introduces within the formal cause, in addition to the form immanent in beings, the exemplary cause, and adopts thereby a Platonic or better said Augustinian philosophy of exemplarism.

[8]See the foundation of this claim of the exclusivity in this direction in Reale 1976: 24ff; 34 ff.; 50.

[9]I prescind here from such changes as are involved in the movement of time itself that does not seem to occur "in" a subject. See the discussion of time in Josef Seifert 1989, ch. 10.

constituted. At the foundation of the already formed materials (such as bronze), also called "secondary matter" (*deutera hyle),* lies that pure principle of materiality which Aristotle characterized as *prime matter (prote hyle)*, and which (in later scholastic terminology of the "the prime matter quantitatively distinct", the "materia prima quantitate signata"), according to Aristotle is the source of *individual* being and essence.

To identify these two meanings of the cause which Aristotle calls material cause contains a serious confusion. For in the wider sense of material cause as the underlying subject of formal (essential) characteristics and change every finite being, and therefore also a spiritual person, insofar as something happens in her, can be considered as a "material cause," i.e., if this is understood as any something which can possess or receive a "form" (essence) and in which change occurs (as any "in which"/*en hoo*). Aristotle recognizes this to some extent in the idea of the "second matter" (*deutera hyle),* an already formed material subject of new accidents and forms, such as the bronze which is material cause for the statue distinct from "prime matter" and already is a material substantial thing that has a form.

Besides, Aristotle's claim that sees the sole principle of individual being in the material cause (prime matter) implies that solely and exclusively the material cause is responsible for individual things and that spiritual substances are pure (non-individual) essences. Thus Aristotle attributes on the one hand to the material cause the tremendous metaphysical function of being the only source of individual being. On the other hand, Aristotle attributes to both the material cause and individual being a very limited significance, as it is according to him just needed and extant in the material universe.

Now, in material entities matter (distinct from form) fulfills to some extent truly the two roles Aristotle attributes to it: being the source of individuality and being the ultimate recipient of form. But these two decisive roles of the type of cause here considered must not at all be attributed to matter in all beings.[10] It is untenable to derive all individuality, least of all the individual spiritual unicity and unrepeatable and indivisible "thisness" of persons, from the pure stuff out of which material entities are made (*materia prima quantitate signata)* and which – in virtue of its extension and multitude of parts and other predicates – can never account for personal individuality.

On the other hand, we may ask: Does not the material cause, understood as any "*in which,"* as any bearer of forms, have a far deeper significance than that which Aristotle concedes to it, by not just appearing within material reality as stuff of which they are made, but by being a foundational principle and cause also for all spiritual forms of becoming. For also a spiritual substance or person is the bearer, "that wherein" essence (form) exists and change can take place. This second and far more fundamental type of "in which" goes beyond the sphere of physical reality and should actually not be called "material cause" but rather be designated by the more abstract

[10]See Seifert 1989 a: ch. 8-9.

Aristotelian terms *en hoo* ("in which") or "*hypokeimenon"* (that which underlies change).

The confusion of these two things may have suggested itself to Aristotle by the fact that in the material world matter to some extent really performs all of these functions (being the recipient of form, the subject of change and form and the source of individuality) though rather the synthetic unity of matter and form, than matter alone, accounts for the individual thisness of material things.

c) *Efficient Causality:* From the formal and the material causes Aristotle distinguishes the efficient cause, through the power and efficacy of which something happens. With this, he has certainly fastened upon another originary kind of causality in an indubitably phenomenological manner. He also gives a formulation of the principle of causality, formulating it simultaneously in relation to efficient, formal and material causes: "Everything that comes to be, comes to be through something, from (out of) something, and as a certain something" (*Metaphysics*, VII 7, 1032a). Only the first and third one of these three propositions contained in Aristotle's formulation of the principle have universal validity and express the 'eternal truth' of the principle of causality that also underlies all natural sciences (besides being the ground of all other explanations of human, moral, spiritual, or any other contingent things, events, and states of affairs): "Everything that comes to be, comes to be through something;" and; "Everything that comes to be, comes to be … as a certain something." The second proposition, 'Everything that comes to be, comes to be … from (out of) something' relates only to the causation of material things that are made out of some material by any (human or divine) agent and, still more narrowly understood, to the production of things through finite agents who can never create anything "from nothing" – which would be the most radical form of efficient causality –, cannot create spiritual substances at all, and can make material things only 'out of *preexisting* matter'.

This causality by the power of which something happens is unfortunately again limited by Aristotle to the sphere of sensible realities, leaving his metaphysics open to the critical question of whether only sensible things have causes or even can themselves be efficient causes, wherefore that pure spirit of the absolute, divine being, according to Aristotle, only influences the world as final cause, *"as the beloved"*[11]. While Aristotle admits at times the absolute efficient causality of free agents and even assigns to it a primary paradigmatic character,[12] Aristotle attempts

[11] See Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, XII, 7, 1072 a 26 ff. See also Reale 1976, 305, for an explanation and for references to the sources of this Aristotelian doctrine.

[12] Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, ed. F. Susemihl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1884). Greek online edition in *Perseus.*, 2.6.8-9; 1223 a 3 ff., describes free will powerfully, attributing to it that we are lords over the being or non-being of our acts: "Therefore it is clear that all the actions of which a man is the first principle and controller may either happen or not happen, and that it depends on himself for them to happen or not, as he is lord over their being and of their non-being. But of those things which it depends on him to do or not to do he is himself the cause, and what he is the cause of is from himself. And since virtue and evilness and the actions that spring from them are in some cases praiseworthy and in other cases blameworthy (for praise and blame are

frequently to reduce the efficient cause to the material world. At other times, he tries to reduce the efficient to the formal cause. In such a manner the formal cause would appear to be *the* fundamental principle of generation.

Admiring his tremendous discoveries, we will have to offer an incisive critique of some of the Aristotelian theses regarding efficient causality.

d) *Final causality:* The final cause, the *telos*, is defined by Aristotle as the end of a thing or of an action, as that *for the sake of which* (*hou heneka)* something is or happens. This end, according to Aristotle, coincides with the good and is the ultimately moving and most important cause in the universe, which Aristotle at times identifies with the essences (formal causes) of things, especially in living things which are an *en-tel-echy*, a being that has its end in itself as the form it is called to actualize.[13]

We now proceed to the most significant section of the first part of this paper, an examination of the personalist dimensions of the four causes which were largely overlooked by Aristotle – to the detriment of a proper understanding of the four causes.

B) Persons as Principles of Explanation of Aristotle's Four Causes

The last one in particular, but also the third and in some respects even the first two of these four causes can be understood in their ultimate specificity and efficacy only if metaphysics is not limited to being merely a metaphysics of substance and

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not given to what necessity or fortune or nature determine but to things of which we ourselves are the causes, since for things of which another one is the cause, that person has the blame and the praise), it is clear that both goodness and badness have to do with things of which a man is himself the cause and origin of actions. We must, then, ascertain what is the kind of actions of which a man is himself the cause and origin. Now we all agree that each man is the cause of all those acts that are voluntary and purposive for him individually, and that he is not himself the cause of those that are involuntary. And clearly he commits voluntarily all the acts that he commits purposely. It is clear, then, that both moral virtue and evilness will be in the class of things voluntary." Aristotle, *Eudemian Ethics*, 2.6.8–9; 1223a3 and following (transl. mine): ὥστε ὅσων πράξεων ὁ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν [5] ἀρχὴ καὶ κύριος, φανερὸν ὅτι ἐνδέχεται καὶ γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, καὶ ὅτι ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστι γίνεσθαι καὶ μή, ὧν γε κύριός ἐστι τοῦ εἶναι καὶ τοῦ μὴ εἶναι. ὅσα δ᾽ ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ ἐστι ποιεῖν ἢ μὴ ποιεῖν, αἴτιος τούτων αὐτὸς ἐστίν: καὶ ὅσων αἴτιος, ἐφ᾽ αὑτῷ. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἥ τε ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία καὶ τὰ ἀπ᾽ [10] αὐτῶν ἔργα τὰ μὲν ἐπαινετὰ τὰ δὲ ψεκτά （ψέγεται γὰρ καὶ ἐπαινεῖται οὐ διὰ τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ τύχης ἢ φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα, ἀλλ᾽ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ἐσμέν: ὅσων γὰρ ἄλλος αἴτιος, ἐκεῖνος καὶ τὸν ψόγον καὶ τὸν ἔπαινον ἔχει）, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ κακία περὶ ταῦτ᾽ ἐστιν ὧν αὐτὸς [15] αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. ληπτέον ἄρα ποίων αὐτὸς αἴτιος καὶ ἀρχὴ πράξεων. πάντες μὲν δὴ ὁμολογοῦμεν, ὅσα μὲν ἑκούσια καὶ κατὰ προαίρεσιν τὴν ἑκάστου, ἐκεῖνον αἴτιον εἶναι, ὅσα δ᾽ ἀκούσια, οὐκ αὐτὸν αἴτιον. πάντα δ᾽ ὅσα προελόμενος, καὶ ἑκὼν δῆλον ὅτι. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι καὶ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡ [20] κακία τῶν ἑκουσίων ἂν εἴησαν. In other texts Aristotle calls free will also "the first principle", "the cause" and "the lord of action". See Aristotle, *Magna Moralia*, 87 b 31 ff., especially 89 b 6 ff.; *Nichomachean Ethics*, III; and *Magna Moralia*, 87 b 31 ff., especially 89 b 6 ff. The moments of self-dominion, self-governance, and self-determination have also been investigated in fine analyses by Karol Wojtyla in his *The Acting Person*, trans. Andrzej Potocki, ed. Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka *(*Boston: Reidel, 1979).

[13]See Reale 1976: 23 ff.

nature, but also is, or becomes, comprehended as a metaphysics of the person qua person.

This should become particularly clear in the case of the last two causes, and I begin therefore my exposition with their analysis: *Efficient causality can only be understood through the metaphysics of the person.* This can be seen through the following reasons:

(1) We find the most authentic embodiment of efficient causality exclusively in personal free will. Every other efficient cause, as Augustine states in *De Civitate Dei*[14], receives it efficacy from without, and operates only to the extent to which it itself is the effect of other causes (actions, processes or events). Therefore only persons who act freely can be properly speaking efficient causes because they act more than being acted upon.

Even plants and animals, despite their spontaneity and activity of their own, cannot properly be considered as authentic efficient causes because their being causes is not wholly but largely determined by preceding causes in their instincts and nature, and by extrinsic causes to which they react. Therefore, such causes that are determined by other causes and consequently rather are mere "transmitters" of the force of other causes than being causes in their own right clearly never suffice to explain human action. (Aristotle concurs with Augustine on this at times).

Free will alone can be considered an efficient cause that is essentially more efficient cause than a causally produced effect, because only free will as the '*principle par excellence*' embodies the *ratio* of the efficient cause in the fullest sense, being truly the origin of that which happens through it. Free will alone can in an authentic sense be that *through which* something is, insofar as the origin of its efficacy lies in the free agent himself. Free will is the only cause in the fullest sense of efficient causality, since it alone truly originates and exerts efficient causality rather than merely passing it on. The free act constitutes either an absolute beginning (in divine freedom) or (in human persons) "acts more than it is acted upon" and thereby constitutes a true, and in a limited sense even an 'absolute', beginning of efficient causality that is not caused from outside the free agent. Therefore, as Augustine says in sharpest contrast to the discussion of causality in most of contemporary brain science and philosophy, non-personal beings and impersonal things and events cannot even properly be considered as efficient causes at all; the existence of such causes that are themselves determined by other causes can therefore never be the whole story about efficient causality because, in the last analysis, they do only what free wills do with them. (The necessarily limited sphere of their operation, which always begins in causality through freedom, does not contradict free actions but on the contrary, these presuppose the – limited realm and dominion of – "determined causes" under laws of nature, which is never the principal cause of human actions but is used by them).[15]

Thus the first one of all efficient causes is the person, since she alone is properly speaking a cause rather than being a mere transmitter of the causal impact of other causes through which she is determined.

[14]Augustine, *De Civitate Dei*, V.
[15]See Ingarden 1970.

(2) We touch thereby a second moment. All other efficient causality, with the exception of causality in and through free will, leads us back to a principle of its efficacy distinct from itself. Solely the free and simple initiating and setting into motion of a chain of causes is a true beginning of a chain of efficient causes.

In fact, without free agents there would be an infinite chain of causes but, as Aristotle Aquinas, and many others including Kant saw, there cannot be an infinite chain in the realm of causality. Therefore, only free will is the ultimate and first principle of explanation of all efficient causality in a contingent world, and therefore also the absolutely first cause of the contingently existing universe, whose origin and existence requires an efficient first cause that can only be a free cause.[16]

(3) We can thirdly ascertain that free will is not only the most authentic embodiment and the only true beginning of efficient causality. Rather, in the personal form of efficient causality there lies a radically other and higher type of efficient causality than that which is thinkable within the sphere of apersonal beings. Therefore, a metaphysics understood as the explanation of the highest cause of all things must necessarily be a personalistic metaphysics. What are these new elements efficient causality takes on solely in free will?

(a) First off, in free self-determination and in free acting lies a unique form of efficient causality for the reason that we are dealing here with a conscious causality, in which the effect proceeds from a conscious act such that the consciousness is a mode of personal free agency and causation which we therefore do not call just causing but acting or making (creating). Because a personal being, broadly speaking, possesses his being in a fully new sense in comparison to impersonal beings, because he is conscious of himself and consciously enacts his own being, he therefore also possesses himself in a unique manner through free auto-determination and through the free and creative production and constitution of things and actions in making and acting.

(b) To free causality not only belongs consciousness but also the specifically personal and rational consciousness as a moment inseparable from it, without which this form of causality would be completely impossible; only the spontaneity of an irrational animal could exist. In acting and making, new states of affairs are not simply engendered or changed in an unconscious, mechanistic manner and not even just in an instinctual, or in the less irrational conscious way like a dog's saving his master, but still without possessing rational knowledge of his life's value. Instead, in the intentional, object-directed acts of making and acting the person directs herself consciously and meaningfully to that which he or she realizes, aims at the realization of things or of states of affairs, calls them freely into being. This relation of the person to that which is real outside of herself includes thus wholly distinct forms of relation and efficient causality that are found only on the level of the person. To comprehend them is necessary in order to unfold the philosophical grasp of efficient causality.

[16]Plato has understood this far more clearly, particularly in his *Timaios.* Also Kant, if we prescind from his skeptical and subjectivist understanding of freedom as postulate, has seen this much more clearly – for example, in the *Third Antinomy* in his *Critique of Pure Reason.* See Kant 1968. See also Seifert 2001.

Also for this reason only on the basis of a personalistic metaphysics efficient causality can be properly understood.

(4) *Free will as an immediate experience of efficient causality:* Moreover, in this free causality, as we carry out the conscious act of causation, of engendering our own acts, in acting and making, the causal power is itself immediately and consciously given; we are ourselves identical with the subject of this power: we experience the flowing out of effects from the cause, at least in the engendering of free acts as such and, in a less strong sense, also in doing and making things through mental acts and bodily actions. Here we do not just understand or infer causal relations but experience them immediately.

(5) *Indubitable evidence of efficacy and efficient causality in engendering (causing) free acts:* The causal influence and efficacy proper to free will of bringing into existence acting itself, research, and in particular willing itself, also represent the classic instances in which efficient causality is given with evidence in the immediate experience of causing acts from our own will "which would not exist if we did not want them," of which Augustine says that it is in a sense even more evident than our existence. This applies also, though more weakly, to the causality found in bodily action that is mediated by all kinds of unconscious physiological processes, but it applies absolutely to the mode in which persons cause and engender their own free acts since nothing lies so much in their power of causation as willing itself. And nothing could be more evidently given in knowledge. For even if we could doubt our very being, believing that we might be deceived in this, we could not doubt our free will of not wanting to be deceived. And indeed we know of our freedom with the same type of immediate and reflective evidence with which we know of our own existence.[17] The awareness of our own free will – a knowledge which is so evident that it cannot be deception – is part of the evidence of the Cogito as unfolded by Augustine.[18] And the existence of free will in us is so evident that its evidence in a certain sense is more primary and indubitable than that of all other evident truths given in the *Cogito.*[19] For even if we could be in error about all things, which is impossible, as Augustine sees, it would still remain true that we do not want to be in error and of this free will we can have certain knowledge:

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[17]Investigating this matter more closely, we could distinguish between the evident givenness of freedom on different levels, a) in the immediate inner conscious living of our acts, b) in what Karol Wojtyìa calls "reflective consciousness" (which precedes the fully conscious self-knowledge), and c) in explicit reflection and self-knowledge properly speaking in which we make our personal freedom the explicit object of reflection, d) in the insight into the nature of freedom, an insight which grasps the necessary and intelligible essence of personhood, which is realized in each and every person, and e) in the clear and indubitable recognition of our personal individual freedom, an evident knowledge which depends, on the one hand, on the immediate and reflective experience of our being and freedom, and, on the other hand, on the essential insight into the eternal and evident truth of the connection between freedom and personhood.

[18]See Hölscher 1986. See also Seifert 1987: ch. 4-5. See also Seifert 1998: 145-185.

[19]Of course, this priority is not to be understood absolutely, for without the evidence of our existence and thinking activity also our freedom and will could not be given.

> Likewise if someone were to say, "I do not will to err," will it not be true that whether he errs or does not err, yet he does not will to err? Would it not be the height of impudence of anyone to say to this man, "Perhaps you are deceived," since no matter in what he may be deceived, he is certainly not deceived in not willing to be deceived? And if he says that he knows this, he adds as many known things as he pleases, and perceives it to be an infinite number. For he who says, "I do not will to be deceived, and I know that I do not will this, and I know that I know this," can also continue from here towards an infinite[20] number, however awkward this manner of expressing it may be.[21] On the other hand who would doubt that he ... wills...? For even if he doubts, he ... *wills* to be certain; ... Whoever then doubts about anything else ought never to doubt about all of these; for if they were not, he would be unable to doubt about anything at all.[22]

The evidence of this knowledge cannot even be refuted by any and all possible forms of self-deception because these imply or presuppose already the evidence of free will.[23] And in this indubitable evidence of free will also the causality in *engendering free acts* is given.

With the free causality of our engendering our own free acts and causing them, with the causality of free will, also another dimension of efficient causality, linked to free will itself, becomes accessible to us: namely the way in which we freely perform bodily actions and through them cause changes in the world, i.e., the causality of realizing states of affairs (through acting) or things (through making) in the external world through our free initiative. Thus with this absolutely evident givenness of our engendering our free acts themselves, also a less absolute but still very clear evidence of us being efficient causes of works, books, buildings and other objects and events is accessible to us. Therefore, besides the "causality of free will itself" also "causality through free will," mediated through the brain and body, the freedom to act and to change the world by our actions, is unambiguously given to us, though it is not given with equally indubitable certainty as the causing of our willing itself.[24]

We find in the ability freely to intervene in the world, and thereby to realize things and states of affairs outside of the person, again two specifically personal and originary types of causality, namely making (*poiein*) and acting (*prattein*), which

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[20]McKenna translates the *infinitum numerum* (wrongly, I believe) by ‚indefinite number'.

[21]Augustine 1970: 480-2.

[22]Augustine, *De Trinitate*, X, 10, 14. See also, Augustine, *Contra Academicos*, II, xiii, 29, *ibid.*, III, 23; *De Vera Religione*, XXXIX, 73, 205-7; *De Trinitate* XIV, vi, 8; *ibid.*, XV, xii, 21; *De Civitate Dei* XI, xxvi.

[23]The indubitable knowledge we can gain regarding our freedom refutes also the theory of Hume (of the non-givenness of causality), which considers almost exclusively forms of causality given within the material, sensible world, being also wrong about them. Cf. Hildebrand 1994: 2- 27. Seifert 1987: ch. 4-5.

[24]Therefore the positions of occasionalism or of a pre-established harmony between our will and external bodily actions (Geulincx and Leibniz), according to which our bodies are moved "on the occasion" of our wills and harmony with them, is not a senseless, although a wrong theory.

must also be considered from the point of view of a metaphysics of causality. In making and creating, the person brings some things into existence, in various degrees of radicality which range from producing mere technical products to creating intellectual or artistic works. In acting, the person realizes states of affairs in relation to already existing things.

In both cases, the person also realizes acts in herself and determines herself, whether through the unique and direct causality by which she calls her free acts into existence, or through the human and moral effects of these acts on herself as a person. And this allows us to see a sixth way in which efficient causality requires the understanding of personal beings in order to be properly understood.

(6) *The free subject as a self-determining efficient cause:* We see in the light of the preceding reflections that the person herself, and thereby a spiritual being, i.e., the human person as such in her spiritual aspects, is and can be an efficient cause and agent of free interior acts as well as an object of efficient causality, in that freedom with essential necessity does not merely bring into existence external objects and processes, but also inner acts. Indeed free will has, above and beyond acts performed by the person, the person herself as primary object, even though normally by turning in the first intention to other persons and values outside the person, but it acts at the same time upon the person of the free agent herself in a peculiar form of reflexivity which is inseparable from the exercise of free will.[25] This unique case of auto-determination and auto-causation of free agents does not happen only in the obvious manner, such as in free decisions, for example, or in the free act of calling into existence thinking itself, or research, and other acts and activities, but rather also in the sense in which the person, on the basis of that which she does in her conscious actions and of that at which she aims, also determines herself in a far deeper and farther-reaching sense than the one in which the person can change any material being or animal let alone the one in which animals can cause changes in the material world or the world of plants and animals.

Self-determination is an effect of the use of free will, and thereby an absolutely unique form of causality, in which, as the philosopher Wojtyła profoundly explains[26], not only objects and states of affairs outside of the person are the objects of action, but the person herself, who in her free acting gets hold of her own self, becomes good or evil, and determines herself in a completely unique manner. In the self-determination of the free subject or of the free substance itself lays therefore a unique form of causality, which is unthinkable within the sphere of impersonal being and even in the outward-directed efficient causality of the person.

The actualization of the deepest potentialities of the person cannot happen without the free will of the person. The distance, which metaphysically speaking separates the good person from the evil one, also gives witness to the efficacy of free will upon its own proper subject, and this effectively contradicts the Aristotelian limitation of efficient causality to the sensible-material world. In fact, it becomes

[25]See on this Wojtyła *1979*.
[26]See Wojtyła 1979: Part I, ch. ii; Part II, ch. iii.

clear that efficient causality is not only also possible with spiritual substances, but lies rather – in its fullest sense – exclusively in their sphere.

All of these insights of a metaphysics of the person also refute the third Aristotelian thesis noted above, according to which efficient causality is ultimately reducible to formal causality. This thesis turns out to be clearly incorrect. An agent who acts freely in such a way that his act is a matter of free choice cannot possibly act simply in virtue of his essence or nature and therefore free will as efficient cause cannot be reduced to the essence or formal cause of the agent.[27]

We can see that this is impossible both when we consider the moment of inner self-determination and when we consider efficient causality through free will, in which states of affairs or events outside the person, or at any rate outside of the free acts themselves, are realized, but freely intended and realized by the subject. When we think of that unique form of causality found in personal acting, through which events, processes, states of affairs and causes (which for their part involve further ends of acting) outside of the person are freely realized by the person, we understand that if they were a mere outflow of our essence, and thus reducible to "formal causes", they would precisely not be free. Thus it becomes clear in this case of free external action that the essence (the formal cause) in no way coincides with the efficient cause. Free will as efficient cause is essentially distinct from the formal cause and likewise from all effects and states of affairs that are realized simply through our having a given nature. The same holds for the free creation or making of artifacts, and above all of works of art. Here the free act of the person, which remains immanent in the person but still possesses transeuntive efficacy, cannot possibly be identified with the form which the material object, such as the work of art for instance, receives, or with our own essence or that of our act. Likewise, no other object or other state of affairs, realized through making or acting, possesses the same essence as its efficient cause, nor do the acts that produce these things, let alone their causal effects, coincide with the agent's essence.

Even those effects within the moral sphere in our own person, such as the goodness or wickedness of the person herself, effects that are far more intimately linked with free acts than the objects produced by us, are distinct from the cause which brings them into existence. This is shown clearly from the fact that the acts and the actions through which someone becomes good or evil have long passed away or can at least lie in the past, while their effects continue to remain in the person. In addition to this, the permanent personal characteristics of evilness or goodness possess an ontic character wholly different from the individual acts or actions from which virtues or vices, good or evil actions, and their effects of guilt or merit arise.

B) *A Metaphysics of finality must be a personalistic metaphysics as well:* In the case of the final cause it is even more immediately evident and more easily seen than in the case of efficient causality that exclusively the metaphysics of the person can

[27]Even in the case of procreation, which comes closes to coincide with the formal cause, efficient and formal cause remain different, the (efficient) causal activity in procreation, which is effective for a limited period of time, is not reducible to the formal cause of the progeny, which continues to exist after the act of generation.

perfect the classical metaphysical doctrine of the causes. Indeed a final cause "for the sake of which" something is or is made must remain thoroughly incomprehensible without the metaphysics of the person. Again, we can find at least two reasons for this dependency of all operation of final causality on personal beings:(a) If the end, as Aristotle emphasizes with full justification, must in the first place be identified with a good (even though the two notions are distinct and human persons can have evil purposes for their actions), it becomes evident that the final cause cannot at all be a cause in itself, since the goodness and value of a being are not of themselves capable of bringing anything extrinsic to them, such as acts of persons, into existence, or of being per se the explanatory principle of a thing or becoming. The value is itself a 'consequential property' of things, as Ross say,[28] and this makes it impossible to classify it among the efficient causes, or among the natural causes at all. Rather, the only manner in which the good (the *agathon* or *kalón*) can work is that of an efficacy mediated through knowledge and personal acting. Only through the sphere of conscious personal knowledge and of the free acts motivated by this knowledge can the good become a cause.

Therefore, it is also no linguistic accident that the end and similar concepts can be used for both the objective finality which we find in nature or technology as well as for the goal of personal acts. To speak of the purpose of events in lifeless nature, such as of the obviously existing finality of organs in organisms, means always to assume an efficacy of meaning and of the good which, as becomes evident through deeper reflection, can only happen through the mediation of personal knowledge and freedom. And therefore an atheistic metaphysics has no justification in admitting finality and meaning in nature, wherefore atheists like Richard Dawkins and others fight so fiercely against any admission of a purpose and plan and final causality in nature, though few things could be more evident than the presence of final causality in nature and no biologist could possibly understand the function of any organ without recognizing its purpose and function for the organism.[29]

To remain within human experience, we immediately recognize when we find a work of art or other beautiful man-made things, artifacts, machines; none of which occur in nature, that a human agent has been at work and has acted as efficient cause for the sake of an end.

With this we touch upon one of the greatest weaknesses of Aristotelian metaphysics, that is, his doctrine according to which the unmoved mover (God) attracts the whole of reality only as final cause and as the object of love, but not as efficient cause.[30] This implies on the one hand a mythologization and personification of non-personal creation, as if it were able to know the good and realize it for the sake of being good, and on the other hand overlooks the deepest metaphysical function of efficient causality in the form of free will, and above all of divine creative freedom, through which alone final causality can operate in nature. Of course, also in non-

[28]See Ross 1960: 280 ff.
[29]See on this Spaemann and Löw 1981.
[30]Some interpreters of Aristotle, such as Carlos A. Casanova, believe, based on some texts, that this usual understanding of Aristotle is incorrect.

personal beings certain things can objectively *be* the means, and others the ends. There is no essential necessity whatsoever that would forbid that final causality, a relation in which one thing serves another and exists "for the sake of the other," actually exists in impersonal machines, natural objects or irrational living beings. On the contrary, in nature and in machines we obviously find countless means-ends relations, which precisely must be designed by an intelligent person because neither water nor stars, neither a plant nor an animal possess any intelligence of their own and therefore the extremely intelligent order found in them allows us to infer that they have an intelligent maker. The operation towards ends, be it in nature, in technology, or in art, can only be explained by an intelligent and free efficient cause, a person endowed with intellect who orders the means towards values and ends, or who makes certain things for the sake of achieving others.

(b) But personal beings not only are causes and conditions necessary for the operation of any final causality in nature or in artifacts; they also embody final causality in an entirely new and higher form which is far more intimately connected with, and inseparable from, personhood. For we find in the personal realization of a goal itself, in personal acting which is related to a final *telos*, the most perfect and a principally different form of final causality, which is radically distinct from the finality that is instilled by a person upon a machine or exists in an organism. The ends we find in the sphere of persons have a fundamentally different meaning. This is particularly evident in the sphere of ethics, where the radical essential distinction within finality, between the free desire to realize an end in actions through which the person becomes good or evil, and mere natural causality and objective finality, which as such (except *as freely willed* and thereby as a personal end) could never ground moral values, is obvious.

Within the sphere of personal finality, we must still distinguish the objective *finis operis*, the essential goal inscribed in a certain kind of action such as life-saving or murder, from the subjective *finis operantis*, the extrinsic purpose, goal or motive of accomplishing an act. Both objective essential ends and subjective purposes of acting are specifically personal forms of finality which are by this very fact radically distinct from any finality possible in nature or art. We can ponder the ethical relevance of both the essentially objective personal end of an act and of the subjective end of the acting subject. This distinction regards fundamentally distinct forms of specifically personal goal-directedness and finality. Only a personalistic metaphysics sees the dependence of final causality on persons and recognizes at the same time the fully new way in which finality is realized in the various forms of a free and conscious turning of the person to various ends. The personal value of this turning towards these ends can never be measured morally speaking only in relation to consequences of acts, which to do is the grave error of ethical consequentialism.[31]

C) *Formal causality as well can be understood only on the basis of personalist metaphysics:* A deeper reflection shows that also the philosophy of the formal cause can only be completed through a reflection on personal being. It is indeed no accident

[31]See Seifert 1985.

that Aristotle, in treating of the four causes, always draws examples in which the person imprints a form onto some matter. He chooses the example of the sculptor, who makes a statue out of bronze, or he speaks of the silver coin, whose form was stamped by a person onto a piece of silver. We can see the need to complement a philosophy of formal causality by personalist metaphysics through the following six reasons.

The form is, in contrast to matter as such, something explicitly "spiritual", i.e., something not strictly material even when it exists in material things. As immaterial principle, it is in some ways akin to persons and has something in common with them, and is above all ordained to be known and bestowed on matter by them. This leads us to recognize a second relation between formal cause and person:

While form (formal cause) itself embodies another, radically different form of the "spiritual" than personal being, it proceeds from, and is addressed to, personal spirits. The forms are "spiritual" not by being or possessing a personal spirit but by being intelligible and meaningful in a manner completely different from the material cause and ordained to personal minds. "Form" is something which can only be grasped by a mind and which, because of its intelligibility, has a specific ordination to the mind not found in material causes (although also these can only be known by the mind): they lend themselves to be understood by persons. This holds true of the essential forms and formal qualities of life-less things, plants and animals. Form, even when it exists objectively and independently of spirit in nature and more obviously when it exists in a completed work of art after the death of the artist, is ordained nevertheless in a deep and meaningful manner to the spirit, which alone can grasp it as such, and to which it is addressed in virtue of its meaningfulness and articulateness, value and beauty.

Many forms do not even exist in things themselves, but only on the level of appearances which direct themselves already *as appearances*, and not only in virtue of their form, to the person and in some sense depend on the person, thus differing from the *thing in itself*, i.e., from those characteristics of being and essence which belong to a thing's autonomous and mind-independent reality.[32] The appearance is here the real thing, for example music is not identical with the objective waves studied by the physicist but coincides with what only a person can perceive *as music* and in its inner meaning. Some of these forms which depend on appearances are even less part of a world of things conceived wholly apart from persons than others. The form of a work of art or the tones of Mozart's *Don Giovanni*, for example, that constitute this work of art as a work of art, do not exist "in physical nature" in the same sense as do air waves or the material characteristics of a sculpture or work of architecture, even though also here the human or more generally speaking the personal aspect of them depends on persons.

The contingent existence of eternal and necessary essences (forms) in the world can only be caused by persons as efficient causes. Neither the knowledge of form nor its being impressed upon the material and any sort of contingent being found in the world, find adequate explanation without reference to the existence and the activity of

[32]See Seifert 1987, ch. 5-6.

a person.[33] This is even true when the form and essence of such formal principles as numbers or the laws of space and time or of movement are necessary (still their being concretely embodied in material things is not, but is contingent).

A special case: Temporal and eternal 'forms' whose laws cannot take their effect in the physical world by mere objective essential necessities but only by freedom. Whenever a form and a meaningful unity are realized in matter in such a way, however, that this form is both meaningful and could be different, such as in all the different species of plants and animals and the human body, it is even more impossible to consider either accident or blind and non-spiritual matter, or irrational living causes, or ideal objects and *eide* themselves, as sufficient grounds for the coming into existence of such forms, which is one of the key insights expressed by Plato in his *Timaios* and which renders in this respect his *metaphysics* superior to that of Aristotle.[34] The proof for the existence of God from the finality of nature depends upon this same foundational knowledge that the spiritual unity of meaning and the finality of forms within nature are such that purely accidental, material and non-thinking causes or substances could never sufficiently explain them.

The reference of the formal cause to the person becomes even more evident when one thinks of those forms which are not *contingent* and can for this reason be imposed on material objects only by persons, but which, while being *essentially necessary and timeless, can nevertheless be realized solely by the mediation of personal freedom.* That contingent man-made or historically and culturally changing rules of taste, of style, of conventions and customs can influence objects and become formal causes only by the intervention of free agents is not difficult to understand. But that there are also *absolute essential necessities* which can only operate by the mediation of freedom is a particularly striking fact and leads to an important distinction within essential necessities.[35]

There are some essentially necessary laws, for example of motion, which are automatically realized in each object that falls under these laws, for example any moving object.[36] But there are others which, while their essential and absolute necessity renders impossible any dependence of these ultimate formal causes (*eide*) themselves on the human spirit or on material and historical facts, nevertheless, in the form of eternal laws of oughtness, exert their influence on human affairs or on the

[33]See Seifert 2010, ch. 3 and 4.

[34] Understanding this superior personalistic insight of Plato also excludes the common interpretation of the demiurge as a mere symbol or allegory. See Reale 1997; 1993; see also Seifert 2000; and the same author 2002: 407-424.

[35] When we consider the dependence on free will solely within the sphere of essential necessities, which must be distinguished from 'contingent necessities of nature' and from all non-necessary and accidental essences and essential unities of such-being, another highly significant dependence of formal causality on persons becomes clear and a significant distinction must be drawn within essential necessities. See on this Hildebrand 1991; see also Wenisch 1988: 107-197. See likewise Seifert 1976a; the same author1987; 2009.

[36]See Reinach 1989 b: 551-588.

world only by the mediation of personal freedom.[37] With respect to them only the freedom and understanding of a person, and this in a new sense, can achieve the passage between the intelligible and the real world.

Formal causes within the world of persons: Moreover, many forms, essences and essential structures are realized only in the person and the spirit, while they are not at all found in the material world. Among these are the essences of all personal acts, of personhood itself, of the good, of happiness, of love, of justice, etc. Many of these, moreover, are pure perfections, and therefore central objects of metaphysics.[38] For this reason also, a metaphysics of form can clearly only be brought to its completion through a metaphysics of the person.

D) *A phenomenological-personalist critique of the Aristotelian metaphysics of the material cause as source of individuality: spiritual substances (ousia) are not "pure forms".*

(a) The strange view of Aristotle[39] (that exerted also a considerable influence on Aquinas)[40], that spiritual substances are something like species or genera is closely bound up with his conception of matter as *the* principle of individuation. In the metaphysics of Aristotle, matter is the ultimate principle of individuation.[41] Aristotle holds that the form as such does not admit of the distinction between species and individual, and that in a purely spiritual world in which no matter exists, there could only exist pure forms. Aristotle thus attributes to the material cause understood as pure matter a tremendously important role as *the* principle of individuation, a view that entails the thesis that spiritual substances can only be "pure forms", and do not allow for the existence of concrete and individuals spirits and spiritual beings, i.e. persons.[42] He is convinced, however, in stark contrast to the logical consequence of the view that spiritual substances are not individuals, which would make them

[37] In addition to absolute and essentially necessary *eide*, it is also necessary to admit the existence of ideas, which can be discovered, which precede the forms in temporal things. All individual things and the laws of nature are subordinate to atemporal ideas and necessary essences (*eide*), which do not merely possess an articulation and precision of meaning, but also belong to a intelligible cosmos which as such subsists without beginning or end, and which Augustine 1961 saw as grounded not in a purely ideal Platonic world of ideas, but in the divine spirit. See Seifert 2000, ch. 1.

[38] See on this notion of *pure perfection*s Scotus 1962; see also Seifert 1989, ch. 5; the same author 2004: 65-82.

[39] See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, IV, 3, 1070 a 10 ff.; XI, 2, 1060 a 3 ff.; IV, 8, 206 ff.; 215 ff.; 298 ff.

[40] See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae*, I, q. 75, a. 7. To be sure, Thomas holds in other places (which, in my opinion, cannot be brought into agreement with the many sections on matter as principle of individuation) that the soul possesses esse as well as individuality in itself (*Quaestio Disputata de Anima*, a. 3, 2 ad 5).

[41] It is also the ultimate bearer of the *hypokeimenon*, which receives the *actum primum* of the essential (substantial) form and is the origin of every other similar function of bearing characteristics.

[42] See, against this, Boëthius' definition of the person „*persona est naturae rationalis individua substantia',* and many others. See on this also Crosby 2004; and Seifert 1989, ch. 9.

entirely incapable of experiencing or thinking, that these forms are 'pure act' and can execute acts such as knowing.

In many respects, and in particular from the point of view of an adequate metaphysics of the person, it is necessary to criticize this conception.[43]

(i) First, Aristotle seems to have accepted with this position an equivocation of the concept 'spiritual' which goes back to Plato, and in particular to the *Phaedo*.[44]

In this equivocation – as Duns Scotus, Suarez, Edith Stein, and Dietrich von Hildebrand have pointed out – the personal soul, the personal spirit, comes very close to being an abstract universal and both are considered to be similar, while these two, though both are different from matter, are utterly distinct. And so we find also in Thomas Aquinas the assertion that a separated soul, were it not for its ordination to some matter which individuates it, would have to be a universal form, such as the color white[45]. We have to criticize this conception, by pointing, together with Scotus and Suarez, to the ultimate originary datum of "spiritual individuality of persons," and showing that the originary datum of concrete individual being is in no way restricted to the sphere of matter, and cannot at all find its ultimate explanation in *materia prima quantitate signata*. Rather, it is rooted in a far more originary and fundamental manner in spiritual, personal being. It is not necessary to develop this critique here extensively, but only to present it briefly, since it helps to illuminate the confusion which underlies the Aristotelian philosophy of material causality.

(ii) Secondly, we find here the error of considering the form as such, including that which is abstract and ultimately divorced from every plurality and concreteness of individual being, as *act*, and to endow it with those characteristics which could not subsist in universal forms as such, but can solely exist in real and concrete, individual beings. On this point, Aristotle is overly Platonic, not too little Platonic. That is, he ascribes to the universal principles, of which he claims that they could not possess in any way individual existence, characteristics and a supremely real existence, which can only belong to the concrete and individual *ens realis*.

[43]See on this also the superb critique of Edith Stein 1962 (1986).

[44]*Phaedo*, 79 a ff. There, it is asserted that because neither the soul nor the universal, abstract, non-individual forms are visible, audible or in any other way perceptible through the senses, the soul and the abstract forms must be similar to each other. From the atemporality of the universal forms is deduced the immortality, or eternity, of the human soul. As much as this argument of Plato's for the immortality of the soul contains many deep truths, in particular the truth of the reciprocal ordination of personal spirit and universal, spiritual principles of form, there lies nevertheless a fundamental equivocation in identifying spirit in the sense of the most concrete, most individual being with the spiritual in the sense of universal abstract forms, or even in considering these two realities as similar.

[45]See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologica*, I q. 75 a. 7. This equivocation was discovered in a seminar held by von Hildebrand in Salzburg in 1964, and is contained in an unpublished manuscript which is part of the collection of his unpublished works.

Aristotle overlooks the fact that only the concrete individual personal spirit can participate in the abstract forms *cognitively*, and therefore can absolutely not itself be an abstract form.[46]

The irreducibility of the explanatory principles of reality to the four causes, the specifically personal explanatory principles of being and the person as cause.

We have already seen that a metaphysics of the *aitíai* and of the *archaí* can only be completed through a metaphysics of the person and that a reduction of efficient causes to material and physiological ones reverses the order of causes and is a topsy-turvy theory of causality because it entirely overlooks personal agency as a prime form and explication of causality. But many more questions remain. I now wish to turn to the question of whether the Aristotelian thesis that only the four causes which he distinguished could possibly exist is correct, or whether this thesis does not rather show that the Aristotelian *Metaphysics* – despite the sublime explanation of the unmoved mover in book XII which makes Aristotle a father of the metaphysics of spirit and indeed of personalistic metaphysics – is overly rooted in a naturalistic model of being, and does not do justice to the objective demands of a metaphysics of the spirit and of the person[47]. Moreover, it is in turning to these specifically and exclusively personal forms of causes that we will go farther beyond Aristotle than we have done until now.

A) The intentional subject-object relation as a metaphysical relation irreducible to any of the 'four causes'.

We must first of all take into consideration that relation and that dependence which we find between object and subject in intentional acts. This relation, which is further differentiated into still more specific relations which nevertheless all share the common moment of a subject consciously directing himself to an object, is already insofar fully *sui generis* as it is necessarily *conscious*. Moreover, it is impossible to characterize the object of an intentional act as the form of this act, or to characterize the dependence which an intentional act can have on its object, through which it is to a certain extent "formed", as a case of formal causality. The decisive point lies precisely in that the personal subject reaches out beyond his own act and takes spiritual possession of the object of consciousness. Perhaps it is better not to treat of this fundamental intentional relation in the abstract, but rather to treat of it as it is modified in the concrete forms of dependence between intentional objects and various intentional acts. Such an investigation will better illuminate the fact that also

[46]Far from considering with Aristotle and St. Thomas that being an abstract spirit and being free of any principle of individuation is a condition for the ability to know abstract forms, we must say: were the knowing spirit itself abstract, it could never know the universal. Aristotelianism likewise overlooks the fact that the person can also know unique, individual forms and individual beings as such, something which Scotus both saw and explained with great penetration and which is the condition for concrete conscious human life, human action and in particular human love, gratitude, etc.

[47]With regard to the reduction of all *aitíai* and *cause* to the four distinguished by Aristotle, see his *Metaphysics*, A 3, 983 a 25 ff. See also Reale 1967: 25. See also Schwengler 1960, in particular vol. II: 26.

generally speaking, the dependence between intentional object and intentional act is of a fully unique character, and is neither reducible to material nor to final causality.

B) The irreducible transcendent relation and the metaphysical relationship of dependence between the act of cognition and the object of cognition.

Let us first think of the *cognitive relation*. When a spiritual subject knows that a particular state of affairs in fact obtains, we find necessarily in this cognitive relation a transcendence in virtue of which more than an immanent content of the cognitive act is realized in the subject. Rather, the *knowing* subject really and intentionally reaches beyond himself and grasps reality as that which it is. Even a 3 year old girl who understands the question and request of her grandfather to please tell her daddy to call back on Skype after dinner, understands, and enters into a cognitive relation with, a question and a request that are wholly different entities from her understanding.

It is necessary to stress that in this relation there also lies a real relation of dependence, in which the subject, or his really existing act, really depends on the being that is known. This being, however, is in no way the formal cause or the essence of the act, an act which rather possesses essential characteristics (such as conscious enactment, for instance) which can in no way be predicated of the object known (e.g. the perceived donkey or the intuited principle of non-contradiction), and which can in fact be contradictorily opposed to the essential marks of the known object.

If however the object which is grasped in knowing is not the formal cause or the essence of the act which grasps it, one could be tempted to consider this relation as a case of efficient causality. But this is also in no way satisfactory. On the contrary, if the act of knowledge were merely the effect of the object known, let alone of brain events which would have the role of efficient causes of knowledge, then the specific cognitional relation as such would thereby be dissolved. In fact, if the act of knowledge is merely determined by an object through which it is causally evoked, then knowledge as such is in no way explained. Indeed, if the act of knowledge is causally produced by an object, by a material thing for example, through material processes in the body which then have this act as a result of their efficient causal force, then the subject could never know whether this purely natural causal chain in fact results in a content of consciousness which corresponds or does not correspond to the real nature of things. "Knowing" would then lose its cognitive character and its object would be just an immanent content of consciousness which has an external cause in the material world. Moreover, its content would not be dependent on the nature of the things that are the *object of knowledge* but on blind chemical and physical causes which as such have nothing to do with the nature of the objects known, such as a chain of chemical causes in the body bear no resemblance to the headache they cause. A dependence of "knowledge" on a pure series of physiological or physical natural causes could not explain knowledge at all. Just as a computer hardware and software or archive does not allow the computer the slightest *knowledge* of whether the product of the physical causes that produce its output, corresponds to reality or not, it would be with all human cognition; there would not exist any act of *knowledge* whatsoever. (Besides, the meaning of the computer output does not consist

in the physical signs but in their conceptual meaning which is not produced by physical causes at all). In this way, by a materialist causal theory of brain causation of knowledge – instead of assigning to brain events a decisive but subordinate and merely mediating and serving role for knowledge – knowledge would not be explained, but abolished, and a materialist brain scientist, not only when he seeks to explain free actions but also when he seeks to explain knowledge by mere physical causes, would destroy the entire basis of his own rational scientific knowledge which, instead of knowledge, would be nothing but an accidental product of physical causes.[48]

The authentic cognitive relation and its unique form of dependence on the object of cognition presuppose that the reality cognized discloses itself to the knowing spirit in a manner that is not a mere case of efficient causality, but rather a real-intentional participation in the being itself as it is. This spiritual act is certainly really dependent on its object, but in a specifically transcendent kind of relation and spiritual participation, which precisely constitutes the cognitive relation as such and excludes that cognition can ever be a mere effect of the object known, but rather is a real-intentional participation in, and an intentional being-determined-by, the object.

That this relation cannot be one of efficient causality already follows from the fact that many objects of knowledge are not material entities, are indeed often not at all real beings, but either abstract universal essences or purely ideal images and relations, or even consist merely in a lack or privation of being, as in the case of the knowledge of nothing or of certain kinds of negative states of affairs and evils that are mere privations of being such as total ignorance, which obviously could not be the efficient causes of real acts such as those of knowing.[49] We can add that states of affairs, which are a chief object of knowledge, never are efficient causes because states of affairs do not at all have the character of things or events and their operations.

We find then in the way in which the act of knowledge is determined by its object a wholly unique relation, which includes a clear metaphysical dependency of the act on its object and which therefore must be taken into account, if the metaphysician wishes to investigate all the forms of *aitíai*, but which cannot be classified as any of the four *causes* discovered by Aristotle.

Naturally, it would be senseless to claim that the being known is the material cause or the final cause of the cognitive act.[50]

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[48]See Seifert 1972: 62 ff., 67 ff., 69 ff.

[49]See Millán-Puelles 1990/1996.

[50]Despite any relationships of finality which may obtain between the object and the act of cognition, we cannot conclude that the fundamental nature of the cognitive relation and of the form in which a real being, namely the act of cognition, is dependent on another ideal, real, or any other kind of object, is a relation of finality. It would certainly never seriously enter into anyone's mind to assert for instance that mathematical knowledge is a means to the realization of mathematical laws (something which is excluded already by their eternity and necessity), or to analogously interpret the cognitive relation as a relation of finality.

C) Motivation as a metaphysical ground of explanation sui generis of volitional acts and the fundamental importance of metaphysics of the person for ethics.

Something similar also holds for the relation of motivation. In the sphere of motivation, a real being, namely a free act, is in a certain way called into existence by something else, namely, the motivating object or its value and other forms of importance, but our acts are not caused by these motivating objects alone but as well by the will of the subject. The specific uniqueness of this relation lies in the fact that the object known does not from itself engender the intentional act related to it, as may happen in the case of knowledge, but that the act is engendered both through the motivating object and through the mediation of the free spontaneity and self-determination of the subject, and in fact becomes the cause of the free act only if the subject freely opens himself to the motivating power of the object. Moreover, besides the object, the free person herself remains a decisive cause of the act.

It is one of the reductionist tendencies in ethics and in philosophical anthropology to interpret the relation of motivation in the light of one or the other of the four Aristotelian causes and in terms of one of the forces in a parallelogram of forces. Thus, it is maintained that the motivating object brings the motivated act causally into existence, through mere efficient cerebral or psychological causes. Such determinism neither does justice to the datum of motivation nor to the evident datum of free will. On the other hand, those philosophers who reject determinism cede easily to the opposite temptation to explain the free act purely in terms of an unmotivated arbitrary and senseless "pure spontaneity" of the subject, asserting that the motivating object, or its importance, have no foundational influence on the subject and his act. The latter view recognizes as free only wholly unmotivated, unplanned, arbitrary, senseless and purposeless volitional acts which are also the kinds of acts, besides urges that have nothing to do with free acts, which Libet investigates in his famous "empirical tests of free will."[51] On an incomparably higher intellectual level, also Kant assumes in his ethics, in order to avoid determinism and eudemonism, that the free act must not in any way be motivated by the object.

In reality, however, the motivating object or its motivating importance is certainly a decisive ground that brings about our acts, but those things that motivate our free acts cannot in any way on their own force be the *cause* of a free act. They can perhaps become causes and reasons of our intentional affective experiences by their own power, motivating these emotions of joy or of mourning in a way we cannot resist and that does not stand within our own power. But motivating objects can become causes or reasons for our free acts' existence exclusively through the mediation of the spontaneity of the free subject; even less can the volitional act be explained through pure physiological efficient causes. Thus, the motivating object is in an entirely new sense the cause or reason to act, which does not contradict, but presuppose freedom of the will. On the other hand, the attempt to divorce the causes and reasons of a free act entirely from their motivating object does not explain free

[51]See —— (and Haggard, P.) 2001: 58; and Mele 2009; and Habermas 2004a: 27; Habermas 2004b: 871-890; and Habermas 2005: 155–186.

will but sheer arbitrariness. Only an understanding of the irreducibly new phenomenon of motivation can overcome these two opposite errors which have the same root: a complete misunderstanding of the kind of personal reason and cause a motive is for human actions. The completely new relationship of the motivating object being the reason for a free act is possible only on the level of the person, because the object does not bring the act into existence by its own power alone but only through its being known and additionally through the free acceptance and cooperation of the free spontaneity of the subject with the potentially motivating power of the object in its importance and value, to which the person has to speak an inner free "yes" in order that the motive be allowed to become co-cause of our free act.

D. The particularity of the specifically personal causes

Personal causal relations, at least most of them and the ones we have considered thus far in this paper, presuppose, with absolute necessity, consciousness in its specifically personal rational form. That these personal causal relations are not at all conceivable within the mere material or the physiological world of brain events, while all other four causes can be realized in non-personal nature, already shows that this metaphysical ground of explanation for being or becoming is of a nature sui generis, and that it does not allow its being reduced to the other four causes, let alone to mere physical efficient causality, as Libet attempts.[52]

One could name many other such relations and causes which play a role solely in the sphere of the person.[53]

E. The relation of 'due relation' as another personal causal relation

Let us consider another one of many metaphysical relations and causes. This cause or reason contributes to the coming into existence of real personal acts, but only on the basis of knowledge and freedom. This relation throws light on the ultimate *raison d'être* of being and of the world as such. I mean that relation which von Hildebrand more than any other philosopher has investigated, namely that of "due relation" (*Gebührensbeziehung*).

Every being demands, to the extent to which it is possesses intrinsic value, a due response, a response appropriate to the rank of its value. Every being that is a bearer of intrinsic values deserves to be affirmed for its own sake, it deserves a response of joy because it is objectively something gladsome, it deserves the response of

[52]In the *Phaedo*, precisely in the context of the metaphysics of the person, Plato has clearly pointed to the distinction between efficient causes and conditions, a distinction which is of fundamental importance for the discussion of the body-soul problem, as has been demonstrated in other works. See Plato, *Phaedo*, 99 b. See also Seifert 1973, 1989 b: 143 ff.

[53]Among the other causal relationships which are not reducible to the four causes we find also the specifically personal relation of dependence and foundation which lies in reflection, where the act which is reflected upon and its dependence on its subject and its rational nature are the explanatory grounds for the possibility of reflection. Likewise, that relation belongs to the specifically personal causal relations, in virtue of which the inner structure and logic of acts such as that of promising, brings into existence other beings, such as obligations and rights which proceed from promises. See Reinach 1953; 1989c; see also the English translation and commentary on this book in Reinach 1983: xxxiii-xxxv; 1-142.

reverence or respect which recognizes its own proper worth and dignity, it has as it were a "right to" an act of affirmation in which its objective worthiness that is to be affirmed actually finds a corresponding free affirmation on the part of the subject.

This due relation culminates in that principle which lies at the root of the personalistic ethics of Karol Wojtyła , Tadeusz Styczeń, and other important ethicists of our time for whom the person merits affirmation and love for her own sake, *persona est affirmanda propter seipsam et propter dignitatem suam* (the person is to be affirmed for her own sake and for his or her own dignity).[54]

That the infinite Good demands recognition and affirmation before and above all else, indeed demands an adoring love, the call for which flows out of the nature of the absolute Good, to whom alone the highest love and recognition must be given, excludes any interpretation according to which this adoring love would be a mere arbitrary act of the will or obedience to positive law.

Free persons can affirm and love the good, and through the fulfillment of this relationship can realize a unique kind of goodness, namely that of moral goodness and of love. No non-personal nature can fulfill this relation; no non-personal being can bring into existence real acts that stand in such a due relation to their object. This can be accomplished only by free and conscious subjects. Although the due relation is not itself a conscious relation, it appeals to a conscious rational subject capable of knowing the good and giving it the "right response." No non-personal nature or alleged cerebral efficient cause of volition can give the value response which is due to goods, as Hildebrand would express it.[55]

It is likewise impossible to consider this relation as exclusively one of finality. We must, precisely in order to do justice to the ultimate *telos* of the world,[56] free ourselves from any interpretation of the world as a system or network of relations of means and ends. Neither the relation of an act being due to a good nor an act of love is an instance of a mere relation of final causality. That an act is due to a being does not mean that it serves that reality to which it responds in the sense of being related to it as a means. Rather, the "for the sake of," "for the love of the other" as it is intended in fulfilling the due relation, is a form of relation absolutely different from final causality. In it, the reality of the act, which gives to the object a response which is appropriate and due to it, is taken completely seriously and is not subordinated to the object or other person as if it were a mere means, but in a very different "reverential" way of subordination because a respect, reverence or love are simply due to a person.

The essential distinction between due relation and final causality becomes clear above all in the fact that the good to which the response is to be given in the most profound instances in which this due relation is realized does not at all depend on the response for its realization. Thus, God is neither the goal nor an end to be realized in adoration, and yet adoration still occurs above all for the sake of God himself, since all praise and all adoration is due to Him because of his infinite holiness. It would be fatal to assert that because God requires nothing and because human acts are of no use

[54]See Styczeń 1979.
[55]See Hildebrand 1978: ch. 17 and 18.
[56]See on this Seifert 2007.

to Him, acts of adoration are performed only for the sake of human persons themselves, and not for God's sake. In such a position, final causality is excluded with full justification, but it is overlooked that the far deeper sense of *propter hoc* in the sense of the fulfillment of the claims of due relation demands that adoration be performed above all 'for the love and for the sake of God'. This shows how important it is to avoid every reduction of due relation to final causality and every confusion of the two meanings of *propter hoc*.

We touch here upon still another form of causality which classical metaphysics and ethics generally overlooked and misinterpreted, namely, the relation of superabundance or of superabundant finality. This relation is found in the relation between moral goodness and happiness, or between happiness and love.

Similar to due relation, this relation is not itself a conscious personal relation, but is nevertheless realized primarily, though not exclusively, but in an essentially different way, in the sphere of conscious personal being. Traditional metaphysics and ethics view also the relation between love and moral virtues to happiness in the light of a relation of pure finality, considering love or the moral life of the human person as a means to the end of happiness.[57] In reality however, the deepest moral life of the person and the deepest love arise for the sake of the beloved being or for the sake of the beloved person, and is in no way a means to one's own happiness, which Aristotle considers as the highest good. Happiness may never be considered the end of moral acts in such a way that the moral life and the love of the person *become* merely a means to the fulfillment of one's own subject, as Maritain holds – despite his deep analyses of the character of Antigone and critique of eudaemonism.[58]

Whatever superabundantly springs out of love, namely happiness, arises only then when love and the beloved are taken seriously and affirmed for their own sakes. Only if we love another person for her own sake, and if our love is in no way a means to the end of making ourselves happy, can we truly become happy. The misapprehension of this relation of *superabundance* lies at the root of numerous anthropological and ethical errors such as hedonism and Aristotelian eudemonism, a danger overshadowing also a great part of medieval philosophy.[59] Here once again the elementary importance of an adequate metaphysics of different causes becomes evident. It is not only indispensable for an appropriate understanding of causality but also decisive for philosophy of the person, philosophical anthropology, ethics, and of course for any adequate religion and theology.

In view of this short discussion of specifically and uniquely personal types of causes we recognize the unfortunate reduction of the extent of causes which Aristotle gave rise to by his rash judgment that his indeed fundamental distinction between the four causes is a complete one and can sufficiently account for what occurs in the primary kind of being, the being of the greatest dignity: the person. Not only was it a fatal mistake not to recognize the incomprehensibility and inexplicability of the four

[57]See Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, passim.
[58]See Maritain 1962, ch. 9.
[59]For its critique see also Scheler 1966. See also Hildebrand 2009, ch. 10. See also Seifert 1976b.

causes without doing justice to the unique role persons play in and for each of them. Not only was it one of the most serious errors to absolutize the role of material causality for the constitution of individual beings or to deny the unique individuality of immaterial beings like souls or persons, and to overlook the far superior mode and ground of the spiritual individual being of persons. But it was an equally great mistake that has many tragic consequences for ethics and philosophical anthropology not to recognize those reasons and causes which explain human knowledge and action, the movements of the human mind and heart, and which can in no way be regarded as subspecies of the four causes. Thus we have to go beyond Aristotle and to rethink the immense complexity of causes in the light of a philosophy of the person.

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SCIENTIFIC HOLISM: CHINA MEETS WEST

Zhaolu Lu*

Abstract: This paper begins with an attempt to dissolve the issue of whether traditional China had science. It clarifies the issue as a philosophical problem about whether Chinese culture embraces a natural philosophy—a rational and abstract conceptual system that offers a higher order of understanding and explanation of Nature than do empirical sciences. It dissolves the issue by articulating Chinese natural philosophy characterized as scientific holism consisting of law-like Dao, paraconsistent properties of Yin and Yang, and interdisciplinary domains of Heaven, Earth and humans and by arguing that Chinese Science, the scientific spirit that is culturally distinctly Chinese, and Western Science, the scientific spirit that is culturally distinctly Western, will merge at the point of scientific holism, despite of their historical differences and contraries.

SOME YEARS ago, one of my colleagues, who was the dean of School of Natural Sciences, asked me if I could offer science-majored students a "Chinese Science" course. That struck me as a fascinating proposal. Though the course did not work out, the proposal inspired me to undertake a research project concerning the following questions. Is there such a thing as Chinese Science? Can any science be legitimately described as distinctly Chinese? How can a science be culture-specific? These questions converge on a problem that I am here attempting to dissolve.

I. The Problem of Chinese Science

IS THERE a meaningful way to speak of Chinese Science? This question was raised at the time when Needham started out on his monumental work, *Science and Civilization in China*. His sinological friends "doubted whether Chinese culture had ever had any science, technology, or medicine significant for the world" (Needham 1981, 3-4). Of course, this is not a novel doubt. Early in the twentieth century Dr. Youlan Feng, a distinguished Chinese philosophy of the 20th century, even presumed that China did not have science (Fung, 1922, 237). The cloud of suspicion dispersed, however, when Needham demonstrated that "before the river of Chinese Science flowed … into the sea of modern science, China had seen remarkable achievements in many directions" (1981, 9). The influence of Chinese achievements in science and technology, especially the four great inventions, on the world history is so profound that, according to Francis Bacon, no religious movement, political operation, or military maneuver is comparable to it (1620, vol. 4, 114). Sivin, in his earlier thought, once argues that humanity has evolved *more than one* tradition of science. To think of science this way is not to think of "science as a world phenomenon with many

*Dr. ZHAOLU LU, Professor of Philosophy, Tiffin University, Tiffin, Ohio 44883, USA. Email: luz@tiffin.edu.

local variants"; it is, rather, to think about science as a local and cultural phenomenon that contributes to the formation of the river of world science (1973, xi).[1]

However, it has been argued that science and technology in China, which once occupied an advanced position in the world for a long period of time, failed to culminate in such a scientific revolution as the European one in the modern time. Toby Huff, for example, indicates that in such fields as astronomy, physics, optics and mathematics, which form the core of modern science, "the Chinese legged behind not only the West but also the Arabs from about the eleventh century" (Huff 1993, 239). Huff further indicates that unlike Arabic-Islamic science, which paved the path leading to the scientific revolution in Europe, Chinese Science was not even on the path. According to Huff, then, there is something internal to Chinese Science that explains its "great inertia," that is, that the superiority of China to the West in ancient and medieval times "was wholly of a practical and technological nature, not one of *theoretical understanding*" of nature (1993, 238, italics added). Following Nathan Sivin (1982), Huff claims that this simply technological and not scientific advantage indicates that in ancient China "there was no overall, *coherent natural philosophy* such as one finds among the Greeks, Arabs, or medieval Europeans" (1993, 244, italics added). Once again Chinese Science is clouded with doubts.

Is there such a thing as Chinese Science? This is not an empirical question. It is not to be answered by simply pointing out, for example, that Chinese medicine is a paradigm of Chinese Science. The problem that Huff, following Sivin (1982), poses is that China "had sciences but no science, no *single conception … for the overarching sum of them all*" (Huff 1993, 533; italics added). Sivin explains this problem as follows: "There is no obvious order in which to survey the Chinese sciences. There were no fixed relations between them. Thinkers before, during and for centuries after Han did not agree on, or even argue about, what those relations should be" (2002, 226-227). So, the problem about Chinese Science is not going to be solved no matter how many sciences one finds in Chinese tradition. Indeed, if we look for sciences in Chinese history from the point of view of modern science, in particular, if we look for those theories, methods, discoveries, and inventions that directly played a role in the emergence and development of modern science, we won't find many if any. The Sivin-Huff requirement for a cultural tradition to embrace science is that it must have fostered "*abstract systems of thought and explanation* that give higher order to our thinking about the natural realm" (Huff 1993, 238, italics added) or a "*single structure of rational knowledge* that incorporated all the sciences" (Sivin 1995a, 169, italics added). Over one and a half century, the intellectual history has moved forward in some interesting manners. It took Chinese intellectuals about half a century to discover that China did not have sciences. It is generally believed that one of the two most significant outcomes of the May 4th Movement of 1919 was that so-called Mr. Science was invited to China. It took about half a century for this new belief to take root and flourish. The basic system of modern sciences in China was established between 1920s and 1950s. And then, it took another half century for intellectuals,

[1]Note that this earlier idea of Sivin's does not deny that a science can be international or trans-cultural. Modern natural science, for example, is the common property of all mankind.

domestic and overseas, to rediscover that China actually had sciences and that what she actually lacked was science—an approach to Nature. But is this belief really true?

II. Chinese Approach to "Nature"

The reasoning behind the Sivin-Huff position runs as follows:

(1) If there is Chinese Science, then it must be a theoretical framework that fosters a general approach to nature and that framework must be distinctively Chinese.
(2) Traditional China did not have such an approach to Nature.
(3) Therefore, there has not been Chinese Science.

Needham does not agree with premise (2) and hence he does not agree with the conclusion. His monumental work is precisely motivated by the convictions that Chinese civilization fostered a sophisticated philosophy of Nature giving rise to theoretical understanding of nature and that "Chinese civilization had been much effective than the European in finding out about Nature and using natural knowledge for the benefit of mankind for fourteen centuries or so before the scientific revolution" (1981, 3). However, Sivin and Huff have a point and their position is fascinating. It entails that Chinese Science is possible if Chinese approach to nature is possible. This is exactly where Needham starts his investigation into scientific culture of traditional China. Needham's observation is that though "modern science had arisen only in European culture and not in Chinese or Indian … Chinese civilization had been much effective than the European in finding out about Nature and using natural knowledge for the benefit of mankind for fourteen centuries or so before the scientific revolution" (1981, 3). Thus, Needham argues that the existence of Chinese Science is a concrete fact and not merely an abstract possibility, and it is evidenced by Chinese approach to nature.

The claim about Chinese approach to nature is a claim about the general framework as the common basis of discourse and activities among Chinese sciences. This is not to deny that there existed diverse approaches to nature in Chinese culture. Derk Bodde (1991) identifies seven of them. They are the antagonistic/indifferent approach, the exploitative/utilitarian approach, the theistic/anthropocentric approach, the naturalistic/analytical approach, the animistic/moralistic approach, the semi-receptive approach, and the wholly receptive approach. But none of these approaches served as the general framework for common discourse and activities in Chinese sciences; and in fact, none exerted significant influence on Chinese sciences. What is missing on Bodde's list is a *scientific holism*. According to Dusek (1999), Chinese tradition is one of the three traditions that foster a spirit of scientific holism.[2] Scientific holism "is radically different from the mainstream mechanistic image of science" (Dusek, 1999, 1). It seems to me that this scientific holism is at heart of Chinese scientific spirit. It is this scientific holism that provides a general framework for Chinese sciences. It is in this scientific holism that one sees the legitimacy of Chinese Science.

[2]The other two are Western Renaissance occultist and German Romantic.

In what follows I shall offer an outline of the scientific holism that, I think, characterizes Chinese Science. Before I proceed, I would like to make some important notes on how I would approach to the outline. First of all, I assume, as Sivin used to believe, that humanity has evolved more than one tradition of science. Hence, my outline of Chinese Science characterized as a scientific holism will not start off a particular concept of science or a set of criteria for sciences. The concept of Chinese Science would not have made much issue had a trans-history, cross-culture definition of science existed. Second, the problem with which this paper is meant to deal is whether Chinese culture embraces a rational and abstract conceptual system that offers a higher order of understanding and explanation of Nature than do empirical sciences. For this purpose I will look into Chinese scientific *spirit* rather than disciplinary sciences so as to recapture the critical dynamics that characterize the holistic framework of Chinese Science. Hence, examining disciplinary sciences to determine which of them qualify as Chinese Science is not relevant here. Chinese Science—the scientific spirit that is distinctly Chinese—may exist without any disciplinary science that instantiates it. Third, I take it to be the task of this paper to put forth a novel perspective for viewing and understanding Chinese Science. Hence, I shall concentrate my zeal on general characteristics of Chinese scientific holism and will not go in great details. In fact, the components of the outline that I will offer are all familiar to us; but their structure, relationships and significances have been interpreted differently in different contexts. The perspective I am suggesting is that Chinese natural philosophy may be characterized as a scientific holism consisting of law-like Dao, paraconsistent properties of Yin and Yang, and interdisciplinary domains of Heaven, Earth and humans. Finally, my interest is not merely in reinterpretation of the past. Scientific holism, as opposed to scientific reductionism that has dominated modern science for over three hundred years, has become increasingly popular since the middle of 20th century. Though it is still premature, its scientific spirit, namely, the holisticity (paraconsistence, nonlinearity, synergiticity, interdisciplinarity, intersystematicity, and parallelism) holds great promise for next scientific revolution. I wish to show, again in an outline form, that Chinese Science, which missed the modern train, has the ticket to the next one. This claim about the future of Chinese Science is not as radical as Needham's claim that the Chinese anticipate the second scientific revolution or that the Chinese attempted to leap from a primitive approach to nature to a postmodern science without going through modern scientific revolution (Ronan, 1978, vol. 1, 165-166).

III. One Nomological Relation: Dao

The first component of Chinese Science as a scientific holism is the Dao or the "Great Way" as it is usually understood in the English-speaking world. If there is anything central to Chinese scientific thinking, then it is the pursuit of the one Dao. For Chinese Science, to do science is to pursue the Dao.[3] Insofar as the goal of science is

[3]Beginning with Song Dynasty pursuit of Dao became a pursuit of Li. I shall explain this in later part of this paper.

concerned, Chinese Science isn't essentially different from western science for which to do science is to discover (or to describe) laws of nature or to formulate lawful explanations. Such a pursuit is the perennial problem and the persistent effort of Chinese scientific thinking. Needham understands this characteristic of Chinese Science as being grounded on "the assumption of a permanent, uniform, abstract order and laws by means of which the regular changes in the world could be explained" (1993, 40). That is to say, Needham takes Chinese pursuit of the Dao to be comparable to a pursuit of law of nature. Bodde, however, takes exception, arguing that there is no clear sense of "laws of nature" evidenced in Chinese classics (1991, 332-344). I appreciate Needham's insight; and I am also sympathetic with Bodde's position. Bodde is right in saying that the notions of "the mandate of heaven," "the Supreme Oneness," "the ultimate Rule," "the Regularity" and "the Constancy" found in Chinese classics are not sufficient to capture the essential idea of laws of nature. What Bodde observes is the distinctiveness of Chinese pursuit of the Dao. I wish to reconcile Needham and Bodde by arguing that Chinese pursuit of the Dao is both distinct from and comparable to western pursuit of laws of nature. Interestingly, it will turn out that the distinctiveness substantiates the comparability.

In pursuing Dao in the context of scientific activities,[4] Chinese Science went in quite different a direction than western pursuit of laws of nature; and running in that direction Chinese Science eventually reached the point that while still indulged in a dark meal she was amazed to see that western science was enjoying a candle-lit dinner on the modern train passing by. Needham describes the dark meal in quite positive a way: in contrast to merely mechanistic and analytical view of nature, Chinese Science is an *organic* view (1981, 14). The organic feature is essential to all versions of scientific holism; and in the context of pursuing the Dao, it exhibits in three interrelated modes of thinking: generationism—thinking of Dao as the single generator of myriad things, connectionism—thinking of Dao as the central radiator of universally connecting, and unificationism—thinking of Dao as the ultimate force of cosmic unifying. These modes of thinking are already evident in Chinese classics as early as in *Do De Jing* (e.g., chapters 25, 39, 40, and 62) and they can be construed as follows.

In contrast to ancient Greek science that focuses on the search for ultimate constituents of the cosmic structure, ancient Chinese Science focuses on the search for the ultimate source of cosmic generation. Hence it is a cosmic generating theory and not a cosmoplastic element theory. *Generationism* is concerned about growth and production. As growth and production always refer one to network of relations, the thinking in the mode of generationism leads to the mode of *connectionism*, the view that it is the relatedness that determines the attributes of individual things and not the other way around. As Needham frequently argues, Chinese Science envisions a universal, dynamic connectedness such that every phenomenon is generated through connecting with every other. "On the Greek worldview, if a particle of matter occupied a particular place … it was because another particle has pushed it there";

[4]Here I confine my discussion to scientific context and exclude the discourse on the Dao as moral laws.

whereas on the Chinese view "the particle's behavior was governed by the fact that it was taking its place in a 'field of force'" (Ronan, 1978, vol.1, 165-166). Since it is through Dao that myriad things are generated and connected, Dao unifies, and continues to unify, every system in the universe including the universe itself; and this leads to *unificationism*. Needham argues forcefully and with textual evidence that this organic philosophy of nature, consisting of generationism, connectionism and unificationism, "was universal among Chinese thinkers" and it "helped the development of Chinese scientific thinking" (1981, 14). One exception is Moism, the only one among all schools of thought in the pre-Qin period that adopted analytical, reductionistic, and experimental approaches. Moism failed to become the main stream of Chinese Science just as Heraclitus of Ephesus, a holistic scientist, failed to become the main stream of western science. It is not difficult to see that what Chinese Science pursues in the name of pursuing the Dao is akin to universal and necessary truths that operate regularly and that explains, predict and justify relevant events in the world, the latter being considered as an essential feature of laws of nature in modern science.

While both search for universal modality that affords justificatory, explanatory and predicative power, western science concentrates her zeal on quantitative dimension of laws of nature, Chinese Science seems satisfied with qualitative dimension of the Dao. Thus, much of the development of western science consist in the discovery of necessary relationship among magnitudes (e.g., the law of gravitation); but much of the energy of Chinese scientific spirit is spent on the investigation into relationships between Dao and Li and between Li and Qi. Here is how Chinese thinking roughly goes. Dao is instantiated by multiple Li's. "Myriad things are made by and subject to different Li's and the totality of these different Li's exhaust the Dao" (*Hanfeizi*, "Jie Lao"). These different Li's are, roughly, the causal mechanisms metaphorically imagined as the "reasons" and "grammars" of worldly "words" (objects, events, and states of affairs). Zhuxi put the same point in more dynamic term. These multiple Li's are principles according to which heaven, earth and myriad things are generated (*Zhuzi Yulei*, Vol. 95). From what are myriad things generated in accordance with their Li's? The answer is: From Qi. "What [physically rather than metaphysically] exists under the heaven is nothing but Qi" (*Zhuangzi*, "Zhi Bei You") and "myriad things spontaneously emerge in the meeting of the Qi from the heaven and the Qi from the earth" (Wang Chong's *Lunheng*, "ziran"). Thus, Li's are in turn embodied in the movement of Qi (of multiple kinds). Needham remarks that the pursuit of physical Li through experimenting on Qi is very much wave-oriented rather than particle-oriented (Needham, 1981, 11). This is because there are different scientific images involved in western science and in Chinese Science. Qi is a fine, continuous, and dynamic flow that fills, penetrates, and pervades through the universe and that can be pictorially imagined as air or imaginarily visualized as vapor. It has the characteristics of matter, force and energy all together conceptualized in western science. It is the idea of Qi rather than that of matter that permeates in the Chinese physical thoughts. Discovering Li through experimenting on Qi characterizes Chinese Science in practice.

Chinese Li-Qi relation is parallel to the Greek form-matter relation, though they are not identical and cannot be reduced to one another. There is some degree of dualistic and analytical flavor in the Li-Qi conception. Li is universal, multiply realizable, and indivisible in a relevant domain, whereas Qi is particular, unique, and divisible in the domain defined by the relevant Li. However, the Li-Qi conception is an integral part of the generationism of Dao. It is more plausible to think of Li as something very close to that of nomological mechanism and Qi to that which combines the notions of wave, field, energy, and particle. Though discovering Li through experimenting on Qi sounds familiar to and even translatable into western science, one may argue that the notion of the Dao is still too vague and fuzzy to be scientific. What is Li, the so-called instantiations of the Dao? It looks nothing like F = ma or $E = mc^2$, each being an instantiation of Law of Nature. The reason why Li's do not look like instantiations of laws of nature is simple; they are not quantified.

Still, notion of Dao is, in an important and significant way, comparable to the notion of laws of nature. The comparability may be approached by dissolving a long-standing puzzle about the Dao. It has been a puzzle how the Dao produces myriad things and gets them all connected and unified. To this question there has not been a philosophical answer that would make sense in scientific context. Indeed, the notion of Dao can be as mystical as Newton's notion of the First Mover. However, mysticism is not the only cause of this puzzle. The following notion associated with popular understanding of the Dao has also made significant contribution to it: The Dao is a relationship between objects or events. On this notion the myriad things are holding direct relation to the Dao; their coming into being, enduring changes, and ceasing to be are all due to the manipulation of the Dao. It is hard to demystify the Dao if we think of it as an extensional relationship between objects or events. For, then, the Dao simply does not explain why each thing becomes what it is and why each event happens as what it is.

Now, the puzzle about the Dao may be a puzzle about laws of nature as well. Like the Dao, a law of nature is a universal and necessary truth. However, if we think of it as an extensional relationship holding between objects or between events, then it invites a similar puzzle as does the notion of Dao. It is puzzling how a universal generalization with a strong modality would explain a particular instance if it were an extensional relationship between objects or events. It may serve to categorize an instance that falls in its domain; but it does not explain why the instance is what it is. Just how would the fact that all hearts circulate blood together with the fact this thing is a heart explain why this thing circulates blood? No, they wouldn't! It is the relationship between the property of heart and the property of circulating blood that explains. A law of nature as a universal truth is essentially a necessary relationship between properties; and in the case of these properties are quantified, it is a necessary relationship between magnitudes—e.g., mass, force, energy, acceleration, etc. F = ma or $E = mc^2$ are good examples, where F, m, a, E, c are magnitudes or quantified properties. Because the property F-ness necessarily relates to the property G-ness, this thing must be G if it is F. The notion of necessary relationship between properties has

the explanatory power, whereas the notion of extensional relationship between objects doesn't.[5]

Likewise, much of the mystical appearance of the Dao would come off if in the context of science it is understood as universal truth whose essential feature is necessary relationship between properties (rather than between objects or between events). Thus, our understanding of the relationship between myriad things and the Dao becomes scientifically more transparent, that is, myriad things are subject to the Dao by virtue of possessing the properties the Dao subsumes. The analysis of the Dao in comparison with laws of nature is applicable to Li's as Li's are instantiations of the Dao. In modern science whatever object or event or change that instantiates properties subsumed by a law of nature is subject to that law; likewise in Chinese Science whatever object or event or change that instantiates properties subsumed by a Li is subject to that Li. This common pattern builds a sort of bridge between Chinese and western sciences and we are thereby compelled to admit that the Dao in the context of Chinese Science is law-like or nomological of some sort.

What are the properties that the Dao subsumes? Between what properties is Li a necessary relationship holding? The answer is: They are Yin and Yang. The Dao in Chinese Science is a nomological relationship between these two fundamental properties of Qi. Myriad things are subject to the Dao by virtue of possessing the Yin-Yang properties, and each is subject to a different Li by virtue of possessing a particular instantiations (a special pairs) of Yin and Yang.[6] Are Yin and Yang properties? Is the Dao in the context of Chinese science a relationship between Yin and Yang? Can laws of nature and the Dao be translatable into one another? Next section, which outlines the second component of Chinese scientific holism, will answer these questions.

IV. Two Paraconsistent Properties: *Yin* and *Yang*

E Jing (*I-Ching* or the *Book of Changes*—a classic source of Chinese Science) provides the conceptual framework for Chinese Science (Needham, v.2, 334-335) and plays a pivotal role in Chinese technological innovation (Graham, 1989, 368-370). The Yin-Yang conception is the key concept in the *E Jing* and it is the second component of Chinese scientific holism.

In all instantiations of Chinese Science, *Yi*n and *Yang* appear as the common properties that Qi possesses, and hence they are the common properties that myriad

[5]For detailed discussion on this topic, especially on laws of nature as intensional relationship between properties or magnitudes, see Dretske 1977.

[6]These two properties are sometime understood as two states of Qi (Ho 1985, 11). I am not sure about this interpretation. But this state-based notion is consistent with the property-based notion I just described. Just as we wouldn't have a radically different understanding of F=ma if the relata involved in the law (*F*, *m* and *a*) are construed as different states rather than properties, so wouldn't we run into a radically different understanding of the Dao as law-like if Yin and Yang are construed as different states rather than properties. Next section offers more discussions on Yin and Yang as properties.

things possess. In other words, each of myriad things embraces both *Yin* property and *Yang* property (*Dao De Jing*, 42). Why should we understand *Yin* and *Yang* as *properties* rather than objects or events? First of all, it had been the maneuver of Chinese Science over a long history to generalize and synthesize physical (and mental) properties in *Yin* and *Yang* terms. Such a maneuver commenced as early as with the time of *E Zhuan*, wherein it says "a female, a *Yin* thing and a male, a *Yang* thing." It was developed by the Huang-Lao School during the period of Qin and Han dynasties and popularized by the Xuan School (roughly, dark learning) during the period of Wei and Jin dynasties. Collecting and examining all the concepts that have been incorporated in the *Yin-Yang* conception at both metaphysical and physical (including psychological) levels, one will find that *Yin* and *Yang* invariably refer to properties—e.g., being existent/nonexistent, being covert/overt, being strong/weak, etc., just to list a few, and they are conceived as the fundamental properties of Qi.[7]

Moreover, understanding *Yin* and *Yang* as properties makes significant difference in our understanding of Chinese Science as a pursuit of the Dao. It is evidenced in Chinese classics that the Dao and each of its instantiation (*Li*) is characterized as some relationship between *Yin* and *Yang* properties. The connection between Dao and *Yin-Yang* appears as early as in the *E Zhuan*; the most popular quote is: "Once Yin, once Yin; and that is the Dao", meaning that Dao is both *Yin* and *Yang*, and it is now *Yin*, now *Yang*. The Huang-Lao School, especially the *Huai Nan Zi* (a famous classic) is responsible for the initial interpretation of Dao in terms of the interaction and transformation between Yin and Yang. "The Dao, claimed as a rule, begins with one; but one does not give birth to things and hence it divides into *Yin* and *Yang*. The harmonization of *Yin* and *Yang* give birth to myriad things" (*Tian Wen Xun* or *the Teachings of the Heaven*). This is the conceptual foundation on which the author of this classic work formulates explanations for physical, chemical, biological, social, and mental phenomena as well as regularities of those phenomena. Although these explanations are not consistent in treating the *Yin-Yang* as the most abstract concept and sometime *Yin-Yang* is only listed as one of the pairs of properties that the Dao subsumes (*Dao Ying Xun* or *the Teachings of Dao Response*), that the Dao is a relationship between properties is clear.

I have argued that if we think of the Dao as nomological relationship between properties rather than objects, then we can think of the Dao in such scientific terms that particular bodies are subject to the Dao by virtue of instantiating the *Yin-Yang* properties under a certain description. This argument suggests a way of making Chinese and western sciences comparable. However, it does not advocate the view that Chinese science and western science can be translated one into another. The translatability problem is not that Chinese Science fails to grasp the idea of laws of nature. The problem is rather caused by its internal logic to be explained as follows.

What we observe in Chinese scientific thinking is that self-deployment and mutual transmutation of *Yin-Yang* is imaginarily visualized as wave-like behavior as

[7]I don't mean that Chinese Science *reduce* all properties to the Yin-Yang. Unlike western sciences, the philosophical foundation of Chinese Sciences isn't an analytical reductionism. It is rather a *reason holism*, which I will explain shortly.

it is described in the *Tai Ji* Diagram where *Yin* and *Yang* appear to be opposite properties that also exist in one another. Here "opposite" refers to either contraries or contradictories, depending on what instantiates *Yin-Yang*. Thus, in the holistic rationality of scientific thinking, for example, *Qi* is either *Yin* or *Yang* and each is both; it is, as the metaphor "*Qi*" suggests, neither substantial nor void but both; it is both a body and a wave but neither, and so on. These dialectic theses afford only a holistic interpretation, which follows paraconsistent logic. Both modern science and Chinese Science have faith in reason; but the former has faith in consistent reason and the latter in paraconsistent reason. Perception of opposites can be found in all cultures (Dusek, 1999, 48); however, the western tend to emphasize on the opposition of the opposites whereas the Chinese on the unity of them. In view of this fact, an attempt to translate Chinese Science, for example, the science in the *E Jing* into the consistent logic may be an interesting logic exercise but will not capture its scientific spirit. This is because *Yin* and *Yang* are paraconsistent properties and they are only consistent in the cases of their being instantiated as contraries). Thus, unlike laws of nature in modern science, which subsume consistent properties, the Dao subsumes paraconsistent properties. Hence, it is difficult to translate the concept of Dao into that of Laws of Nature. The latter would look awkward in the consistent logic if it had included the nomological relation that *Yin*-ness universally necessitates *Yang*-ness and vice versa such that if something were *Yin* then it would be *Yang* and vice versa.[8]

It is worth noting that as paraconsistent properties *Yin* and *Yang* are not like color and shape, which can be static possessions of objects and events. Rather *Yin* and *Yang* are dynamic properties, ranging over opposite *activities* and opposite *processes*. Dao as a nomological relationship between paraconsistent Yin and Yang dictates a dynamic approach to Nature. As I indicated earlier, ancient Chinese Science focuses on the search for the ultimate source of cosmic generation. It is therefore not entangled by the problem of infinite divisibility and propositional derivability; rather it is puzzled by conceivability of generating existence from nonexistence. Dao is understood as both a paraconsistent source of existence and nonexistence and a dynamic source such that mutual transformation of *Yin* and *Yang*, once embodied in Qi, manifests in five distinct and yet inter-locked modes of motion known as Wuxing—i.e., water, fire, wood, metal and earth. The doctrine of Wuxing was once construed as a theory of elements out of which the world is made of; however, scholars of Chinese studies have later realized that the reductionist interpretation or any interpretation that views *Wuxing* as physically distinct substances misses the primary concern or an emphasis of the theory used in scientific and philosophical studies in Chinese tradition (Schwartz, 1996, 81-97). Fashionable interpretations are now diverse, ranging from five agents (Fung) to five processes or five phases of a process (Sivin, 1987, 73, 75), etc. The fact is that in all Chinese sciences what

[8]I am not arguing that the reason holism, together with its paraconsistent logic, only exists in Chinese culture. Though it has existed in western cultures since ancient Greek as Lloyd demonstrates (1996, chapter 6), it failed to catch the modern train of science just as did Chinese Science. However, in contemporary world, paraconsistent logic is as odd and popular as non-linear sciences.

Wuxing refers to are five dynamic properties rather than elements, instantiating the paraconsistent *Yin* and *Yang*. In the doctrine of Wuxing "water," "fire," "wood," "metal," and "earth" are metaphors for dynamic properties or modes of motion. These properties or modes are mechanical descending (water), mechanical ascending (fire), physical reshaping (wood), chemical modifying (metal), and biological growing (earth).

Yin-Yang is the conceptual apparatus by means of which Chinese Science aggregates properties, physical and mental; and the Wuxing is the conceptual apparatus by means of which Chinese sciences aggregates modes of motion, change, and event, whether they are physical or mental. Thus, they constitute a conceptual schema and a common vocabulary of Chinese sciences and technological studies. However, the entire conception consisting of Dao, *Yin-Yang*, *Li-Qi*, and *Wuxing* is so vague and fuzzy that a methodological transformation of the conception becomes extremely difficult. It is even difficult for the philosophers who accept the holistic conception. The methodological guideline recommended by Daoism is *Xunlan*, i.e., roughly, transcendent observation from Dao's point of view, which requires merging of the object and the subject. No matter what the transcendent observation means, pursuing Dao from Dao's point of view is as paraconsistent as the concept of Dao itself.

The methodological guideline recommended by Chinese Buddhism is Liaowu, i.e., roughly, understanding in transcendent intuition, which requires understanding of the object with reference to understanding of the subject—i.e., understanding the object's answer to the way of the subject inquiry. Transcendently intuitive understanding may go in two forms: (1) *Jiewu*, i.e., roughly, understanding through dissolving puzzles (and hence recognizing truth) in transcendent intuition during meditation, and (2) *Zhengwu*, i.e., roughly, transcendently intuitive understanding through embodied cognition of truth (during physical practice). Both *Xunlan* and *Liaowu* blur the distinction between internal (subjective) world and external (objective world) and both exclude empirical observation and experiment on the one hand and rational calculation on the other. Thus, they are both as vague and fuzzy as the conception of which they are the methodological transformations. To put this point in a positive way, the spirit of Chinese Science indulges itself too much in thought experiment.

The methodological guideline recommended by Confucianism is *Gezhi*, shorthand for *Gewu Zhizhi*. It roughly means exhaustively inquiring into (*Li* of) things to pursue the highest knowledge. This, though relatively articulate, is open to various interpretations and hence it has historically undergone enormous evolution. The problem lies in the method of *Gewu*. It may be either cognitive or perceptual, either rational or empirical, either theoretical or experimental, either analytic or synthetic. *Gezhi* was a methodology of the thought-experiment kind at the time when it was advanced in the 11th century, using initially as an epistemological method for self-cultivation. It was then gradually extended to include intellectual inquiry into physical existences of various kinds and transformed into various methods including empirical ones. *Gezhi* began to incorporate more and more natural studies in Yuan Dynasty. Zhu Zhenheng (1282-1358), for example, titled his celebrate medical book Gezhi

Yulun and insisted that medicine be part of Gezhi. Ming dynasty (1368-1644) was perhaps the best time Chinese Science should have caught. A part of gezhi was known as *ziran zhi xue* (natural studies) and knowledge of natural studies was tested in civil examinations. A good portion of *Gezhi Congshu* (Collection of Gezhi Works) published in Ming Dynasty devoted to scientific and Technological works. The Gezhi of Fang Yizhi (1611-71) style was even more radical; his work *Wuli Xiaoshi* was exclusively a study of physical world. When history reached late Qing dynasty *Gezhi* already officially embraced such disciplinary studies as geography, mathematics, survey and mapping, mechanics, acoustics, optics, electricity, and chemistry.

Virtually, "Learning of *Gezhi*" had occupied the conceptual place of science before the concept of the science was introduced (via Japan) into China in early 20th century. Even long after the introduction of the western concept of science, Chinese sciences continued to be understood as studies of *Li* (of some *Gezhi* sort). In other words, the emergence of Gezhi Learning, especially in its later evolution, makes a significant methodological turn. It indicates, though suggestively, a way to transcend the transcendent intuition that occupies the spirit of Chinese Science for over a thousand years. Unfortunately, traditional political and ideological systems together with Manchu invasion make the process of methodological evolution painfully slow. Had the methodological turn completed at due time, that is, had it so evolved as to include analytical, rational, and experimental approaches at both theoretical and practical levels at due time, which was certainly possible if it was let go naturally, Chinese Science could have culminated in modern science.

Another source of the translatability problem is that in pursuing the Dao Chinese science has emphasized on the qualitative dimension of the Dao at the cost of losing the sight of the quantitative dimension. Li's, the instantiation of the Dao, are elaborated but not quantified. The same problem occurs in the study of *Yin-Yang*, the supposed properties that the Dao subsumes.[9] Needham makes it very clear that the quantitative contemplation of Dao in Chinese Science is invariably algebraic rather than geometric. Of course, from the viewpoint of modern mathematics, which integrated algebra and geometry through Descartes' work, Chinese mathematical thought was handicapped, but so was ancient Greek. While geometry remains an essential element of mathematics, an algebraic system has infinite capacity of multi-dimensional representation of shapes. The quantitative contemplation of Chinese Science tends to remain in a continuous and infinite mode. The specific mathematical issues about quantitative study in Chinese Science need not concern us here. As the qualitative dimension of Dao is emphasized, and in fact overemphasized, in Chinese Science, it is plausible to claim that the problem with Chinese Science is that it fails to produce quantitative sciences (Schwartz, 1985, 328). However, this problem helps Chinese Science maintain her holistic position on another aspect of Chinese approach to nature, which in turn generates a different issue.

[9]There are some interesting studies on the quantitative dimension of Yin-Yang properties. Hetu (The River Diagram) and Luoshu (Writing from the Luo River) present them in a decimal system; and the *Book of Changes* presents them in a binary system. Scholars have found a conversion between the two.

V. Three Interdisciplinary Domains: Heavens, Humans, and Earth

The third component of Chinese scientific holism is a triad of three domains of scientific inquiry: Heavens, humans, and earth. Sivin (1973, 1980, 1995a) once proposed the following list of disciplines that might be called Chinese sciences: medicine, alchemy, astrology, geomancy, physical studies, mathematics, mathematic harmonics, and mathematical astronomy. These disciplines can be described as Chinese Science because they are circumscribed by and confined to the general conception described above, namely, the conception consisting of the monadic Dao and the dyadic properties of *Yin-Yang*. Without this conception, they would lose their cultural identity. However, once these disciplines are put in the context of the scientific holism, they should be more appropriately understood as endeavors and activities of following three kinds of science: heaven science, human science, and earth science. These three sciences are essentially *interdisciplinary* domains. What I am suggesting is that whether we accept the holistic interpretation of Chinese Science changes our view of its history. From a disciplinary point of view, the history of Chinese Science exhibits many disciplinary studies, which may or may not be scientific in their own right; however, from the viewpoint of scientific holism, Chinese Science throughout its history has cultivated interdisciplinarity, which is an essential characteristics of scientific holism and which is one of the three main features of today's intellectual movement (the other two being interculturality defining cross-cultural and transcultural studies and internationality defining globalization). One may argues that interdisciplinary study without disciplinary studies is impossible! Yes, but then we have yet another explanation why Chinese Science failed to culminate in modern science.

Ever since Needham it has become a popular view in the studies of Chinese Science that Daoist thought is the root of science and technology in China. Indeed, the permanent theme of Chinese Science is to pursue Dao; but, Dao is not a private property of Daoism (Graham, 1989, Hansen 1992). Majority of scientists during the Song, Ming, and Qing dynasties associated themselves with Confucianism. Confucianism is very much responsible for developing a natural humanism, as opposed to the anthropocentric humanism, that Chinese Science fosters in its holistic spirit. An important feature of Chinese worldview is that it treats the world or nature as, metaphorically, a family rather than an individual. It is an image of heaven-man-earth. It places man between heaven and earth, and only in that sense it places man in the center of universe. However, it envisions heaven and earth as a home for man and not as rivals of man. Here the ancient familial model comes into play, which bestows Chinese Science with a familial attitude—i.e., treating nature (heaven and earth) as the home. Heaven science and earth science are developed to deal with nature as our home, that is to say, they are developed to cooperate with nature rather than compete and conquer it, to establish relationships with nature rather than exploit it, to value nature rather than merely use it, and to come home to build a family rather than merely tap resources. Tu Wei-ming (1993a, 1993b) describes this worldview as an "anthropocosmic vision." I would describe it as a natural humanism. A natural-

humanistic approach to nature culminates in a humanistic science for which today's world is hoping. Here is another point at which the holistic interpretation of Chinese Science changes our view of its history. A science with humanistic characters does not make much analytical sense; however, it makes perfect holistic sense in addition to the human sense it makes. A scientific spirit doesn't have to be analytical in character just as a philosophy doesn't have to be Socratic in style and logic doesn't have to be Aristotelian.

Under the influence of the natural humanism, the three interdisciplinary domains of scientific studies flourished with the tendency to concentrating on human science. Confucianism and Legalism, for example, make obvious contributions to social studies. Even the Daoist's contributions to medicine, chemistry and biology, and the Moist's contributions to logic, mechanics and optics are more human studies. Thus, the history of Chinese Science exhibits a "life-oriented feature" (cf. Wang, 2001, 56). As this life-oriented feature is materialized, we see the three most mature technologies are ceramic, textile, and architecture; the four great inventions are paper, gun power, compass, and printing; and the four most developed disciplines are agriculture, medicine, astronomy, and mathematics. This historical phenomenon leads scholars to characterize Chinese Science as empirical, practical and technological and deny that there are "abstract systems of thought and explanation that give higher order to our thinking about the natural realm" in Chinese Science (Huff, 1993, 238). This is a salient example of failure to understand Chinese scientific holism. The failure causes one to observe only "*ge wu cheng qi*" (experimenting with things to make a device) but not "*ji jin yu dao*" (extending technology for an understanding of Dao) that I explored above. Insofar as technological transformation of sciences is concerned, life-oriented science is not unique to Chinese Science. Wasn't ancient western science a life-oriented science in the same sense? Wasn't modern science a life-oriented science in the same sense? Isn't contemporary science a Life-oriented science in the same sense? Technological and practical culmination of freely pursuing truth and knowledge is always dictated by the orientation of human Life. It is a normal historical pattern of science that "abstract systems of thought and explanation that give higher order to our thinking about the natural realm" develops through and parallel to the flourishing of life-oriented disciplines. Ming-Qing scientist Fang Yizhi's distinction between the learning of "*zhi ce*" (quality measure—i.e., empirical sciences) and that of "*tong ji*" (universalization—i.e., theoretical sciences) is an example of the self-awareness and theoretical expression of the historical pattern in the spirit of Chinese Science (cf. Zheng 2001). However, the natural humanism in its historical context did have negative effect on the realization of Chinese Science. The overemphasized value orientation and its prioritization on inappropriate level suppressed and limited the spirit of freely pursuing truth and knowledge. The historical phenomenon that Moism could not manage to continue in the main stream of Chinese intellectual movement and was pushed to the peripheral is a good example. But Moism didn't die as people usually assume (Bai, 1996). It continued at the level of scientific and technological activities.

Conclusion

I have painted a simple picture of Chinese Science—i.e., as our philosophers of science wish, a simple picture of Chinese theoretical understanding of, or approach to, nature. It is a simple picture with a triadic structure: the monad of nomological Dao manifested in multiple Li's embodied in various forms of qi, the duet of Yin and Yang properties manifested in the five basic modes of motion, and the triad of the interdisciplinary and natural-humanistic dimensions of heaven science, human science and earth science. The simplicity of the picture is like the simplicity of Chinese painting. It affords a simple view of the cultural specificity and the holistic model of Chinese Science. Yet it suggests rather complex a worldview, a view consisting of connectionism, unificationism, reason holism, interdisciplinarity, and natural humanism. It enables us to understand why "Chinese Science got along without dichotomies between mind and body, objective and subjective, even wave and particle" (Huff, 1993, 537-538) and I add, between value and fact, even between materiality and spirituality. Was it because this scientific holism that Chinese Science missed the modern train? Does this scientific holism suggest a different scientific revolution?

"Chinese Science is perhaps the major alternative to Western science" (Dusek 1996, 73), but it should not insist on its cultural identity. If it does, it will miss next train of scientific revolution. However, when Chinese Science finally got on the modern train and obtain analyticity (in the early twentieth century), it should not abandon its holisticity (as much as it did up to today) because that is its admission ticket to next train. In today's scientific world, traditional property-dualism is being replaced by holism through interdisciplinary, intercultural and international movements, which blur more and more traditional dichotomies in the intellectual mind. We are in the process of aggregating properties that we used to think irreducibly distinct. Analyticity and holisticity will eventually merge. 250 years ago Denis Diderot, commenting on the future course of natural science, wrote: "Just as in mathematics, all the properties of a curve turn out upon examination to be all the same property, but seen from different aspects, so in nature, when experimental science is more advanced, we shall come to see that all phenomena, whether of weight, elasticity, attraction, magnetism or electricity, are all merely aspects of a single state (Diderot, 1754, XLV, 68). That was the time of modern scientific revolution when Diderot wrote this. It has been argued that western culture does not lack a tradition of scientific holism (e.g., Dusek, 1999). So, Chinese Science isn't Chinese, and it will be recognized as Chinese Science when it is no longer Chinese.

Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for their informative, thought-provoking comments and suggestions, which were instrumental in the development of my thoughts in the final version of this article.

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SECULARISATION, MAN AND THE ECOLOGICAL CRISIS

S. G. Nigal*

Abstract: For centuries, man has been trying to understand himself and the universe in which he lives and by which he is sustained. While striving for food and shelter, dependent on the Nature surrounding him, the human race has constantly been engaged in a struggle for existence and has been forced to adjust to the inherent natural laws of Nature. But man, being rational and inquisitive, has been making attempts to understand this system of natural governance in order to control it. To put it more candidly, man has been trying to conquer Nature. It is this exploitative attitude towards the environment that is directly and indirectly creating ecological disasters. If man has the capacity to make changes in Nature, which he has amply demonstrated through scientific and technical progress, then he must accept liability for his varied acts and their harmful consequences to the environment. In this way, man has a responsibility towards Nature. Man has completely forgotten the factual truth that Nature is indispensable, he himself is in Nature, and that he cannot exist without Nature. Thus, one can argue that the way out lies not only in preventative measures but also corrective measures, focusing on developing a reverential outlook towards Nature. This paper is mainly concerned with modern Western thought, its secularization of man which subsequently has had detrimental impacts on the environment, and how only a divine reverential outlook towards Nature can stop the ecological crisis we face.

FOR CENTURIES, man has been trying to understand himself and the universe in which he lives and by which he is sustained. In order to gratify his biological needs such as hunger and thirst, man has always had to depend upon Nature and in turn has been forced to adjust himself to Nature in his struggle for existence. But man, being rational and inquisitive, has been making attempts to understand the natural world and the laws governing the natural phenomena in order to control them. To put it more candidly, man has been trying to conquer Nature. Aided by science and technology, this desire to conquer outer Nature was immensely whetted and Nature in turn began to suffer. As natural resources became scarce and the environment started rapidly degrading, man too began to suffer. Thus one can see the factual truth that Nature is indispensable for the existence of life on earth, that man himself is in Nature, and that even today he cannot exist without Nature.

*Dr. S. G. NIGAL, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Academy of Vallabha Vedanta and Research Center, University of Mumbai, Mumbai – 400098, India. Email: vikasbrahmbhatt@gmail.com.

I. Ecology and Conceptual Environment

Today we are constantly bombarded with talk of the environment's deterioration and ecological problems such as global warming, deforestation, and animal extinction. Hence, we come across slogans and phrases such as "Save Planet Earth"; "Be Clean, Go Green"; "Plant a Tree, Save a Life." These words of warning and wisdom suggest that man reflects upon his own achievements and failures. Having reviewed what he has done to the environment and biosphere, experts have aptly coined the phrase "ecological rape" to describe the human attack on Nature.

This paper is mainly concerned with modern Western thought, its secularization of man which subsequently has had detrimental impacts on the environment, and how only a divine reverential outlook towards Nature can stop the ecological crisis we face. Ecology is the scientific study of the close bond between organisms and the natural environment. Thus we have human ecology which deals with the interrelationship between man and the environment. Presently, there is immense concern about the effects of human activities on the atmosphere. The most glaring fact to be noted in this connection is the horrible incidence of pollution of air, water and other natural resources, all of which has led to the phenomenon called global warming. Therefore, it is rightly warned that the continued pollution of earth, air, and water, if unchecked, will eventually destroy the fitness of this planet to support life in general and human life in particular.

Man lives in two environments: the external physical environment, which includes a natural atmosphere and living things such as plants and animals, and the conceptual environment, which consists of man's view of the universe and his attitude towards it. One may, for instance, have a purely commercial and exploitative orientation towards Nature, while another may have a reverential outlook towards it. It is these thoughts that motivate man to do certain activities which ultimately affect both the environment and himself. Hence, an analysis of these attitudes is crucial to the study of ecology and to find out the solution of our ecological problems.

Man is not a passive being subject only to the principles of physics, chemistry and Darwinian natural selection. He has been resisting environmental pressures since the dawn of humanity. As a creator, he has been making tremendous progress in scientific knowledge and technological proficiency. With this, man has not remained a helpless victim of the original environment. Ironically, he has instead become a victim of his own scientific achievements and innovations which harness that environment. The human conquest of Nature appears to be moving in the direction of the degradation of man as man. We may experience the elimination of the very existence of human beings from this planet if he fails to pay heed to the ecological problems. This is not to voice a pessimistic note of a prophet of doom, but man will have to think over these issues sincerely and seriously. It will not be enough to ponder over such problems merely from the standpoint of utilitarianism. Man will have to take a philosophical perspective of his ecological niche in the universe and look within to understand why exactly things have become the way they currently are.

II. A Brief Story of Western Thought

Modern science and technology were mainly developed by the West. It was Francis Bacon, a great British popularizer of science, who once rightly said, "Knowledge is power." This meaningful statement became a motto for those who aspired to conquer Nature. However, Bacon also gave a significant warning which was gradually and conveniently forgotten. He had admonished, "Nature can be conquered only by obeying her" (Bennett and R.J. Chorley, 1978, 14). It is the disregard of this significant ecological warning that has today placed the very fate of human survival on this tiny planet in jeopardy.

The conceptual environment, or the ethos, of Western society has always been dominated by Judeo-Christian ethics, which is anthropocentric. In the story of Genesis, the Bible advises us to fill the earth and subdue it; to have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living thing that moves upon the earth (McKibben, 1990, 69). This theological model is a teleological one. According to this scheme, Nature is ordered by the transcendent God's design. Furthermore, it is believed that man is superior to Nature. God created all things for man's sake and therefore, man should have dominion over Nature. The Earth is in the centre of the Universe and man is in the centre of the whole creation. Descartes, a 16th century French philosopher and the father of modern European philosophy averred: "Nature is a great machine to be manipulated by man to suit his own ends." According to him, animals have no soul, no minds, and therefore no feelings. Thus, man is free to do anything necessary for his own good. Such self-centered thinking was similarly preached during the second half of the 19th century by evolutionists like T. H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer who put forth the doctrine of war between man and Nature.

III. Man and Environment

As a result of the above mentioned thoughts, the relation between man and Nature has come to be conceived of in terms of hostility and even enmity. Nature exists as the enemy of man and therefore it must be conquered by any means. Today, we see the results of this as wild animals are driven to extinction and forests are recklessly destroyed. There is a virtual competition among multi-national companies to exploit natural resources. The only goal is amassing and reinvesting material wealth. Everybody is mainly concerned with raising the standard of living but no one bothers about the standard of life. It is this exploitative attitude towards the environment that is enormously creating ecological disasters. If man has the capacity to make changes in Nature, which he has amply demonstrated through scientific and technical progress, then he must accept responsibility for his varied acts and their harmful consequences on the environment. In this way, man has a responsibility towards Nature, to its flora and fauna, and also to the future generations of mankind. Hence the questions are rightly asked: are we not bringing about a major ecological catastrophe? Are we not heading towards mass suicide? Are we not defrauding the

future human generations? Any well-informed and responsible person will answer these problems in the affirmative. Yes, we are responsible for the ecological imbalance and it is in our hands to restore environmental balance. We can take two measures in this regard: one corrective and the other preventive. Take for instance the pollution of the river Ganges in India. Either we can make efforts to clean up the pollution that we have added into the Ganges, or we can strive to stop the dirtying of the river water itself.

The problem does not end here though. By thinking more deeply, we come to realize that what lies at the root of the ecological problem is the human attitude towards Nature. Is Nature a matter of material utility only? If the answer is yes, then we cannot stop the mindless exploitation or rape of Nature unless we take a long-term view of diminishing utility. Regardless of one's standpoint, man will have to take a more serious look at his relation with Nature and reconsider it. One thing is doubtlessly certain—man exists in the natural world and he has no option but to live together with Nature. Interdisciplinary and multidisciplinary approaches to this issue reveal the intimate relationship between mankind and the environment. How then can we condemn Nature as the enemy of man?

The horrible truth underlying this problematic attitude is that man himself is being "thingified" or commoditized in modern society. This is the result of the secularization of both man and Nature. According to one view, the secularization of man is the de-spiritualization of man. It is a process of making man worldly by separating man from his religious connection or influence. Thus, secularization of man means making and treating man as no more than a this-worldly animal. Such a man treats Nature as nothing more than the material for a life of pleasures. This attitude then degenerates into an exploitative attitude towards others and more so towards Nature.

It is true that the policy of environmental control once was, and even today in many cases is, adopted—and rightly so—as the means of self-preservation. But the times have changed considerably. This limited view will not suffice. Man must take stock of what he has done to the external Nature and thereby to humanity at large. We are not Leibnizean monads, each living in its enclosed existence apart from all others and Nature. The basic fact about the things and events in the universe is that they are interrelated. J. Krishnamurti's famous quote, "To be is to be related," seems to be the law of existence. In this connection, Rene Debos, a microbiologist, writes, "The fundamental law of ecology, it is often said, is that everything is relevant to everything else" (Debos, 1976, 18). Percy Bysshe Shelley poetically expresses this truth, "Nothing in the world is single; by the law Divine, all things mingle." Thus, we have to accept the fact not only of interconnectedness, but also of interdependence.

The greatness of man is that only he can understand this fact of universal interrelatedness as well as the relevance of each to all. So the attitude of mindlessly manipulating and exploiting Nature is dangerous and even suicidal. This truth has been very convincingly demonstrated by the findings of biologists, ecologists and other scientists.

So the real question then is: What should be our attitude towards external Nature and also towards the future generations of human beings? Egoistic hedonism has no

answer to this major problem. On the contrary, the doctrine of selfish axiological materialism (one who stresses only secular values) is creating havoc in modern society. This situation is producing widespread cynicism. Oscar Wilde once defined a cynic as a man who knows the price of everything and the value of nothing. This crassly materialistic and commercial cynical attitude must be replaced by a more responsible, humane and even spiritualistic orientation towards oneself, others and the whole of Nature. Anthropocentrism and the consequent arrogance of man must be replaced by an attitude of humility, gratitude and reverence in regards to Nature. The phrase "man's dominion over nature" should give way to "man's stewardship of the environment."

Man is great because he has the capacity to understand his responsibility towards Nature and become its guardian. Humans therefore ought to have a self-imposed obligation to respect animals, plants and Nature. Man will certainly have to use natural resources, but he has no right to misuse or spoil Nature, far less to destroy it. "Our mother is useful but she has a plus value which cannot and should not be measured in terms of material utility," rightly pleads Shri Pandurang Shastriji Athawale, an Indian philosopher, social activist, and spiritual leader. Our mother, he explains, ought to be respected even though she ceases to be useful in her old age. She serves her children but this does not mean she should be treated as a mere useful housemaid. Of course, even a servant must be treated as a respectable human being. In India, even a cow is respected as a mother. Throughout the world, sane voices in different societies have always used the language of "Mother Nature" or "Mother Earth." There are hymns on this theme in the holy *Vedas* of the Hindus and other ancient texts of the world. It is heartening to note that once again scholars in modern times are upholding this reverential concept of the Mother Earth. Debos very aptly defends this perspective and writes, "Above and beyond the economic and ecological reasons for the conservation, there are aesthetic and moral ones which are even more compelling. The statement that the Earth is our mother is more than a sentimental platitude " (Debos, 1976, 118).

All these considerations demonstrate an urgent need to save the planet and to maintain the variety in Nature and the harmony between it and man. Morally developed human beings should gratefully recognize the debt they owe to society, to Nature or to the "cosmic intelligence" (God) which is immanent in the universe and also transcends it. It is only man who can appreciate and respond to the beauty and sublimity in natural phenomena such as in landscapes, sunrises, and sunsets. Only man praises a rose for its scent and beauty and extols certain birds for the harmonious quality of their songs. Man has an aesthetic need which the beauty of the Earth satisfies. It is true that man creates a second world within the world of Nature, but still he needs Nature for his survival and his growth as a human being. Thus, human creativity should be so promoted that the beauty in the environment is not damaged. We should not harm the environmental health and thereby the well-being and happiness of the humanity at large.

IV. The Way Out

There can be no two opinions about the truth that there should be a cordial and harmonious relationship between humans and the environment. This harmony can be maintained only if we take a reverential attitude towards both life and Nature. Such an attitude must be rooted in a philosophical standpoint like that of Shankara's *Advait Vedānta* or that of *Ishavasyamidamsarvam*[1]; that is, the Divine Reality that resides in me is the Reality that dwells in Nature. In the language of the *Gita* and devotionalism, the Reality underlying both man and Nature is God, who may be called by any name. This sort of philosophy engenders love for both God and the Universe, while maintaining man's sense of responsibility for his actions. We are free to maintain or mar the harmony between man and Nature. The above mentioned type of outlook or attitude is found in the way of thinking and way of living of true saints like Saint Francis of Assisi, Saint Tukaram and a host of others. For such souls the universe is friendly. Moreover, the world is to be understood as a series of opportunities to be utilized for the comprehensive development of human beings. There is a note of optimism in this outlook, for every difficulty is a sort of opportunity. This view is not against the value of utility. But utility is only one of several values such as beauty, love, gratitude, justice, and truth. Thus, this type of reverential attitude forces man to take a holistic approach to the world, both human and non-human, living and non-living. This attitude will also lead to a more fulfilling life. Understood in this sense, Nature is not an alien and hostile entity that needs to be defeated and conquered.

Furthermore, man must also look within to enable himself to understand and control the greed and lust that exist within. It is this greed, or what is correctly dubbed as "greedy capitalism," that generates the possessive and exploitative attitude in man towards others and Nature. Self-understanding and self-control therefore are essential to stop the dehumanization or brutalization of man. The individual man, society as a whole, and all of the non-human existence in this universe are to be conceived of not as concentric circles but as constituting a spiral system in which anything in the world is continuous with the totality of things and beings in the cosmos. In this view, the destroyer of the ecological balance can be compared to the man who cuts on the wrong side of a branch of the tree on which he sits; it is a self-defeating activity. Thus, the wholesale felling of trees for utterly selfish purposes is both ecologically and practically wrong. The same can be said about the hunting of birds and wild animals for sheer enjoyment. Regardless of whether the earth requires our existence or not, we need the earth with all its beauty and wealth for our own existence and for our own growth as physical, emotional, and spiritual beings. Man is neither the maker nor the master of this planet. Yet it is his responsibility to respect and protect this rich and beautiful earth. Even Julian Huxley, an evolutionist thinker and biologist, is not prepared to leave the course of future development of the human species to the natural cosmic process of biological evolution. Instead, he rightly opts for rational selection in regard to man's future survival. Man's evolution, he remarks, is not biological but

[1]*Ishavasyam Upanishad* – Verse 1. (The whole universe is pervaded by the Divine Being or the whole universe is the abode of the Supreme Divine Being)

psychological; it operates by the mechanism of cultural tradition which involves cumulative self-reproduction and self-variation of mental activities and their products. Accordingly, major steps in the human phase of evolution are achieved by breakthroughs in the dominant patterns of mental organization of knowledge, ideas, and beliefs—ideological instead of biological or physiological organization. Further, he writes: "Man's destiny is to be the sole agent for the future evolution of the planet" (Huxley, 1962, 118). This view establishes human responsibility towards Nature in general.

Sometimes it is said that the earth is a super-organism. Thus it is argued that the phenomenon of pollution is not a serious threat to life in general and human life in particular on this globe. The living earth, like all individual organisms, will always react in such a way as to restore the environment to its original state and ensure its own survival. This view is based upon James Lovelock's controversial Gaia hypothesis about the earth as he discusses in his 1988 book, *The Ages of Gaia*. Gaia refers to the Greek goddess of Earth. This supposition is very much similar to Greek hylozoism. It implies that man need not worry about the damage he has done to the environment. Moreover, it suggests that to say "we have damaged nature" makes no sense for everything that we do is natural. But this I think is going too far. Our historical experience of the atomic bombs in Japan, the Chernobyl nuclear plant explosion in Soviet Russia, the Bhopal tragedy in India and countless other incidences of the pollution of planetary resources all go counter to the above mentioned thesis. These events clearly illustrate instead how our reckless exploitations have violated the natural equilibrium and done irreversible damage to the environment. Ironically, it was Lovelock himself who later on became the first scientist to measure the persistence of chemicals in the air and had to accept the conceivable hazard that these pollutants posed. In this way, he ultimately ended up refuting his own hypothesis.

Therefore, there is no other way out of this crisis but to develop and adopt a philosophy of life and of the universe, which generates and promotes a reverential attitude towards man and Nature. While practical options, such as planting more trees and banning certain chemicals, can certainly be utilized to aid the present situation, the permanent solution lies only within a complete transformation of mankind's outlook. It should neither be this-worldly nor other-worldly; it should be holistic and integral. Religion can play a very significant role in this regard provided, as Dr. R. Sundar Rajan has suggested, religion has remained merely a hermeneutics of soul but should become the hermeneutics of man. In this connection, Dr. R. Sundar Rajan writes: "A fundamental transformation of our social consciousness of the natural world will come about only when the principle for reverence and responsibility for non-human life becomes a moral regulative" (Bhatt, 1985, 180). He also mentions the fact that some Christian theologians are trying to revive the philosophical thoughts of Jacob Boehme (1575-1624), a German uneducated mystic, and F.W.J. Schelling (1725-1854), a German idealist. These thinkers advocate a philosophy of Nature which comes very close to the spiritual non-dualism, or *Advait Vedānta*, of The Upanishads in general and Shankara in particular. For instance, Boehme has said: "In all the processes of Nature, God is concealed; only in the spirit of Man is He recognized … God is not sundered from Nature but is related to it as the soul to the

body" (Hoffding, 1855, 71). Schelling also writes, "Nature is visible spirit and spirit invisible Nature." At one place he remarks, "Nature herself is a great poem" (Thilly, 1955, 467). What Boehme and Schelling want to support is that Nature is not merely the dead material substance. It is alive and it is intricately woven together by a common thread with every other living entity in this universe, including human life. Religion must stress the multi-dimensional Nature of man and preach the doctrine of integral-ism in regard to empirical, social, moral and spiritual values. Surprisingly, such a doctrine is supported by both *Vedanta* and *Sānkhya* philosophies in India. Nature (*Prakriti*), according to *Sānkhya*, strives for both material enjoyment (*Bhogārtha*) and spiritual liberation (*Mokshārtha*) of the individual soul. Moreover, *Vedānta* asserts that the Universe is the manifestation of the Divine and is rooted in It. So there is harmony between man and Nature. Such an attitude is called Bhakti (Loving Devotion to the Supreme Being who supports, pervades, and permeates the whole of the cosmos). Such pure love will not allow a devotee to sit idle when mankind is facing an ecological crisis.

In conclusion, it can be said that man is a moral entity, for only human actions are capable of being characterized as moral or immoral, rational or irrational. So it is his responsibility to preserve the Earth's fitness for his continued existence. In this connection, it has generally been accepted by modern thinkers like Bruce Allsopp and biologists like Julian Huxley that man has become a major force in the ecology of the Earth. He can be either creative or destructive; and therefore has moral duty of trusteeship for Nature. The exercise of this trusteeship depends upon his recovering the sense of respect which has become depraved in utilitarian industrial societies. Simply put, the ball is in mankind's court; it is up to us to decide what we will do. It is heartening to note that many institutions, organizations, and even eminent individuals are engaged in the creation of ecological awareness in the minds of the people and their leaders. There is an explosion of knowledge but what is scarce is wisdom and although knowledge comes, it is wisdom that lingers. Global warming is a serious and real phenomenon. If it is not dealt with immediately, man may be left to face his own extinction. While thinking globally is good, acting locally is better. Let us hope that man becomes wiser by experience, acts like a responsible trustee and steward of the environment, saves this planet from man-made calamities and thereby preserves life on this lovely planet. Let us also hope that man realizes the Divine Truth that God helps those who help themselves.

Acknowledgement: In the process of having my article accepted by the Journal of East-West Thought, I had many people who played an influential role in providing me with constructive criticism that allowed me to deliver the final product. Of those people I would like to both acknowledge and thank the three anonymous reviewers of the Journal of East-West Thought for their recommendations as it allowed me to, in turn, better my article.

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WITTGENSTEIN, DEWEY AND CONFUCIANISM ON AESTHETIC ETHICS OR ETHICAL AESTHETICS

Yuedi Liu*

Abstract: As a practitioner of "Constructive-Engagement Methodological Strategy" in comparative philosophy, I will place the Anglo-American analytic tradition, Pragmatism and Chinese Confucianism within the same philosophical framework so as to work out the distinct styles underlying their "common concerns". My hope is that this undertaking can lead to a constructive exchange between these influential philosophical traditions: between Wittgenstein's "Ethics and Aesthetics are One" and Confucianism's "Perfectly Good and Perfectly Beautiful", between Dewey's aesthetics on the emotional in "an experience" and the Confucian's the unity of daily rituals and ordinary emotions constitutes. Based on the discussion above, it can be argued that Wittgenstein, Dewey and Chinese early Confucianism all move towards a living aesthetic ethics or ethical aesthetics, or in other words, all of them are in essence an ethical-aesthetic art of living, which is quite close to my proposal of "Living Aesthetics". It is exactly in the framework of living aesthetics that we try to work on a sort of aesthetic ethics or ethical aesthetics that returns us to the life-world.

IT HAS BEEN noted that comparative study of Chinese and Western philosophy has gone beyond traditional parallelism towards a Constructive-Engagement Methodological Strategy（Mou, 2001, 337-364）. The fundamental agenda of this new movement is "to inquire into how, via reflective criticism and self-criticism, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions, insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources from different philosophical traditions and/or from various styles/orientations of doing philosophy (including those from the complex array of distinct styles/orientations of doing philosophy within the same tradition), can learn from each other and jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise and/or a series of common concerns and issues of philosophical significance. In this way, the issues and concerns under its reflective examination are eventually general and cross-tradition ones instead of idiosyncratically holding for Chinese philosophy alone" (Mou, 2008). As a practitioner of this approach, I will place the Anglo-American analytic tradition, Pragmaticism and Chinese Confucianism within the same philosophical frame so as to work out the distinct styles underlying their "common concerns". My hope is that this undertaking can lead to a constructive exchange between these influential philosophical traditions.

*Dr. YUEDI LIU, Associate Professor, Institute of Philosophy, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. Specialties: Comparative philosophy, Chinese philosophy and aesthetics. E-mail: liuyuediliuyuedi@yahoo.com.cn.

I. Wittgenstein and Confucianism

It is commonly known that Wittgenstein noticed the identity of ethics and aesthetics in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (Wittgenstein, 1955, 183). But as early as July 24th, 1916, he already had a famous statement in his notebook: "Ethics and aesthetics are one" (Wittgenstein, 1961, 77). With very few exceptions, in dealing with the relationship between ethics and aesthetics, western scholars resort to Wittgenstein's writings, in particular, his later works on action and intention. However, a reconsideration of Wittgenstein from a comparative philosophical approach may lead to new discoveries.

I.1 "Ethics and Aesthetics are One" and "Perfectly Good and Perfectly Beautiful"

In *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (§4.003), Wittgenstein touched on beauty and goodness. He wrote, "Most propositions and questions that have been written about philosophical matters are not false but senseless. We cannot, therefore, answer questions of this kind at all, but only state their senselessness. Most questions and propositions of philosophers result from the fact that we do not understand the logic of our language. (They are of the same kind as the question whether the Good is more or less identical than the Beautiful)" (Wittgenstein, 1955, 63). This paragraph reveals the theme of the book: instead of being a totality of things, the "world" is made up of "*Sachverhalt*" (i.e. "atomic fact", or "state of affairs", which seems to be a more popular rendering). For Wittgenstein, a proposition is nothing other than a picture of atomic facts, which is essentially "a model of reality"(Ibid., 39). In this sense, language is the "pictures of facts" that we make to ourselves. Thus, the task of philosophy is to conduct a logical analysis of propositions. As propositions correspond to facts, all that is beyond the limits of language is senseless.

In the ending part of *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (§6.421), Wittgenstein made another famous statement concerning ethics and aesthetics: "It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one)" (Ibid., 183).[1] Since aesthetics and ethics are one (and the same), it certainly follows that aesthetics is also transcendental. The idea that ethics is transcendental can be traced back to as early as July 30, 1916, when Wittgenstein, in his notebook, put down the sentence: "Die Ethik ist transcendent" (Wittgenstein, 1961, 79). It is noteworthy that Wittgenstein was discussing a "happy life" at that time (Ibid., 78). He pointed out that the mark of a happy life can be described, but it cannot possibly be given a physical mark, but only a metaphysical one or a transcendental one (Ibid., 78). Obviously, how so aesthetics was originally related to ethics in the context of "life".

On July 24, 1916, Wittgenstein explained in his notebook why ethics is transcendental. The reason he gave is that "Ethics does not treat of the world. Ethics must be the condition of this world, like logic" (Ibid., 77). But in the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (§ 6. 41), Wittgenstein simply mentioned "that life is the

[1]A more recent translation of this sentence is: "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. Ethics is transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same.)" This translation seems more appropriate in that it puts the stress on "words". (Wittgenstein 1961, 86)

world" without further development (Wittgenstein, 1961, 73; 1955, 183). Here, what is crucial is his conclusion: "Hence also there can be no ethical propositions. Propositions cannot express anything higher" (Wittgenstein, 1955, 183). Wittgenstein first asserted that "all propositions are of equal value." He continued, "The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it is and happens as it does happen. In it there is no value -- and if there were, it would be of no value. If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. For all happening and being-so is accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would again be accidental. It must lie outside the world" (Ibid., 183).

Wittgenstein distinguished between the "speakable" world and the "unspeakable" world. The former is the world of facts related to language, propositions and logic, and is what philosophers aim to analyze, while the latter is the mysterious world of which we must be silent, to which aesthetics and ethics belong. For Wittgenstein, thought does not go beyond language, so the distinction between what can be thought and what cannot be thought is simply the distinction between what is speakable and what unspeakable. To speak of the world is to reveal the world in words; whereas, the world depends upon words being meaningful. Therefore, it follows that ethics and aesthetics are "transcendental" in that they go beyond the limits of the world.

Likewise, primal Confucianism also distinguished between the "speakable" and the "unspeakable", as is illustrated by what Confucius said, "If you understand it, say you understand it. If you do not understand it, say you do not understand it. This is wisdom" (*The Analects*, 2. 17). On the one hand, Confucius was indeed "silent" about something. For he "would not discourse on mystery, force, rebellion, and deity" (*The Analects*, 7. 20). In explaining why, Zhu Xi, a celebrated Neo-Confucian scholar, stated it was because "the Master discoursed on the constant rather than the mysterious, virtue rather than force, good government rather than rebellion, the affairs of man rather than those of the unknown." (*Si Shu Jijie* [Collected Commentaries on the Four Books]) Evidences for such explanation can be found in a dialogue between Confucius and one of his pupils, Zi-gong:

> The Master said: "I wish to speak no more."
> Zi-gong said: "Sir, if you do not speak, what shall we, your pupils, abide by?'"
> The master said: "What does Heaven say? Yet the four seasons revolve and a hundred things grow. What does Heaven say?" (*The Analects*, 7. 19)

So, it seems safe to say that Confucius was far more concerned with constancy, virtue, good government and human affairs. Yet this does not mean that Confucius denied the existence of the mysterious, force, rebellion and the divine. Instead, he said, "When offering sacrifices to the gods, he felt as if the gods were present" (*The Analects*, 3. 12). And, when Confucius asked what Heaven says, he was just suggesting that the Way of Heaven is unspeakable, and that it is all that one can do to feel awe in silence. So Confucius was silent. However, although Confucius himself was silent about transcendental things, he seemed to believe that "if one finds a way for what one wants to say, then the unspoken meaning is established (Wang Fu-zhi,

the "Inner Chapter" of *Thoughts and Questions of Chuan Shan*). That is to say, one can grasp the unspeakable by finding a way to say what one wants to say.

In contrast to Confucius, when discussing the "unspeakable", Wittgenstein had in mind the basic relationship between language and world. We still remember that he said: "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (Wittgenstein, 1961, 88; 1955, 149). Of course, Wittgenstein did not deny the existence of "another world". This may be due to the influences he came under. As someone said, "one must mention the following as having played their varying roles in stimulating Wittgenstein's mind: the writing of Schopenhauer; and as mediated through the latter, the essential 'message' of Kant's philosophy as well as that of Buddhism; the novels of Dostoyevsky; Tolstoy's writing and preachment in behalf of the Gospels; some of the writing of Søren Kierkegaard, the Danish theologian and a founder of modern existentialism; and William James's *Varieties of Religious Experience*" (Munitz, 1981, 191). However, Confucius' vision of the world was obviously different, for it was "one that had to be felt, experienced, practiced and lived. He was interested in how to make one's way in life, not in discovering the 'truth'"(Ames and Rosemont, 1988, 5). This accounts for Confucius' suspension of the judgment of the "mystery and force."

In the post-Kantian tradition, the distinction between morality and aesthetics still works. While morality is believed to involve practical purposes and activities, aesthetics is purposeless and purely disinterested. In this way, ethics and aesthetics are completely separated. It is clear that Wittgenstein's view of ethics and aesthetics as one and the same has broken away from the post-Kantian tradition, and thus, is enlightening. At least on the surface, it is similar to Confucian doctrine's view that beauty and goodness are identical, notwithstanding Wittgenstein has his footing in the mysterious, unspeakable world, while Confucius in the everyday world.

For Confucius, although beauty and goodness are distinct, they need to be united to restore the lost tradition of "rituals and music assisting each other". So he advocated that which is at the same time "perfectly good and perfectly beautiful". In the *Analects*, Confucius said of *Shao*, a piece of dance music in praise of the ancient sage king *Shun*, as "perfectly beautiful! And perfectly good!", and said of *Wu*, a piece of dance music in praise of King *Wu* of *Zhou*, as "perfectly beautiful! But not perfectly good!" (*The Analects*, 3. 25) Based on his doctrine of *Ren* (humanity), Confucius considered *Shao* to be perfectly beautiful and perfectly good because it represented the ancient Chinese sage king *Yao* yielding his throne to *Shun* voluntarily due to his greater worth and sagacity. In contrast, the dance music of *Wu* is perfectly beautiful but not perfectly good because King Wu obtained his throne through warfare. Obviously, there is a moral concern here. It is such a moral awareness that enabled the earliest Confucianism to demarcate beauty and goodness, far more clearly than any predecessors did. For Confucius, he was living in an age that witnessed the "collapse of rituals and corruption of music." In other words, the tradition of "rituals and music assisting each other", first found by Duke of *Zhou*, had degenerated. Music was no longer limited by moral codes and was reduced to a sort of sumptuous, purely aesthetic form for princes. Likewise, rituals became empty ideas that failed to enlighten. In response to such a historical dilemma, Confucius wanted to return to the

abandoned tradition where rituals and music were harmoniously united. On this basis, Confucius further put forth the idea of uniting goodness and beauty. Therefore, it is justifiable to say that, what is fundamental to the unity of beauty and goodness is the very idea that rituals distinguish that which is different, and music unites that which is the same.

I.2 "The Beautiful is what Makes us Happy" in Contrast with "Ramble Among the Arts" and "Perfect Yourself with Music"

Although Wittgenstein had been obsessed with the "fixed structure" of the world, whether in his *Notebooks 1914-1916* or in *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, he did not cease to look for the dynamic relations between ethics and aesthetics. For example, he said, "Art is a kind of expression. Good art is complete expression" (Wittgenstein, 1961, 83). And, "the work of art is object seen *sub specie aeternitatis*; and the good life is the world seen *sub specie aeternitatis*. This is the connexion between art and ethics."(Ibid., 83) Nevertheless, who is the agent that mediates between beauty and goodness, and art and morality? Wittgenstein's answer seems to be based on his wisdom of life, for he claimed that beauty is closely related to man's happiness. He said, "there is certainly something in the conception that the end of art is beautiful. And the beautiful is what us makes happy" (Ibid., 86) .

In contrast, what is fundamental to Confucianism is the aspiration to "contain beauty in the good", and ultimately to perfect the good in beauty. This is a state of happiness. From Mencius' treatment of "humanity and righteousness as beautiful" to "Confucius and Yan Yuan's pleasant place" in Song and Ming Neo-Confucianism, they were in essence pursuing an ideal life that integrates rituals and music, beauty and goodness. That is to say, Confucian moral self-cultivation inevitably contains aesthetic elements. However, for this Confucius had a rather different recommendation. He said, "Inspire yourself with poetry; establish yourself on rituals; perfect yourself with music" (*The Analects*, 8.8). This implies that, on the one hand, the inspiration of poetry prepares one for rituals, and on the other, it is only through music that both rituals and humanity can be perfected. As Xu Fuguan said, Confucius meant by this to stress the importance of both rituals and music, especially the role of music in the formation of a wholesome personality (Xu, 1987, 4). If such a reading is correct, then Confucius had in mind the highest value of arts to man.

Confucius also said, "Aspire after the Way; adhere to virtue; rely on humanity; ramble among the arts" (*The Analects*, 7.6). It is clear that, for Confucius, only the arts, to which poetry and music belong, can offer autonomous aesthetic activities that fully realize his aesthetic ideal. Here, beauty is not only contained in the good, but also permeates the acts and movements of a free defined personality. As Confucianism attaches the greatest importance to the "perfection of man", morality naturally constitutes the basis of aesthetic engagement, which, however, amounts to the highest stage of morality. Perhaps, this is exactly what is meant by "rambling among the arts" and "perfecting yourself with music".

Some scholars believe that Wittgenstein mainly drew on ancient Greek philosophy in his treatment of ethics and aesthetics (Dickinson, 1909). But this is not the case. As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein was more influenced by G. E. Moore.

Although in *Principia Ethica* Moore regarded the term "goodness" as indefinable, he still thought of beauty and goodness as the most valuable things in life. Wittgenstein followed Moore in understanding beauty and ethics in terms of the meaning of life.

Sometimes, Wittgenstein was also confused by questions like this: "Is it the essence of the artistic way of looking at things, that it looks at the world with a happy eye?" (Wittgenstein, 1961, 86) When dwelling on this question, Wittgenstein displayed a tendency to identify beauty with goodness. He first asserted that "aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That what exists does exist" (Ibid. 86). Then he added, "Life is grave, life is gay" (Ibid., 86). While the former statement shows that Wittgenstein described in a phenomenological sense—though within the limits of language—the function of arts in revealing the world, the latter arises from his understanding of life: art is different from life, and it can make us happy by being satisfying.

I.3 "Live Happily" and "Enjoy Beauty and Goodness Together"

For Wittgenstein, it is only in the sense of happiness that ethics and aesthetics are one and the same. Yet we still remember that for Kant "beauty is the symbol of morality"(Kant, 1987, 228). It is clear that Kant relates beauty and goodness to something transcendental. In contrast, Wittgenstein brings them back to life in this world. That is to say, it is happiness that mediates between beauty and goodness, and ethics and aesthetics. What is "happiness"? Wittgenstein explained, "And in this sense Dostoevsky is right when he says that the man who is happy is fulfilling the purpose of existence" (Wittgenstein, 1961, 73). I In other words, "in order to live happily I must be in agreement with the world. And that was what 'being happy' means" (Ibid., 75). Here, the crucial words are "life" and "world". Wittgenstein had only a few words regarding life and world: "The world and life are one" (Ibid., 73). It is clear that, on the one hand, Wittgenstein wants to stress the importance of realizing the purpose of life, but on the other, he also wants to stress the agreement between the realization of the purpose of life and the world as the "objective mark" of a happy life. Yes, a happy life already justifies itself, and it is not necessary to ask what a happy life is. The crucial point is that, the issue of life is solved once it is dismissed.

By relating beauty and goodness to life, Wittgenstein proposed that, in pursuing happiness, we should bear in mind that the world is not subject to our will; on the contrary, we should conform to the world. Take a literary work for example. If a literary work X increases our understanding of the existence of this world, and to the same extent, increases our affinity with the world, then still to the same extent, it will increase the totality of happiness in our life. It is in this sense that we say "X is beautiful." After all, beauty should be something that "makes us happy."

In advocating that which is perfectly beautiful and perfectly good, Confucius also emphasized the harmonious unity of beauty and goodness. Xun Zi developed this thought by saying, "when music is performed, the inner mind becomes pure; and when rituals is cultivated, conduct is perfected. The ears become acute and the eye clear-sighted; the blood humor becomes harmonious and in equilibrium; manners are altered and customs changed. The entire world is made tranquil, and enjoys together beauty and goodness"(Xun Zi, 1944, 84). Here, the "enjoyment of beauty and

goodness" together points to a happy feeling that arises from the unity of beauty and goodness. As it is, the "enjoyment of beauty and goodness" is an extension of the tradition of "rituals and music assisting each other". The enjoyment brought by the unity of beauty and goodness is in essence a sort of aesthetic satisfaction that is imbued with human emotions. At any rate, it must be remembered that, in the Confucian aesthetic ideal, beauty and goodness occupy equally important positions, no more this than that.

II. Dewey and Confucianism

II.1 Empirical Naturalism and the Biological Basis of Humanity

John Dewey labels his philosophy "empirical naturalism" or "naturalistic empiricism"(Dewey, 1958, 1). He treats experience as being "of as well as in nature." (Ibid., 4) That is to say, experience is within nature, on the one hand, and on the other, it is also about nature. For Dewey, "experience" is what William James calls a double-barreled word. It is "double-barreled", because "it recognizes in its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality" (Ibid., 8). So, experience is a unity of "doing" and "undergoing", and "knowing" and "having". "Every experience is the result of interaction between a live creature and some aspects of the world in which he lives" (Ibid., 43-44). Further, the pattern and structure of experience does not only consist in the alternation between active "doing" and passive "undergoing", but also in the interaction of the two, where the uncertain elements of experience gradually complete themselves through a series of events.

To be brief, Dewey's experience is a sort of activity that does not merely exert its influence, but also is exposed to external influences, due to the fact that human organisms are both an agent and acted upon due to the unity of "doing" and "undergoing". Dewey's conception of "experience", for that matter, is somewhat similar to that of classic Chinese Confucianism. Take, for example, one of the key concepts of Confucianism: "*Ren*" (humanity). Confucius demonstrated his understanding of the relation between individual experience and humanity by saying, "If I desire humanity, there comes humanity!" (*The Analects*, 7. 30) It implies that, in the experience of humanity, the individual is both an active agent and a passive recipient. Another story: When asked to define humanity, Confucius said: "Loving men" (*The Analects*, 12. 22). This amounts to placing humanity in the social perspective of inter-subjectivity. More importantly, as in the mainstream of Chinese thought, it has been found that Confucian ethics has a profound biological basis, which explains the ever-lasting popularity of Confucianism. There is even research on the biological basis of Confucianism by western scholars, represented by a well-noted sinologist, Donald Munro, son of the famous philosopher Thomas Munro (Munro, 2005, 47-60). Donald Munro rightly points out that in contrast to the emphasis on rationality by the mainstream of Western thought, emotions are held in due regard by Confucianism. Nevertheless, Donald Munro's view is still one-sided in that he fails to see that the Confucian scholars are appealing for an encultured define practice on the basis of natural emotions, and that the encultured practice must agree with moral

principles, in particular, the principle of humanity. So, it should be remembered that Confucian ethics places equal emphasis on sentiments and morality, and tries to achieve a dynamic balance between them.

II.2 "An Experience" and "Consummation of Humanity"

Dewey suggests that when an experience is consummate, it becomes "aesthetic". This means that his *Art as Experience* is more than an aesthetic work. Instead, it concerns the nature of experience itself. In defining "aesthetic experience", Dewey invented the concept of "an experience". From the many examples that Dewey takes from daily life, such as games, talks, writing and other artistic activities, it is clear that "an experience" comes from daily life, but has its own character. As Dewey said, "Such an experience is a whole and carries with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency"(Dewey, 1934, 35). On the other hand, Dewey insists that the unity is a necessary quality for any experience to become "an experience", for it gives the experience a pervasive singleness. So, "The *form* of the whole is therefore present in every member. Fulfilling, consummating, are continuous functions, not mere ends, located at one place only" (Ibid., 56).

As a matter of fact, the experience of humanity that Confucianism advocates is mostly a Deweyan experience. For one thing, Confucian moral experience is right in daily life. For another, the Confucian ideal moral state has all the qualities of an experience, such as an individualizing quality, self-sufficiency, completeness, etc. The ethical aesthetics of Confucianism does not stop here, though. It is well-known that Confucius offered a curriculum of "Six Arts" for the moral cultivation of the common people. Not his own invention however "Over his lifetime, Confucius attracted a fairly large group of such serious followers, and provided them not only with book learning, but with a curriculum that encouraged personal articulation and refinement on several fronts. His 'six arts' included observing propriety and ceremony (*li*), performing music, and developing proficiency in archery, writing and calculation, all of which, in sum, were directed more at cultivating the moral character of his charge than at any set of practical skills. In the Chinese tradition broadly, proficiency in the 'arts' has been seen as the medium through which one reveals the quality of one's personhood"(Ames and Rosemont, 1988, 3-4) .

As indicated above, whether it be the state of "rambling among the arts" or that of "perfecting yourself with music", both have amounted to the highest stage humanity". In Dewey's words, both belong to "consummatory experience". Just as Dewey himself said at the end of *Art as Experience*, "art is more moral than moralities. … Were art an acknowledged power in human association and not treated as the pleasuring of an idle moment or as a meaning of ostentatious display, and were morals understood to be identical with every aspect of value that is shared in experience, the 'problem' of the relation of art and morals would not exist" (Dewey, 1934, 348). Similarly, the highest stage of Confucian ethics is an aesthetic life that is made possible by long and profound artistic education.

II.3 "Emotions" in Experience and Ethical *Qing*

For Dewey, however, an experience itself is not necessarily an aesthetic experience. He makes a distinction between "an experience" and "aesthetic experience", though at the same time connects them. He claims that an experience must have the aesthetic quality, or "its materials would not be rounded out into a single coherent experience"(Ibid., 54-55). It is not possible to divide in a vital experience the practical, the emotional and the intellectual and to set the properties of one over against the characteristics of the others. But it is clear that Dewey tries to include "emotions" in his theory. He protests that "'intellectual' simply names the fact that the experience has meaning," and that "'practical' indicates that the organism is interacting with events and objects which surround it." Further, Dewey said, "I have spoken of the esthetic quality those rounds out an experience into completeness and unity as emotional" (Ibid., 41). It may follow that aesthetic experience must be emotional. Yet, although "emotion is the directing force of aesthetic experience"(Mathur, 1992, 389) ,an emotional experience does not necessarily have aesthetic character. After all, emotion in a Deweyan sense is "total undergoing of the experience" (Alexander, 1987, 205), and thus, is by no means confined within the field of aesthetics. Dewey certainly has a broader understanding of the functions of emotions. For example, he said, "Yes, emotion must operate. But it works to effect continuity of movement, singleness of effect amid variety. It is selective of material and directive of its order and arrangement" (Dewey, 1934, 69). Besides, an emotion "reaches out tentacles for that which is cognate, for things which feed it and carry it to completion"(Ibid., 67-68).

As "the experience itself has a satisfying emotional quality because it possesses internal integration and fulfillment reached through ordered and organized movement" (Ibid., 38), Dewey's concept of emotion is essentially similar to the concern for *Qing* in early Confucianism, though *Qing* is such a broad term as to comprise the meanings of "sentiments", "feelings", "emotions" and even "affections". Etymologically, *Qing* refers to a clear and pure heart-mind. In Confucianism, it includes such feelings as love, sympathy, benevolence, etc. that serve as the foundation of interpersonal relations in the society. Confucian scholars also base their knowledge and understanding of life on such "naturalistic" sentiments or emotions, as they lead to reciprocal acts such as filial piety. For example, Mencius worked out a unique doctrine of "Four Seeds": "A heart of compassion is the seed of humanity. A heart of conscience is the seed of righteousness. A heart of courtesy is the seed of ritual. And a heart of right and wrong is the seed of wisdom. These four seeds are as much a part of us as our four limbs" (*Gongsun Chou*, Book One). This paragraph is the best testimony to the idea that Confucian ethics began with emotions.

In short, when considering the relation between aesthetics and ethics, Confucianism displayed a line of thought similar to Dewey's: firstly, the concept of experience in Confucian ethics is much closer to Dewey's; secondly, Confucian ethical aesthetics also comprises a concept of "an experience"; and finally, the stress of Confucian aesthetic ethics and Dewey's aesthetics on the emotional in "aesthetic experience" is nearly the same.

III. Confucianism: Civilizing through *Shen Qing* (Deep Emotions)

The previous section has shown that, contrary to what many scholars have assumed, Confucian ethical aesthetics and aesthetic ethics are both *Qing*-Oriented rather than *Ren*-Oriented. Evidences can be found in *Guodian Chu Slips*, a Confucian work that was written over two thousand years ago. For example, a piece of writing entitled "Human Nature Derives from Mandate" goes: "Human nature (*Xing*) derives from the Mandate (*Ming*); the Mandate comes from heaven (*Tian*); the Way starts with emotions (*Qing*); emotions arise out of human nature."("Human Nature Derives from Mandate" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) Here, "*Qing*' is more likely to refer to the "facts" （Graham, 1990, 59-65; 1989, 98）. But how could the term "*Qing*" come to designate "state of affairs", "event instance" or "condition of things" at the same time that it refers to the emotions that comes from within? The reason is this. Although "*Qing*" mostly happened in concrete contexts, it sometimes acquired a metaphysical sense, and came to mean something ontological, say, the contexts where emotions arise. Here, the complex relations between *Qing* and other key concepts, such as *Ren*, *Li* and *Xing*, come to the foreground.

III. 1 "*Ren*" and "*Qing*"

As for the connection between *Ren* (humanity) and *Qing* (emotions), there is a reference to rituals and music in *Guodian Chu Slips*: "Humanity is internal. Righteousness is external. And Ritual-Music is both (internal and external)."("Six Virtues" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) This is analogous to what Confucius said: "If a man is not humane, what can he do with the rituals? If a man is not humane, what can he do with music?" (*The Analects*, 3. 3) Yet Humanity should not be seen as the essence of rituals and music, for both quotations only discuss the basic relationships among rituals, music and humanity. Humanity is not singled out as something higher above the other two. A functional approach is found in *Guodian Chu Slips*: "Rituals work for the order of communicative acts, while music gives birth to humane emotions or civilizes men." ("Sentences Series, One" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) At any rate, rituals, music and emotions cannot be said to be caused by humanity alone. Since "humanity is born among men," it certainly follows that emotion is also a defining element of man.

III. 2 *Li* and *Qing*

In terms of the relationship between *Li* (rituals) and *Qing* (emotions), there are the following points in *Guodian Chu Slips*: (1) "Rituals arise out of emotions and get incited by them."("Human Nature Derives from Mandate" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) (2) "Rituals are performed out of human emotions." ("Sentences Series, One" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) (3) "Rituals come from emotions, and obtain reverence from rituals." ("Sentences Series, One" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) All these points emphasize that the rituals had their origin in human emotions, such as joy, anger, sorrow and

happiness. The verb "incite", which is used as a predicate of "emotions" in the second point, is especially revealing. For Chinese aesthetics, the most significant legacy of *Guodian Chu Slips* is its reasonable treatment of rituals and emotions. This legacy, however, was neglected in the succeeding millennia. Ever since Confucian scholars in Han dynasty preached that "human nature is good, and emotions are bad", human desires and emotions had been unduly suppressed.

III. 3 *Xing* and *Qing*

Concerning the relationship between "*Qing*" (emotions) and "*Xing*" (human nature), there are two statements in *Guodian Chu Slips*: one, "emotions come from human nature, rituals from emotions;" ("Sentences Series, Two" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) and the other, "truthfulness is the direction of emotions. Emotions arise out of human nature."("Human Nature Derives from Mandate" in *Guadian Chu Slip*) That is to say, man's emotions are determined by his inner nature. When man's inner nature receives stimuli from outside, it will be externalized as emotions, which in turn will give rise to rituals. Besides, it is also stressed that "so long as one is sincere, his mistakes are not evil; so long as one is insincere, even his painstaking efforts will not be appreciated; with sincerity, man does nothing to win trust"(Ibid.). It implies that only sincere emotions can reveal men's true nature. After all, "desire arises out of human nature", "evil arises out of human nature", and "joyfulness arises out of human nature."("Sentences Series, Two" in *Guadian Chu Slips*) In *Li Ji* (The Classic of Rites), the *Qing*-orientation of the aesthetic ethics and ethical aesthetics in Confucianism can essentially be summarized as follows: "When emotions are deeply seated, the elegant display of them is brilliant. When all the energies (of the nature) are abundantly employed, their transforming power is mysterious and spirit-like. When a harmonious conformity (to virtue) is realized within, the blossoming display of it is conspicuous without, for in music, more than other things, there should be nothing that is pretentious or hypocritical." This amounts to saying that those emotions coming from the depths of men make possible a richer, fuller life, flowing with rhythmical movements of music. With some variation, this paragraph was later cited in *Shi Ji* (The Historical Records) for the purpose of highlighting the civilizing function of "deeply seated emotions", from which comes music ("Book of Music" in Si Ma-qian, *Shi Ji*).

Simply put, only when emotions are deeply seated can they civilize. This is the very motivation of both the aesthetic ethics and ethical aesthetics of Confucianism. On the whole, the fundamental idea of Confucianism is this: emotions arise out of human nature, and then they give birth to rituals and music. These three are in charge of both the internal and the external aspects of men, combining to make a perfect personality.

III. 4 The Unity of Daily Rituals and Ordinary Emotions

As early as Confucius's age, the unity of rituals and music were the dominant trend of thought in both Confucian aesthetics and ethics. However, ever since the corruption of music, more importance had been attached to the unity of rituals and emotions; more than that, more people agreed that the source of music lies in the

emotions that are produced when human nature is influenced by external things. So, it is well argued that the very cornerstones of both the aesthetic ethics and ethical aesthetics of Confucius is nothing else but the unity of daily rituals and ordinary emotions.

Why was music replaced by emotions? A historical explanation may be that, as time passed by, the concept of music became too generalized to retain its importance. But there was also a psychological answer: since emotions belong to the deep psychology of men and thus give rise to music, they are certainly more revealing. Such an idea owes a great debt to the findings of the *Guodian Chu Slips*. According to a Chinese scholar, Li Xue-qin, of the 67 bamboo slips under the title of "*Xing Ming Zi Chu*," 36 mainly discuss "music", while the other 30 are on "nature and emotions" (Li, 2006, 260, 265). This discovery somewhat alters people's traditional thinking on the relations between music and emotions. But why is music so closely related to emotions? The answer may lie in the prevailing idea expressed in *Yue Ji* (Discourse on Music): emotions arise when human nature is influenced by external things, and it is from emotions that music comes. So, emotions are more fundamental than music (and rituals). This determines that the aesthetic ethics and ethical aesthetics of Confucianism are both emotion-oriented.

Of course, just as rituals and music support each other, rituals and emotions can also support each other. Interestingly, in reflecting on the issue of "aesthetic experience", some Western scholars suggest a distinction between two modes of aesthetic engagement, namely "being" and "doing" (Cometti, 2008, 166-177). If we adopt this suggestion, then the emotions that Confucianism advocates can be said to both a being and a doing. That is to say, they are not only the emotions with which we practice the rituals on special occasions, but also the most ordinary emotions one is likely to have in daily life. In other words, instead of being special, detached aesthetic experiences, such emotions always maintain continuity with daily, ordinary experiences.

Conclusion

Based on the above discussion, it can be argued that Wittgenstein, Dewey and early Chinese Confucianism all move towards a living aesthetic ethics or ethical aesthetics, or in other words, all of them are in essence an ethical-aesthetic art of living, which is quite close to my proposal of "Living Aesthetics". It is exactly in the framework of living aesthetics that we try to work on a sort of aesthetic ethics or ethical aesthetics that returns to the life-world (Liu, 2005; 2007).

In his notebook, Wittgenstein wrote on July 8, 1916, that we should "live happily" (Wittgenstein, 1961, 75) . He made that point again on July 29th, saying, "It seems one cannot say anything more than: Live happily ! (Ibid., 78) As a matter of fact, this is another key to understanding Wittgenstein's aesthetics and ethics, for *Ein Ausdruck hat nur im Strome des Lebens Bedeutung*. It is enough to repeat "Live happily". We do not need to say more. After all, the world of the happy is different world from that of the unhappy. The world of the happy is *a happy world* (Ibid., 78) . Likewise, Deweyan experience is mainly about "a social context and the ability to

regard themselves from the social perspective", hence, also about a "life-world" (Alexander 1987, xviii). Dewey's aesthetics points to the "Art of life" (Alexander, 1988, 1-22), where beauty and goodness, aesthetics and ethics are coalesce. As is noted, "This kind of Art of life is the goal behind Dewey's ethics, his philosophy of democracy, and his theory of education" (Alexander, 1987, 269). In explaining experience itself, Dewey once said, "Because the actual world, that in which we live, is a combination of movement and culmination, of breaks and re-unions, the experience of a living creature is capable of esthetic quality"(Dewey, 1934, 16) . It is clear that Dewey said it in view of the important role that the aesthetic plays in life. Just as a critic pointed out, "The essential artistic criterion for Dewey is a heightened, intensified, and deepened experience of the qualities of things and events", and "make life precious, worthwhile, and meaningful"(Mathur, 1992, 372).

By the same token, Confucianism can be seen as a form of meliorative aestheticism. It tries to confer value on the world by making an affectionate community. More importantly, it takes the rituals to be the basic aspect of the interpersonal communication and interaction, while concrete emotions, which are refined by rituals, are the locus in realizing this world (Ames, 2003). Due to its emphasis on the unity of well-practiced rituals and daily, ordinary emotions, Confucianism has suggested a different path to return to the life-world.

According to Wittgenstein's well-noted account of "life-form", "our form of life is foundational in that it sets the scope of our various practices and yet can only be characterized by exploring the full range of practices in which we engage" (Hutto, 2004, 28). This underlies a sort of "aesthetic life-form", described by Wittgenstein himself as an "everyday aesthetics itself" (Gibson and Hueme, 2004, 21-33). For that matter, the "aesthetic life-form" constitutes in essence a "pattern of life". If all this taken into account, there is a "Third Wittgenstein" (Hark, 2004, 125-143) who proposes a sort of aesthetic ethics and ethical aesthetics with a view of returning to the "life-world" (*Lebenswelt*) . Therefore, it can be concluded that Wittgenstein, Dewey and Chinese early Confucianism follow the same path in their "aesthetics of life". They not only advocate the ideal of returning to life on the doctrinal meaning, but they also strive to realize it in everyday life.

Acknowledgement: *I would like to express my gratitude to the three anonymous reviewers for substantial written feedback.*

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ARJUNA: THE DEFEATED HERO

Proyash Sarkar*

Abstract: The customary way of interpreting the dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa in the Bhagavad-Gita is to consider it merely as an expression of the fear of the diffident Arjuna, who is depicted by almost all the commentators as being scared of fighting the battle, and Kṛṣṇa's ingenuous solution to it. This paper argues that this common way of looking at the conflict leaves the central theme of the debate unattained and unsolved. The debate can also be viewed as a statement of the confrontation between two ethics and two notions of the self. The claim is not that the customary interpretation is false, or that the present one is the only possible interpretation. It rather makes a much moderate claim that it is possible to give the text an alternative reading, which sheds some light on the nature of Indian ethics as such. It is long debated as to whether India had ever had an ethics. This paper claims to give some insight into the debate.

THE BHAGAVAD-GITA being the repository of the mainstream Indian ethics deserves special attention of anyone who is interested in the subject. It is debatable whether India had ever had an ethics, which, as it is ordinarily understood, is the study of the norms of conduct and their justification. It tries to discover, and sometimes invent, what is right and what is wrong, but always with some justification. Whether or not India had an ethics depends on what counts as an ethical justification. If mythological explanation together with testimony of reliable persons or revelation is to be counted as a valid source of justification, then India did have an ethics. Both in India and abroad ethics for several centuries derived its justification from religious and mythological sources. All religious texts have an ethics in this sense. What is written in the textbooks of Indian ethics are mostly a set of rules of human conduct. These rules are often collected from various law books like *Manusaṁhitā, Parāśrasaṁhitā*, etc. These texts provide us with some mythical story about genesis and also about the origin of these texts, which are claimed to be revelations to the ancient seers who percolated their wisdom, through their disciples, for the benefit of mankind. This provides us with a ground for following the norms stated in those texts. Once we accept this story of genesis, these norms become compelling for us, since these norms come directly from God, who created this universe with all its life-forms. So, it may be urged, the claim that Indian ethics does not provide justification in support of the norms prescribed in it, does not stand. But modern ethics after the enlightenment has never relied upon myths or revelation for justifying the theories proposed in it. Ethics, as construed in the contemporary

*Dr. PROYASH SARKAR, Associate Professor, Department of Philosophy, Jadavpur University, Kolkata 700 032, India. Email: proyash@rediffmail.com.

Western thought, is a normative study of human conduct. It studies the righteousness and wrongness of human action and those of the norms guiding such conduct. But what is noticeable here is that the mere study of those conducts and the norms guiding them was never considered as ethics. It also requires some justification in support of those norms or the criterion (or criteria) validating those norms. In this sense it can be doubted whether India had ever had an ethics. This is not to claim that "ethics" cannot, or does not, have any other connotation. At the same time it must also be noted that this is one of the predominant, and philosophically interesting, senses of the term.

Taken in a wider sense, however, as the study of human conduct, India definitely had an ethics. The study of morality can be viewed from two different perspectives—first from the perspective of prescribing norms and providing justification for them, and second, from the perspective of describing the norms of the society we live in. The second perspective assumes that we live in a justice based society and, hence, we need not revise the norms of conduct prevalent in our society. The reason is that if justice is there, or if it has already been established in the society, then we need not set norms to establish or reestablish it, provided that a justice bases society is our goal. We bring about changes in, or seek to change, our social norms, where we find the existing norms to be deficient. On the other hand, if we confine the task of ethics just to describing the prevalent norms of the society and claim that there is no need to change those norms, we thereby assume that the existing norms can, at least potentially, establish justice. If description of norms of human conduct is to be considered as the task of ethics, then India did definitely have its ethics.

The traditional Indian society was considered to be a justice-based society, though the concept of justice was strikingly different from that advocated by the Western ethicists. Equality had never been a guiding principle of justice in India. Rather, the Indian ethics can be regarded as an ethics based on the principle of inequality. It holds that people situated differently due to their social and sexual identity deserve to be treated differently and have different ethical responsibility from the ethical perspective. It may not be as grotesque, as it appears to be, if we consider that in any hierarchical social order some people within the family have more ethical rights and higher responsibility than the other members. A naturalized from of ethics may confine itself to merely describing those norms.

The *Gītā* stands at the crossroad of Indian ethics. We find in the text many things that mark its difference from the ethical texts written earlier. Though the ethical implications of the philosophies of the *Upaniṣad*-s can be discerned by any serious scholar of the *Veda*-s, it is for the first time in the history of Indian ethics that we find in the *Gītā* a systematic attempt of justifying ethical claims on philosophical grounds. The *Gītā* raises the "why" question at the ethical sphere and tries to answer it in metaphysical terms. Thus ethics becomes supervenient on metaphysics. Second, the *Gītā* rebels against the earlier *Vedic* ritualism *(karmakāṇḍa*) and argues in support of the need for assimilating wisdom (*jñāna*), action (*karman*) and devotion (*bhakti*) for performing the right action. *Vedic* ritualism may be viewed as a sophisticated form of black-magic and has very little to do with ethics as the study of social conduct of human beings. It gives us only some imperatives for performing sacrifices (*yajña*-s),

which lead to some mundane gain (*abhyudaya*), like having more cattle, or some transcendental goal (*nihśreyasa*), viz. liberation. Such imperatives can hardly explain why a course of action is to be undertaken within a just society. Third, as against the consequentialist ethical practices of the *Vedic* cult it advocates deontologism, though at places we find verses, which indicate toward consequentialism. Kṛṣṇa urged, "O Conqueror of wealth (Arjuna) mere action is inferior to the practice of intelligence. Take recourse to intelligence. Those, who perform their action for the attainment of the desired goals, are weak (in character)."[1]

The *Gītā* rightly points out that consequentialism advocates that our ethical practices should depend on our self-interest, and hence, it argues that it cannot be a proper guiding force for our ethical action. It also needs to be noted that personal liberty, which is considered to be one main objective of the entire Western ethics, had never been on the agenda for the Indian ethicist. Personal liberty in ethics and individualism in politics go hand in hand, one complimenting the other. The basic presupposition is that individuals living in societies have a separate existence conceptually prior to that of the society they live in. So, the domain of individual liberty is sacrosanct and should not be intervened by the society. The society reserves the right to interfere into one's personal liberty only if the enjoyment of such so-called individual rights hinders others from enjoying their rights. Thus on this view the individuals are given supreme autonomy of will over and above the society. This supreme autonomy helps the individual develop her personality and also acts as an incentive towards the development of the society. Indian ethics, on the other hand, takes an organismic approach to the society and the individuals living in it. Just as the limbs of a person cannot be considered in isolation from the body the individual lives in and for the society. The individual can enjoy autonomy only within the restrictive and regulative norms of the society. These norms have been codified in the sacred law books, such as *Manusmṛti*. The purpose of a woman's life, for example, is to help man attaining his mundane goal, like producing a male child to get the family lineage going. Since she lives for the society, she is morally obliged to perform her societal duty as a mother, or a wife. She has no right to decide what to do and what not to do. She enjoys freedom only to the extent to which she can decide when to do it or how to do it. Similarly, a man is obliged to perform the duties assigned to him on the basis of the caste he belongs to and the stage of his life he is going through. Everything, including his occupation, or the type of partner that he should take in his life, is thus predetermined to a great extent. He doesn't have freedom to select his mate from any caste of his choice, though within the *suitable* caste he is free to select his bride, subject to the approval of his family. Neither is he free to choose his own calling.

The type of liberty and autonomy that was presupposed in modern Western ethics cannot be witnessed in Indian ethics, as moral agents have been ascribed only a limited autonomy in it. Autonomy and personal liberty are thought to be subservient to the social order in the Indian context. As we have already noted, the traditional Indian societies were guided by social norms later on codified by various law-makers

[1] *Dureṇa hi avaraṁ karma buddhiyogāt dhanañjaya/*
Buddhau śaraṇam anviccha kṛpaṇāh phalahetavaḥ// Bhagavdgītā, 2/49.

including Manu, Parāśara and Gautama. According to this approach, human beings can enjoy freedom to the extent to which the society ascribe it to them, and which has no discord with the social order. Indian ethics believes that rights and duties should depend on and be proportionate to one's station and social status. Individuals have the freedom of will and autonomy only in the restricted sense of enjoying one's rights and performing ones duties according to one's social position determined primarily by birth. This autonomy may be called as subservient autonomy as opposed to the supreme autonomy presupposed in the mainstream Western ethics. We shall see that the dialogue between Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa raises the question of autonomy in a significant way.

Two types of duties are ascribed to individuals in Indian ethics—universal duties (*sāmānya dharma/sādhāraṇa dharma*) and particular duties (*viśeṣa dharma*). Absolute duties are those which are incumbent on the individual irrespective of his/her sex, birth and social status. Duties like nonviolence and truthfulness are supposed to be performed by everybody under all circumstances. Particular duties, on the other hand, depend on the position of the moral agent in the hierarchy of the social order depending on sex, birth and age of the moral agent. For example, the duty of a warrior is to protect the clan and to rule it. The rights and duties of a priest are to study and teach the *Veda*-s and to conduct and perform religious rites. It is noticeable that from the later Vedic era women had little autonomy, and consequently, had a very limited moral agency. The same is true about the other marginalized groups. The entire edifice of the hierarchy of duties (*dharma*-s) follows from scriptures in the Vedic tradition. No further justification is needed, since the scriptures are claimed to be incorrigible. Duties in this tradition have been defined as injunctions (of scriptures). Kṛṣṇa urged Arjuna to perform his duties. Now, which duty Kṛṣṇa was talking about? It is noticeable that Kṛṣṇa was asking Arjuna to perform his particular duty, i.e. his duty as a warrior, at the cost of not observing some of his specific duties, e.g. non-violence.

The *dharmaśāstra*-s contained very little or no discussion of normative ethics. They contained laws, including moral injunctions, governing all aspects of human life. The *Mahābhārata*, and the *Gītā* in particular, is perhaps the only major work where an explicit normative theory has been developed. The line of argumentation with the help of which the main doctrine has been justified in the *Gītā* is metaphysical in nature. However, an argument in support of the metaphysical basis on which the main line of argumentation depends is perspicuous in its absence in the text. We have to keep in mind that the *Mahābhārata* is an orthodox text. Anything that is supported by the *Veda*-s needs no further justification. The argumentative part of the *Gītā* is thus marked by the existence of different moral voices in the heterogeneous Indian society. Working within the bounds of the orthodox forms of life the *dharmaśāstra*-s presupposed that the existing societies to be more or less justice-based societies and are conducive to ethical good. We will argue that the *Gītā* is a major departure from this tradition.

The mainstream Western ethics presupposes a particular notion of the self. The entire ethical tradition of the West, as well as India, is parasitic upon the notion of the self. In the mainstream Western tradition moral agency is ascribed to an *autonomous*

and *detached* self, which can take independent decisions. By the expression 'independent decision' here we mean decisions that are not permeated by passions and are not influenced by the context in which it is taken. This moral agent is a pure form devoid of any content. No relation can move him, no emotion can touch him, and the flesh fails in its beastly endeavor of swallowing up its unambiguous rationality, which is so translucent that like a prism analyzing colors of a ray of light, it separates shades of virtues from those of vices of human conduct.

Here is a story, rather a thought experiment, of an autombie and a senti. They were not actual human beings, but looked like them. The autombie had a set of exclusive rules to guide its conduct. It was autonomous and unlike an ordinary zombie it was not controlled by any external agent, it was created by some external agent though. It had the *intention* of following rules and could report exactly its internal 'mental' states, including its intentions. The senti was a fleshy beast having no rules of conduct. Instinctive drive and gut feeling are the sole factors with the help of which it could assess a situation and decided a course of action. Both the senti and the autombie worked for a humanitarian organization as medical personnel in a war ravaged city of Afghanistan. The autombie had no facial expression of emotions. The senti, on the other hand, was full of emotions and that was expressed in its facial expression. The autombie used to distribute medicines among the patients of a local hospital and senti had the duty entrusted on it of doing beds of the patients. Both of them spent most of the money they earned on doing some good to the patients, like buying gifts for them. The autombie did it dispassionately, while the senti lacking reason did it by a gut feeling.

One elderly lady patient, Umbalica, loved both of them. The senti's passionate eyes reminded her of her twenty-two year old daughter, whom she had lost along with her entire family in an air attack roughly one year back. Rather than resembling the aid providers, the autombie's expressionless face and frigid movements resembled more closely with those of the inmates of the hospital. So, she could identify herself with the autombie more easily than with anyone else. She would wake up early in the morning and wait for them to come in the ward. The autombie was as punctual as was unerring about its duties. It would approach each bed, say, "Good morning!" wait for a reply, acknowledge it, pass the prescribed medicine on to the patient and then move on to the next bed. This entire act would roughly take two minutes for each bed. When the autombie is done with distributing medicines, it would return to its chamber. Umbalica often thought of asking the autombie about the incident that she thought had turned it into a piece of stone. The senti was often late at attending patients. It would spend some time at each bed, talk to them, take care of their individual needs, and then move on to the next bed. Soon it developed a personal relationship with each of them.

The day was exactly one year after Umbalica lost her family and she was extremely depressed. In the morning the autombie came to her bed, looked at her, checked her temperature and, as usual, moved on to the next bed after administering the prescribed medicine. Umbalica's helpless eyes had no effect on it, and it couldn't understand her mental condition. Nor it was requires to understand that, as it was not a psychiatrist. A little later the senti came to her. It looked into her eyes intensely.

With its gut sense it could gauge the turmoil that was going on in her mind. It said nothing, just sat beside her holding her hand. Umbalica asked the senti if it were being late in attending other patients and reminded that it might be scolded by the ward mistress afterwards. The senti politely replied, 'Heavens will not fall if I attend other patients a little later. I want to spend some time with you now. Besides, I'm quite used to her scolding. You don't have to be bothered about that. I can manage such situations.'

It is quite clear from the story that the autombie was more dutiful than the senti and followed the principle of equality religiously. But the question still remains who was a better creature from the moral perspective?

Every moral agent has in herself an *autombie* and a fleshy beast. Depending on their respective theories of the self Arjuna and Kṛṣṇa assessed the war situation differently.

The *Gītā* deviates to a great extent from the mainstream Indian ethics in that it clearly propagates a theory of a detached self in support of the ethical doctrines advocated in it. The self in its pure form, as has been claimed, is devoid of all relations and is not permeated by passions and relations that infuse the mundane existence. Detachment of the self from its *other* has been proposed for the ascetic in the Indian ethics right from the days of the *Upanisad*-s. Perhaps, it was for the first time in the *Gītā* that it was proposed for the ordinary human beings as well. Kṛṣṇa urged in the *Gīta*,

> *Vāsāṁsi jīrnāni yathā vihāya navāni gṛhnāti naro'parāṇi/*
> *Tathā śarīrāṇi vihāya jīrnānyanyāni saṁyāti navāni dehī//2/22//*

Just as human beings change worn-out cloths and put on others that are new, the soul changes its abode and takes a new one after the former gets old. It can better be explained with the allegory of a snake casting off its skin. The relation between the self and the body is similar to that of a snake and its slough, the only difference being unlike the serpent the self is not perishable.

> *Nainaṁ chindanti śastrāṇi nainaṁ dahati pāvakaḥ/*
> *Na chainaṁ kledayantyāpo na śoṣayati mārutaḥ//* (*Bhagavdgītā, 2/23)*

Swords cannot shred it, fire cannot burn it, water cannot drench it, nor can wind make it dry.

At the beginning of the first day's battle seeing his friends and relative Arjuna, on the other hand, stated his predicament in the following verses:

> *Dṛṣṭvemaṁ svajanaṁ yuytsaṁ samupasthitam /*
> *Sīdanti mama gātrāṇī mukhañca pariśuṣyati*//1/28/
> *Vepathuśca śarīre me romaharṣaśca jayate/*
> *Gāṇḍīva sraṁsate hastat tvak chaiva paridahyate*//1/29/

"When I see my own people arrayed and eager for fight… [m]y limbs quail, my mouth goes dry, my body shakes and my hair stands on end."[2]

Kṛṣṇa interpreted Arjuna's predicament as the latter's fear of fighting the battle. But if the arguments that would be presented in this paper were sound, then the attempt of discarding his arguments as frivolous would be besieged by doubt.

Arjuna raised a few serious questions with regard to Hindu ethics. He could see no mundane good, as attaining pleasure, in killing his rivals, who happened to be *his near and dear ones*. He tried to convince that (even on the injunctions of the sacred text) killing an assassin would still invite sin on part of the retaliator. Apparently, he doubted the acceptability of a retributive theory of punishment, one of the principal theoretical bases of a just war. He wondered whether an-eye for-an-eye mode of punishment could bring about justice and the ultimate triumph of good over evil. This appears to be a serious question, which cannot possibly be answered simply by referring to the testimonial evidences that goes against it. Two reasons can be cited for this claim. First, Arjuna's position is also supported by textual evidence. As in *Udyogaparva*, 38, 73, 74 of the *Mahābhārata,* it is said, "conquer anger by non-anger, conquer dishonesty by honesty, conquer a miser by gifts; conquer falsehood with truth."[3] Arjuna, however, didn't give any testimonial evidence in support of his claim. One reason why he didn't quote any text in his support was probably that he knew that an equal number of textual evidences might be cited against his argument. And the stronger reason was that it was the very same texts whose authority he was trying to challenge by his arguments. Quoting those very texts whose authority he was challenging might have made his position more vulnerable to adverse criticism. He made two points clear in his argument. First, he did not endorse the theoretical basis of a just war and second, he thought that moral prescriptions arising out of a concept of a related self would be markedly different from those based on the concept of an unrelated self. It was for the first time in his life that he got the insight that the concept of an unrelated self is a chimera, which led one nowhere, neither to his earthly wellbeing nor to any ethical good. He used the expression "my own people" (*svajanam*) four times in the first chapter of the *Gītā.* His arguments started at verse 28 of the first chapter of the text, where he reported that seeing his own people in the opposite side his body ached, and his mouth went dry. This first expression was a sudden outburst of emotion. Kṛṣṇa, who was a staunch supporter of the reason/emotion binary, developed his main line of argument on this statement.

Seeing his beloved and respected ones on the opposite side Arjuna became full of compassion and said, "my mind is reeling [from the path of the received knowledge of right and wrong]. I see the act of killing my own people to be the causes of producing results that are detrimental to good and righteousness. Nor do I see anything ethically desirable (*śreyo*) can be produced by killing my own people."

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[2]Radhakrishnan, S., *The Bhagavadgita*, HarperCollins Publishers India, New Delhi, 2004, p. 89.

[3]*Akrodhena jayet krodham, asādhuṁ sādhunā jayet/*
Jayet kadaryaṁ dānena, jayet satyena cānṛtam// Udyogaparva, 38, 73, *Mahābhārata.*

Nowhere in the *Gītā* was it said that Arjuna was afraid of fighting the battle because of his own life. He was rather worried for the lives of his friends and relatives. Instead of seeing this emotion as a virtue of his character Kṛṣṇa considered it to be a weakness, which would lead Arjuna to the hell at the end. He (Kṛṣṇa), rather, endorsed the path of persuasion. He himself was convinced at the fairness of the ensuing war and was not open to any argument whatsoever. He wondered how Arjuna, who was an Aryan, could be so emotional like a non-Aryan. He instigated the latter to fight by saying that leaving the battle would cause him vice. Leaving the battle by a warrior is supposed to be a vice for the *kṣatriya* in all *Dharmaśāstra*-s. Kṛṣṇa was, perhaps, referring to that. This, however, couldn't solve Arjuna's worries. For one is not supposed to refute an adverse criticism with the help of the theses under scrutiny or by referring to the texts whose validity is the point at issue. Such solutions are considered to be suffering from the fallacy of being question-begging (*sādhyasama-doṣa*). We would see that the main strategy of the philosophy of the *Gītā* is that of persuasion rather than argumentation. The text is a gem of the art of persuasion and a literary work of equal merit.

Arjuna's view appears to be more congruent with the mainstream Indian approach to ethics. The Indian ethicists never took the ethical agent in isolation in judging her conduct. Arguably, situatedness runs through the entire Indian philosophy. It is for the first time in the history of Dharmaśāstra-s that the *Gītā* advocates detachment for a non-ascetic, a move that made Arjuna all the more perplexed. The *Dharmaśāstra*-s, a group of texts to which the *Gītā* belongs, clearly give us the impression that when it comes to the relation between the individual and the society, they clearly side with the latter. There is no scope for individualism and deontologism. Individual life, as we have already pointed out at the outset, is meant for and is directed towards the betterment of the society. The teleological or consequentialist underpinning of the prevalent views can easily be discerned in the texts. The ethical merit or demerit of an act depends on its conduciveness to the societal goal. No act can be considered to be ethically good by itself. Righteousness of an act depends on the end that it is directed to or the goal it seeks to attain. The *Gītā,* on the other hand, maintains that the ethical merit of an action is intrinsic to it. This, in turn, is justified by divine origin of the duties promoting those acts. Kṛṣṇa advised Arjuna to follow the path of action (*karma*) done not for attaining any personal goal. Arjuna's arguments bring forth the inbuilt contradiction in Indian ethics—absolute autonomy of the self and its situatedness cannot go together. The poverty of the main line of argument of the text lays bare in the inarticulate questions raised by mumbling Arjuna.

However, this was a later revelation in the story. When Arjuna presented his arguments, he seemed to have no idea as to what Kṛṣṇa had in his mind and what type of theory of ethics he was going to uphold to refute the former's arguments. So, it would be ludicrous to claim that Arjuna was refuting deontologism, though his arguments went against it. His arguments rather stemmed from the mainstream Indian approach to ethics.

Arjuna further urged that he couldn't be happy killing his friends and relatives. It is noticeable that though he argued in favor of avoiding homicide in war, yet his

emphasis was clearly on not killing his own people, his near and dear ones. He further wondered how he could be happy in life by killing his own people.[4] Apparently, he found no reason for fighting the battle, other than personal greed for enjoying the kingdom. This first argument can be understood better from a theoretical perspective of a conflict of ethics of a related and caring self with the ethics of a pure detached self. Most of the arguments that he presented subsequently stemmed from his practical concern, vis-à-vis moral concern, for the society he lived in. He was concerned about the extinction of family decent and was also worried about the treachery to his friends involved in the imminent war. He further mentioned that by destroying the families he would be destroying the traditional values maintained and nurtured through the family system and that destruction of those values would result in a surge of immorality into the society (*Bhagavdgītā,* 1/40-41).

Apparently, the last one is a moral argument, as Arjuna was arguing that fighting the battle would cause in a total rout of morality from the society. How far the arguments provided by Arjuna were moral in nature is an issue of constant debate. Commentators like Shri Girindra Shekhar Basu take much pain to show that none of Arjuna's arguments were moral in nature.[5] He further claims that the arguments that Arjuna provided were solely a way of self-deception on the part of Arjuna, who either wedged the war due to personal greed without ever contemplating upon its consequences, or got anguished at the thought that he would have to kill his beloved ones. Aujuna repeatedly used the words "*dharma*" and "*adharma*" while in his arguments. Basu opines[6] that these terms stand for social good and social evil respectively and do not have any moral connotation. I don't see why this should be so, while Arjuna repeatedly used the terms like "*dharma*," "*adharma*," "*śreyo"* and "*pāpa*" in his arguments. It is true that the terms "*dharma*," and "*adharma*," are often used, in Sanskrit, to respectively stand for a social duty or that, which leads to social good and a social obligation for refraining from doing something that leads to social evil. However, the terms "*śreyo"* and "*pāpa*" do hardly have any such social connotation. Furthermore, at the end of his argument Arjuna urged, "…I'm confused about what is morally good (*dharma-saṁmuḍha-cetā*)…guide me" (*Bhagavdgītā,* 2/11). If we interpret '*dharma'* in this statement as social good or social duty, then we would have to claim that Kṛṣṇa's advices, at best, contained nothing that pertained to morality, or at worst, were totally irrelevant. The first alternative does not seem to be acceptable to any orthodox Hindu, who thinks his moral life draws heavily on the teaching of the *Gītā*. A charitable reading of the text must grant at least as much to Kṛṣṇa as to admit that his speeches contained something pertaining to morality. The second alternative is equally unacceptable. It is hard to believe that Kṛṣṇa, whose self-proclaimed omniscience was virtually endorsed by Arjuna, did not have a sense of relevance. If the latter did not put any moral question to him, and yet he started preaching Arjuna morality while in a battlefield, then surely he lacked a sense of relevance. Basu, however, does not address this issue.

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[4]*Swanjanaṁ hi kathaṁ hatvā sukhinah syān mādhava/ Bhagavdgītā,* 1/39.
[5]Basu, Shri Girindra Shekhar, *Bhagavadgītā*, p. 27.
[6]*Ibid.*

It may be argued that though such words as "*śreyo"* and "*pāpa*" do not have any direct social connotation, yet they imply some social aspect of human life, since all aspects, including the moral aspects, of human life are ultimately related with the society such beings live in. Having said this, the objector has already distracted from her main contention that Arjuna's arguments did not have any moral dimension. Besides, rather than refuting the thesis of the present paper, in a way it supports one of the claims made in this paper, that is, the Hindu ethics was developed the backdrop of the *unquestionable* presupposition that the traditional Hindu society as described in the sacred texts is a (morally) *just* society.[7]

The main stake of Arjuna's argument was that fighting the battle would result into the destruction of the existing social order. This and several other similar instances in the *Gītā* can be cited in support of the hypothesis mentioned above. Arjuna further mentioned that the annihilation of the societal values would make the women of the society corrupt, which in its turn, would result in a hybridization of the castes of that highly stratified society. He mentioned that such acts, as wedging a war, would have a cumulative effect on the society destroying the traditional values and the societal order by producing mixed castes, resulting in a total rout of the practice of performing sacrifices for one's ancestors. These things would suffice to lead an individual to hell.

If we consider Kṛṣṇa's speeches that he delivered for Arjuna, after the latter submitted to him, as a disciple submits to an Indian seer, or a devotee submits to her *guru*, we will find that the former endorsed the path of persuasion rather than argumentation. As soon as Arjuna submitted to him, accepted him as his *guru* and sought his advice,[8] he started rebuking Arjuna, calling him a pedantic. Kṛṣṇa's initial reaction to Arjuna's predicament had two reasons in its favour. First, he didn't consider these people deserved any pity. Secondly, Arjuna was reminded that wise men wouldn't think like him—the wise would not lament for those who were living, nor would he lament for those who passed away (*Bhagavdgītā,* 2/11). Arjuna was also rebuked for having compassion, for those who didn't deserve it (Ibid) The second was a more general objection than the first one. Not only had these people, who, according to Kṛṣṇa, had chosen the path of vice (*adharma*), deserved no compassion, but nobody in general deserved to have compassion of others. For, life and death of a person were supposed to be predetermined in accordance with the law of *karma*. Kṛṣṇa's persuasive mood becomes all the more clear if we consider that earlier he reprimanded Arjuna for the latter's "unmanliness" (*klaibyam*) caused by his emotions that were characteristic only of the non-Aryans. Kṛṣṇa contended that such petty

[7]The two crucial terms in this statement are 'unquestionable' and 'just.' I won't say anything about the former. I think B. R. Ambedkar has said enough on the unquestionable nature of Hindu sacred texts. (See B. R. Ambedkar's *Annihilation of Caste*, Chapter XXI, many editions). The presupposition that such a society is a justice-based society can be easily discerned throughout what is called Hindu ethics from the fact that any action that seemed to be in discord with its norms established by the sacred texts were considered to be immoral.

[8] *Yacchreyaḥ syānniścitaṁ brūhi tanme śisyaste'haṁ śādhi māṁ tvāṁ prapannam/ Bhagavdgītā,* 2/7.

emotions didn't suit Arjuna, who was rather known for his ability of inflicting pain upon his enemies. Kṛṣṇa even presented arguments, the validity of which he himself didn't accept. Kṛṣṇa argued that Arjuna's emotions would not lead him to heaven. This has a strong flavour of consequentialism, which goes against the basic contention of the *Gītā*. If we follow Kṛṣṇa's main line of argumentation, then we readily see that he left no stones unturned for rejecting consequentialism in favour of deontologism. This shows that he had only one agendum in mind, that is, instigating Arjuna into fight.

The general philosophical stance that the *Gītā* takes is that of deontologism. Kṛṣṇa's severe criticism of the consequentialism underlying the *Vadic* ritualism shows his allegiance to deontologism. But while refuting Arjuna's arguments he relied on consequentialism on several occasions. For, he had to convince Arjuna by hook or by crook. The jargon of consequentialism was known to Arjuna. So, Kṛṣṇa found it easier to convince Arjuna in terms of that jargon. Kṛṣṇa claimed that he was God and that if a person would think about him at the time of his death, since his mind would always concentrate on God, he would become identical with him [God] (*Bhagavdgītā,* 8/6). Arjuna was, therefore, asked to always remember him, and fight the battle (*Bhagavdgītā,* 8/7). Kṛṣṇa realized that Arjuna was enjoying his long metaphysical speech (*Bhagavdgītā,* 10/1) even though they were in a battlefield. He, however, was not sure whether Arjuna was convinced by it. He left no stones unturned to persuade Arjuna in the war. Finally, he made an emotional appeal, 'If [after listening to all that I have said] you are still unable to follow them, then at least do it for my sake; you will get success.'[9] However, apart from its emotional appeal, this statement has a devotional aspect, which lies beyond the scope of the present discussion. What is pertinent for the present purpose is that in order to bring home his point, Kṛṣṇa relied on consequentialism in this instance as well.

In Chapter IX Kṛṣṇa described a cosmology, according to which everything that happens or exists in this world, was caused by him. He (Kṛṣṇa) is the root cause of what there is. However, his premises were not supported by arguments. Neither were they supposed to depend on any argument. He relied upon persuasion rather than argumentation, as he knew it well that persuasion was often more effective than argumentation. But Arjuna had to be persuaded, since he had already accepted Kṛṣṇa as his mentor and had surrendered to the latter unconditionally. In Chapter X Arjuna accepted everything that Kṛṣṇa said so far.[10] In the light of this complete submission of Arjuna Kṛṣṇa made the appeal mentioned above.

What the present argument shows is that Kṛṣṇa's long speeches had great persuasive force, which could take the bereaved Arjuna under its spell, though the arguments that he provided missed out Arjuna's main contention, i.e. a sense of care arising out of the concept of a related self. The ethics of the *Gītā* starts where reason submits to persuasion, indoctrination supersedes ratiocination, personal liberty subsumes under social wellbeing following the parameters set by the sacred texts and

[9] *Abhyāse'pysamartho'si matkarmaparamo bhava/*
Madarthamapi karmāṇi kurvan siddhimavāpsyasi// Bhagavdgītā, 12/10.
[10] *Sarvam etad ṛtaṁ manye yanmām vadasi keśava/ Bhagavdgītā*, 10/14.

customs including scriptural injunctions act as the sole guiding force of the individual life. It is perfectly in accordance with the mainstream classical Indian ethics, for which human life has a purpose to serve in the design of things and is subsumed under the social order. The type of autonomy of thought that was exemplified in "Arjuna-Visāda-Yoga" has no scope in Hindu ethics, since Hindu ethics is a *Prasthāna-Mīmāṁsā,* a mode of discourse with prior commitment.

Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for their comments and observations on an earlier draft of the paper.

UNIVERSAL TRUTH VERSUS CHINESE EXCEPTIONISM: AN IDOLOGICAL DILEMMA

Chongyi Feng*

Abstract: This is an analysis of a moral and ideological dilemma facing the Chinese authority, with a focus on its shifting position on so-called "particularity of China". Originally the Chinese communists were Universalists who rejected their various rivals' arguments about Chinese "particular national conditions" in order to justify their belief in and application of Marxism in China. In those revolutionary years there was genuine rigor in their intellectual exploration, in spite of Marxist-Leninist dogmatism. The recent embracement of the concept of "Chinese characteristics" and attacks on the "universal values", however, seem to indicate that the universalist position has been abandoned altogether to justify the current political system in a special manner. It remains to be seen whether this effort will succeed in establishing an enduring political ideology for a "rising China" or otherwise quickly vanish into oblivion just as countless ideological catchphrases before it.

I. Marxism as "Universally Applicable Truth"

IT IS AN AMUSING as well as painful irony that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) based on Marxism has become eulogists of the Chinese peculiarity, as refutation of Chinese exceptionalism was an intrinsic part of the development of the CCP itself and Marxism itself in China. Originally, as an alien political party and alien ideology imported to China from abroad, both the CCP and Marxism had to justify their relevance to China on the basis of universalism rather than Chinese exceptionalism.

The birth of the CCP and Chinese Marxism was a by-product of the historical process of "learning from the West" by progressive Chinese during the modern times, although a combination of extraordinary circumstances led to the shift from "learning from the West" to "taking Russia as a teacher" (Mao, 1969, 1359-1360).

The founders of the CCP and Chinese Marxism, Chen Duxiu陳獨秀（1879-1942）and Li Dazhao李大釗（1889－1927）, in particular, were typical Universalists. Chen Duxun insisted that "learning by definition is an instrument of humankind without difference between the past and the present or the difference between China and foreign countries. Only those who understand learning in this way are qualified to talk about learning. Precisely because there is no such a difference, the only criterion to evaluate learning is its quality, regardless of its origin in any country any time" (Chen, 1984, 259). In response to Goodnow's proposal based on his assessment of Chinese "national conditions" for the revival of the monarchy and Yuan Shikai's conversion from the President of the Republic of China to the emperor

*Dr. CHONGYI FENG, Associate Professor in China Studies, University of Technology, Sydney. Email: Chongyi.Feng@uts.edu.au.

of China, Li Dazhao argued that Goodnow made a mistake in taking "the national conditions of the past" as "the national conditions of the present". According to Li Dazhao, whereas political apathy prevailed in China during the ancient times because the social life was centred around families and clans and facilitated by rituals and customs, political participation and contestations for political power have become a dominant trend in modern times because of the penetration of the state in social life through extensive taxation, laws and regulations; whereas people submitted to authorities during the ancient times, modern citizens in a republic have developed their capacity to obey laws and resist tyranny irrespective of the countries in the West or in the East (Li, 1984, 110-113) .

Mao Zedong毛澤東 (1893－1976）， and his followers promoted "Sinification of Marxism" during the Yan-an Rectification Campaign in the late 1930s and the early 1940s. That was a campaign to establish and consolidate Mao's supremacy as a spiritual as well as a military and political leader of the CCP, marginalizing those Chinese communist leaders who had the experience as a "returned student" and better command of the Marxist theory. However, Mao's "Sinification of Marxism" never challenged the universality of truth, but instead sought to faithfully put the "Marxist universal truth" (*pubian zhenli*普遍真理) into practice in China. In order to make the application of the "Marxist universal truth" more effective and easier for the "broad masses", Mao also practised the "Chinese style" and the "Chinese manner" in elaborating the Marxist theory. (Mao, 1969, 500) Mao's promotion of the "Chinese features", the "Chinese style" and the "Chinese manner" also served the purpose of boosting the patriotic credential of the CCP.

Ai Siqi艾思奇 (1910－1966）, the most respected professional philosopher of the CCP in the 1930s and the 1940s, took part in the cultural debates on the "wholesale westernisation" during that time and thoroughly repudiated Chinese exceptionalism. "All reactionary thoughts in China since the modern times", declared Ai Siqi, "shared a special tradition which can be named as the doctrine to close the country to international intercourse. ……No matter how many times they have changed their external forms, their basic contents are as follows: after laying emphasis on Chinese 'national conditions' and Chinese 'peculiarity', and denying the general laws in human history, they have asserted that social development in China will follow the Chinese own special laws only; that China will take only its own road; and that China's own road is exceptional to the general laws in human history". Ai Siqi also pointed out that since the modern times "the thesis of Chinese particular national conditions" was an ideological weapon essential to the traitors of the country and the people; that these traitors, also borrowed heavily from foreign technologies and tricks to advance their interests, actually rejected foreign thoughts and cultures which were helpful for the Chinese to achieve progress and freedom"; that "Sinification of Marxism is possible precisely because Marxism is generally correct, universally valid and omnipotent"; and that "Marxism is an internationalist theory by nature" (Ai, 1941).

II. The Chinese Communist Version of Chinese "Particular National Traditions"

Ai Siqi was certainly right in generalizing the Chinese conservative particularist arguments of opposing progressive theories, be that liberalism or Marxism or both. Yuan Shikai袁世凯（1859－1916），and his American advisor Frank Goodnow were among the first to play up the particularist rationale in the 1910s for opposing democracy and republicanism on the basis of the "national conditions" characterized by Chinese people's alleged lack of desire and political ability for a democratic republic (Goodnow, 1914); Liang Shuming梁漱溟（1893－1988），was well-known for his assertion after the 1920s that Marxist theory of class analysis was not applicable in China simply because China was not a class-based society but an "ethics-based society";[1] in 1935 a group of professors issued the 'Manifesto of Constructing China-based Culture' to reject "westernisation" and called for a unique Chinese ideology to satisfy the unique needs of China;[2] Jiang Jieshi蒋介石（1887－1975），and his Nationalist followers claimed in the 1940s that "the ideologies of liberalism and communism have been fashionable in China since the May 4, ……but in reality their views and propositions are fundamentally incompatible with the psychology and disposition of our nation" (Jiang, 1943, 145).

Ai Siqi and other Chinese Marxist theoreticians during the Republican period would never imagine that Chinese communists would become eulogists of the Chinese peculiarity or Chinese exceptionalism themselves. During the Mao years from the 1950s to 1970s, despite of the fact that the nationalist project of "building the wealth and power of China" was increasingly prevailing over the internationalist project of "liberating the proletariat in the world", Chinese communists were still universalists in the sense that they maintained their belief in the universal truth of Marxism and the theory that the Chinese Revolution was nothing but part of the world revolution with common trajectory and objectives.

However, with the collapse of communist regimes in the former USSR and Eastern Europe, and with the waves of democratisation sweeping across of all cultures, including the so-called "ring of Confucian culture" in East Asia, the banner of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" has been raised in China to reject "Western democracy" on the basis of the particular Chinese "national conditions".

It must be pointed that the original meaning of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" was fundamentally different from the later connotation of the phrase. When Deng Xiaoping鄧小平（1904－1997）first introduced the phrase in his opening speech to the 12th Party Congress in 1982, "socialism with Chinese characteristics" meant socialism with a lower level of development in productive

[1] For a thorough analysis on the thought of Liang Shuming, see Guy S. Alitto, *The Last Confucian: Liang Shuming and the Chinese Dilemma of Modernity*, University of California Press, 1979.

[2] Wang Xinming, et al, "Zhongguo benwei de wenhua jianshe xuanyan [Manifesto of Constructing China-based Culture]", *Wenhua Jianshe* [Cultural Construction], vol.1, no.4.

force and productive relations, justifying the introduction of capitalist measures, foreign capital and technologies for Chinese economic development, and the introduction of institutions and ideas from democracies for Chinese economic and political development (Deng, 1988, 370-373). This argument was further supplemented by the theory of the "primary stage of socialism" put forward at the 13th Party Congress in 1987.

It was Jiang Zemin who summarized the ideas of Deng Xiaoping and gave the phrase "socialism with Chinese characteristics" the new interpretation of rejecting democratic institutions and ideas on the basis of the particular "Chinese national conditions." In his speech delivered at the meeting in commemoration of the 70 anniversary of the establishment of the CCP on 1 July 1991, Jiang Zemin elaborated on the "Chinese characteristics" in a systematic way. He defined these "characteristics" mainly from the negative perspective (*bugao*): not taking the capitalist road, not carrying out privatization, not introducing Western parliamentary system, not introducing Western multi-party system, and not introducing ideological pluralism (Jiang, 1993, 1638-1644). By invoking the concept of "socialism with Chinese characteristics" or the "primary stage of socialism," Hu Yaobang胡耀邦 (1915－1989) and Zhao Ziyang趙紫陽（1919－2005）aimed to minimise the resistance by the conservative forces and advance the cause of reform and opening in making up for the tasks such as developing "commodity economy" and introducing basic democratic institutions and values. These tasks, according to the Marxist framework, should have been accomplished through the bourgeois revolution or capitalist development. Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang in the 1980s were by no means liberals, but they were following the suppressed tradition within the CCP regarding democracy and human rights as compatible with or intrinsic to socialism (Feng, 2009). Their attempts to play down dictatorship and protect liberal forces.

Within the current CCP top leadership, Premier Wen Jiabao 溫家寶 (1942－) is closest to the liberal legacy of the Party. In last few years he repeatedly trumpeted "universal values" and the pressing need to resume political reform. Premier Wen Jiabao took the lead in openly embracing the universal values of freedom, equality and human rights and calling for meaningful democratic reform. In a speech published in 2007 Wen Jiabao wrote that "science, democracy, rule of law, freedom and human rights are not unique to capitalism, but are values commonly pursued by mankind over a long period of history" (Wen, 2007). In a media interview on 23 September 2008 Wen Jiabao defined the scope of democratic political reform in China in three areas: "No. 1: We need to gradually improve the democratic election system so that state power will truly belong to the people and state power will be used to serve the people. No. 2: We need to improve the legal system, run the country according to law, and establish the country under the rule of law and we need to build an independent and just judicial system. No. 3: Government should be subject to oversight by the people and that will call on us to increase transparency in government affairs and particularly it is also necessary for government to accept oversight by the news media and other parties" (Wen, 2009). In another widely publicized interview in September 2010, Wen Jiabao summarized his objectives for

Chinese political reform as follows: "No political party, organization, or individual should be above the constitution and the law. All must act in accordance with the constitution and laws. I see this as a defining feature of a modern political system. I have summed up my political ideals in the following four sentences: to let everyone lead a good and dignified life, to let everyone feel safe and secure, to create a fair and just society and to let everyone have confidence in the future" (Wen, 2010).

Chen Kuiyuan, president of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, asserted that in the "competition between China and the West for the commanding ground (*zhigaodian* 制高點)" in humanities and social sciences "we must establish our confidence and eliminate blind worship [of the West]. We cannot respect Western values as so-called universal values and cannot play down the values of our Party and state as disputable values (*linglei jiazhi* 另類價值)" (Chen, 2008). Jia Qinglin, Chairman of the People's Political Consultative Conference of China urged all political parties and groups in China and Chinese people of all nationalities and all social strata to closely follow the leadership of the CCP and "strengthen the line of defence against the harassment by the two party system, multi-party system, parliament system, tripartite separation of power and other wrong ideas of the West" (Jia, 2009). Wu Bangguo, Chairman of the National People's Congress of China, reaffirmed in his report to the 2nd Plenary of the 11th National People's Congress (NPC) on 9 March 2009 that China should never copy the West and never practise multi-party competition for power, tripartite separation of power and bicameral parliamentary system (Wu, 2009). Again in his work report to the Standing Committee of NPC on 3 October 2011 Wu Bangguo reiterated Jiang Zemin's "July 1st Speech" in 1991 and claimed that China has completed the process of establishing a legal system with Chinese characteristics defined by five rejections (*bugao*), namely rejecting multi-party system, ideological pluralism, tripartite separation of power and bicameral parliamentary system, federalism and privatization (Wu, 2011). Some Chinese sociologists worry that when exceptional measures are taken to "nip destabilizing elements in the bud" and impose artificial "stability", progressive elements in Chinese society can be eliminated and China is experiencing a "social decay", with serious symptoms such as the structural corruption and runaway power (Sun, 2009).

Conclusion

During the revolutionary years the Chinese communists at least claimed to be true believers of Marxism as universal truth, although they were increasingly selective in their application of Marxism and abandoned whatever did not fit their agenda and interests. From the 1920s to the 1940s the Chinese communists were fighting at the forefront against Chinese exceptionalism of all shades. Apart from the theoretical rigour of universalism, there was an imperative for the Chinese communists to dismiss Chinese exceptionalism, simply because the Chinese communist movement was an extension of the world communist movement originated in the West.

The practical rationale for the CCP to change from universalism to exceptionalism is not hard to see. This change has functioned as a cushion to ease the pressure for regime change when "brother parties" in the world have followed the general trend to give up the communist one party rule since the 1990s. According this rationale, China has to be an exception; otherwise there is no ground for China to reject this powerful general trend across the entire world. However, it is hardly possible to find a sound epistemological justification for the CCP to maintain the communist one party rule on the basis of Chinese exceptionalism, precisely because China (or the "Chinese value") is not the origin of this political system. The embarrassing dilemma is that neither universalism nor exceptionalism provides intellectual justification for the Chinese communist rule.

In this age of globalisation and under the policy of "reform and opening to the outside world", China since the 1980s has embraced all aspects of modern technology, many aspects of the market economy. This development is a conscious choice by the Chinese ruling elite and should not be explained in line of cultural determinism. Modern technology, the market economy and constitutional democracy are all imprinted with a mark of the West, but all of them have drawn the experience and accumulated knowledge far beyond the West and should be regarded as common achievement of humankind. It is intellectually inconsistent to embrace modern technology and the market economy as universal but dismiss constitutional democracy as "Western".

Country specific institutions in contemporary world are products of country specific circumstances, especially when different countries are in different stages of development in terms of industrialization, urbanization and democratization. However, these specific institutions and circumstances always find their counterparts in other parts of the world, past, present or future. Values, learning and human capacity cannot be divided according to national or racial boundaries. There is no cultural ground for the dichotomy of China versus West. This dichotomy was an ignorant construct during the early encounters between Europeans and the Chinese. There is profound complementarity of autocratic cultures in the West and the East, just like the profound complementarity of democratic cultures in all parts of the world. More often than not, the claims of national uniqueness or distinctiveness against shared humanity are racist claims in one way or another.

Acknowledgement: I am very grateful to have my article published. I thank many people who in one way or another contributed their valuable assistance in the final completion of this article. I especially wanted to express my appreciation to the three anonymous reviewers of the Journal for their extended professional help to further improve this paper.

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IDENTITY AS A SERIES OF AFFECTIVE TRANSACTIONS

Yubraj Aryal[*]

Abstract: This paper is an attempt to (re) think notions of identity through recourse to the idea of affects. I argue that identity is not a state of representation of some abstract concepts of ethnicity, nationality, religious and political systems but the expression of our interior affective engagement with the world. Identity is a mode of our expression of affects and affections produced when one body encounters other bodies in the world. Rather than defining identity through criteria imposed from without, I define it through a notion of self-affective interiority. The identity is figured as unactualized affective potential proper to subjectivity rather than external concepts which must then be interiorized.

IN THE TRADITIONALIST culturalist account, identity is often defined in terms of race, class and gender, and so on. And we have already produced numerous theoretical models to approach culture, politics and history, and their exercise in the formation of identity as effects of narrative seeing history ". . . as a kind of production of various kinds of narratives."[1] But in this paper, I approach identity from another standpoint: the idea of "noncultural"/"nonnarrated" reality of affect[2] from the position of ethics of immanence[3] in order to show identity as the power of activity of the body. Here, I am trying to make a claim that the idea of our identity can be understood in terms of affectivity of the body rather than in terms of the conceptual abstractions of culture, history and politics. My sense of "noncultural" does not deny culture rather it expands culture's horizon opening new fields for individuations and helps to analyze the content and expression of culture, which we often overlook. In so doing, I divide the paper into two sections. In the first section, I present the role of affects and bodies in identity formation based on the discussion of Foucault, Spinoza and Deleuze; and in the second section, I present identity as an act of self-fashioning one's own self as an act of "self-affectivity," critiquing the views of some major philosophers such as Kant, Heidegger and Derrida on identity.

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[*]YUBRAJ ARYAL, PhD Candidate in the Philosophy and Literature Interdisciplinary PhD Program, Purdue University. He is also the editor of *Journal of Philosophy: A Cross-Disciplinary Inquiry*. Email: yaryal@purdue.edu.

[1]Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak , "The Post-modern Conditions: The End of Politics?" in *Post-Colonial Critic: Interviews, Strategies, and Dialogues*, (ed) Sarah Harasym (London: Routledge, 1990) pp.17- 34, p.34.

[2]Is "noncultural"/"nonnarrated" reality of affect given by nature or is it still a sociocultural formation? It is the later but I am suggesting that identity as a "noncultural"/"nonnarrated" reality of affect constantly sets itself into series of becomings beyond a particular socio-cultural form of life.

[3]Ethics of immanence does not explicitly say anything on the issue of identity. But, I am trying to apply it to the concept of identity in this paper.

I. Identity as Affective Postulation of the Body

I want to start off this section with the two rhetorical questions: What is wrong with the representationalist account of cultural identity, and how can my alternative model of identity save an idealistic/humanistic mission for society? To start with the first question, I disagree with the idea that who am I is limited by ethnicity, nationality, or the political, religious and ethical systems of my origin. What I am cannot be just a representation of the summations of these social and geographical abstractions, nor am I mere effects of narratives under certain "regimes of power." There is a third dimension which complements what I am. That is an idea of "becomings" in my life that tends to reside in a "plane of excess" or a "line of flight."[4] My intelligible extension is grounded in the real world where I encounter not the "clear and distinct" ideas or causations and effects of some conceptual abstractions that we call narratives of history, ideology, politics, and truth, but physical affects and affections[5] that my body produces with another body. I am my affective investment to the world. In other words, the content of my identity is not the idea of some conceptual abstractions, but rather the expressive power of my body in a new relation with the others. My body, which largely shapes my becomings, is an immanent force that encounters other forces in the world, shapes what is in me and can possibly causes to shape what is in others. I am a force, a new emergence within me all the time. That emergence is a purely organic process, and it is an affirmative will to create new individuations. I am neither a de-organic (static) representation of any abstract stratifications that people name "culture," "history," etc., nor am I effects of discursive formation, as Foucault for instance thinks in his *later* writings . I am the organic body not a de-organic formation of effects of some social production. Body is generative organism, which creates affects and affections, which are structured around me and my surroundings. I as an expression of the generative organism (i. e. my body), is not reducible to any external disciplinary practices as Foucault maintains when he says: "True discourse, liberated by the nature of its form from desire and power, is incapable of recognizing the will to truth which pervades it; and the will to truth, having imposed itself upon us [body] for so long, is such that the truth it seeks to reveal cannot fail to mask it" (Foucault, 72a, 219).

For *early* Foucault, my body is acted upon, and some external abstraction (which he calls "discourse") acts upon my body. This is just what Foucault in his later works does not believe, a point that supports my claim in this section that affective postulations of the body largely shape our identity. My body acts upon other bodies and be acted upon. In its active investment to the world, it either enters into compositional or decompositional relationship with other bodies. It affects and is affected at the same time; it shapes its individuation and affects the shape of other's

[4]Deleuze mainly in *Thousand Plateaus* and *Kafka* talks about the idea of becomings; how the becomings occurs beyond the linear social fields, which he calls "plane of excess" or a "line of flight."

[5]Affection is not identical with affect. It is a mode of affects. The affection is an active because affect is its substance.

individuation. All the social practices and institutions are purely organic evolution of my body. My body is not a de-organic state that passively enters into some discursive practices imposed from without; nor is my body effect of such practices. My body is an "affectual self-organization," which not only receives effects in its encounter with other bodies but affects their nature of encounter with it. My body evolves and emerges as well as makes other bodies evolve; it is not something passive recipient of external agency as *early* Foucault claims. It is not discourse that produces and controls my body; it is my body which produces and evolves countless discourses on the expressive accounts of my bodies. What is active is not some external that we can label history, truth, or language.[6] It is my body's active formation of affectual individuations, which give particular notions of outside such as representations. My body not only enters into a particular prior form of culture, like what Ronald Dworkin means in saying: "We inherited a cultural structure. . . ." (Dworkin, 1985, 223), but also actively produces various forms of cultures within me. Culture (and history) is not only the flow of "feelings like identification, loyalty, a sense of belonging" (Appiah, 2005, 181) as it is for some cultural preservationists but is also becoming others. It is not a matter of "fact-value;" it is the manner/mode of expression in or through which we create values. It is all otherwise. For example, when Foucault was in San Francisco with the gay community nearly forty years ago, he realized the possibility to go beyond the prevalent culture and discourses prescribed by regimes of truth and to create identity and social rights for the gay through recourse to body and affectivity. He realized that the affective self-organization (i. e. practice of homosexuality in the case of homosexual people) of the gay community can be a resistance to the prevalent cultural practice and discourse on homosexuality. I mean Foucault in his later career realized that subjective individuation is not, as he earlier had believed an effect of discourse and culture but instead the activity of the generative novelty of the body. That means, body not only receives effects of a particular form of cultural practice but also forms a new mode of cultural expression, shaping identity not simply as an 'effect' of the culture upon our bodies but the affectivity over external bodies.

Therefore, my active emergence defines who I am through the ideas of affects and affections, not through how my body enters into a prior form of socio-cultural-linguistic structures. Trying to define body in terms of such structures is not only a misunderstanding of the nature of laws of body but also, as Spinoza says, a matter of it is having "inadequate ideas"[7] of such structures. The contents of our ideas of any

[6]I acknowledge that one can say these variables are not like something that makes its entry into life from outside but they are already there insides life. I am referring to my rejection to the concept of truth, history and language as abstractions. I believe that these stuffs are affectual states of one's life.

[7]Spinoza calls it having "inadequate ideas," if one does not know the laws of body in nature and he calls it for having "adequate ideas," if one knows the laws. For example, I drink coffee because I know it enters into compositional relationship with my body. That means, I have adequate knowledge of coffee. Likewise if I drink poison, it will decompose my body. My

forms of life are the modes of affects. And my identity is nothing but the position of my body–how it affects other bodies in nature and how it is affected. There exists nothing that we can label culture, language, history and truth, which does not contain affects and affections in my identity. In other words, the ideas of culture, history and truth by which we define subjectivity are affective states of my body. My body is a, non-cultural and non-narrated "bundle" of affections that it produces in its encounter with other bodies–to affect and be affected–, and that reality gives me a different model of being political[8]. These affections are not passive effects as *early*[9] Foucault understands them; they are my active understanding of the world. These affections are my direct and dynamic evolvement with the world, which not only shapes my identity but also shapes subjective positions that my affections encounter in the world. Identity is an active, direct, engaging and affectual relationship of my body with the other bodies. It is not effects of discourse, as for *early* Foucault; nor effects of narratives, as for Gayatri Chakravarty Spivak; nor *in-betweenness* of cultural traps, as for Salman Rushdie. And the ideas of culture and history that are structured around my identity or "I" is a "mode" of affect:[10] a mode is the active and engaging expression or position of body– that the activity of my body form in certain way; they are not an ideological/political state constituted by some narratives (discourses, situatedness) of cultural and historical abstractions into which I make my passive entry.

Body in its modes of expression invents and reinvents infinite sensations in life ever postulating new emergence in me, or as Stephen Zepke puts it: " Subjectivation [identity] is the ongoing emergence of new affective connections opening onto the outside of a subjective 'I.' In its aleatory affectual events, identity is always coming into being, assembling itself. . . becoming" (Zepke, 2005, 153). Therefore, the contents of identifications are "affectual events," not cultural fixations, which traditional culturalists and ethnologists define in terms of misty cultural codes like ethnicity, race, nationality, and so on, which themselves are thus nothing, I reassert, but our affective investment to the world. In other words, the contents of our social identifications entail the affective states of our world. Our identity, therefore, is not a state of representation of some abstract concepts of ethnicity, nationality, religious and political systems but the expression of our emotive engagement with the world. And also, our affective states are not the effects of those concepts which can be qualified good or bad in advance; rather, they are the causes which constitute

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action of taking poison is my inadequate knowledge of natural laws of body. See Spinoza's *Ethics*, p. 231.

[8]This is what means by affective politics, and which makes us possible to do politics or being political beyond the given political set up. I have not discussed this topic in this paper though.

[9]I make distinction between *early* Foucault and *later* Foucault elsewhere in my discussion of Foucault. In his earlier writing like *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault treats identity as an effect of the power and discourse. In his later writing such as *History of Sexuality* and *Ethic*, Foucault changes his position of the concept of the subject and starts to talk about the "caring of the self"–self's relation to itself when defining the identity.

[10]See Spinoza, p.123.

goodness/badness in our object of desire. Spinoza says: ". . . we neither strive for, nor will, neither want, nor desire anything because we judge it to be good; on the contrary, we judge something to be good because we strive for it, will it, want it, and desire it" (Spinoza, 1955, 230). Therefore, the good or bad of our [cultural] identities cannot be regarded as an intrinsic phenomenon. This is what opposes Charles Taylor's view that "it's hard to see how we could deny it [culture] the title of good, not just in some weakened, instrumental sense . . . but as intrinsically good" (Taylor, 1995, 142). Taylor's view is misguided. Any pre-given judgment on the goodness or badness of any cultural groups (e.g. Western or Nonwestern, Orient or Occident, etc.) can have no foundation: such identifications are not "substance," rather they are "modes of substance."[11] Moreover, such modes do not work in generality, rather all expressive modes behave in a unique way. All affections structured in my identity are caused by the nature of my own body and external bodies to it. And the nature of their interaction depends on the ideas of joyful passions and sad passions.

Thus, in so as we perceive that a thing affects us with pleasure or pain, we call it good or evil; wherefore the knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the idea of the pleasure or pain, which necessarily follows from pleasurable or painful emotion. . .; that is, there is no real distinction between this idea and the emotion or the modification of the body, save in conception only. Therefore, knowledge of good and evil is nothing else but the emotion, in so far as we are conscious thereof (Spinoza, 1955, 195).

Therefore the connotative postulations of our identities are affections, not representations or ideas. And the nature of the affections rests on the power of activity of body. The power of the activity of the body assumes expression (not static representation) as one of the fundamental forces of our lives inasmuch as "expression takes its place at the heart of the individual, in his soul and in his body, his passions and his actions, his causes and his effects" (Zepke, 2005, 153). Expression invites a constructive self-engagement and constant interaction with the other, inviting a negation of what is given as identity and affirming what is within us–affective potentials of becomings.

Since identity is a mode of our expression of affects and affections and our cultural goodness depends on whether our actions bring us joyful passions or sad passions, the idealistic mission of our intellectual inquiry for society is to teach how to build a "compositional" relationship with other bodies so that our actions bring us joyful passions. Our inability to recognize this aspect of identity formation leads us into "decompositional" relationships with others and brings us sad passions. Therefore, for the understanding of all this, we do not need any brands of cultural viewpoint of identity and their logic of cultural violence. The immanent Spinozian idea of body can teach us how we should live with others; the theory of affects can teach us how to live with others when we view identity (me and other) as modes of affects.

[11]For Spinoza, substance is not a pure idea but a mode of physical affect and affection.

To understand affective identities in terms of modes of affects means transvaluing all the coordinates of traditional culturalist accounts of identity. In such accounts, identity is being used to create othering of the otherness of others whether culturally or linguistically, which is the expression of "sad passions" because othering the other in any abstract terms is inviting the other into "decompositional" relationships and producing nothing but resentment and remorse, hatred and intolerance. This attempt suffers from a serious flaw on the parts of both those who exclude their others and those who feel excluded. For they do not have a Spinozian "adequate idea" about others as active participants in the maximization of pleasure in me. They lack an art of existence which helps them to maximize happiness in relation with the other. Those who have "inadequate ideas" of how the natural laws of body work relate to the strangeness of others in an unfriendly way. Their inimical stances vis-à-vis others, thus, preclude entering into compositional relationship and so bring sad passions to other bodies and, in turn, to themselves. Therefore the immanence (pure affective materials of the body) is a positive philosophy that teaches us to respect and recognize the strangeness of others, to prevent any "epistemic humility" projected into the other by the others, and to create "new affectual individuations that are not produced by an "I" as their subjective reference point, but produce it as a part of a wider ontological process of creation" (Deleuze, 1990b, 327). This is a necessary condition for a creator of a new value, a new civilization.

When we begin to recognize and honor the strangeness of the other from some solid immanent ethical position aiming at maximizing pleasure for ourselves, we enter into an ethico-aesthetic level where we start to treat other as friends or as an "affectual self-organizing body" like myself whose maximization of joyful passions rests on our ability to enter our interactions with each other into compositional relationship, which calls for the "respect for imaginative differences and the capacity to flesh out those differences in order to see how they might each create powerful and dense visions of values in specific ways of responding to the world" (Altieri, 2008a, 113). The manner in which we each approach the world is very important; this is even more important to the one who invents one's own thoughts, feelings and actions and thereby one's own identity.

Then, when we recognize that "our conative expressivity entails a will to power specifiable in terms of character and recognition. Seen as aspects of processes, the conative drives need not be connected directly to projections about specifiable persons [with specific historical and cultural backgrounds] or even ideal egos" (Altieri, 2003b, 143). Especially when we recognize that identity is not a fixated state embodying history, culture, ideology, geography, etc., but a mode in which we express ourselves through those entities, we begin to recognize that we are eternally self-organizing "conative drive (s)" whose liberation rests not on any given cultural values but on creating values for ourselves, opening the immense possibilities for joyful passions to myself and others which ultimately define us not in relation to any "epistemic violence" or self-humiliating references of culture and politics but on the active understanding of the emergence of my being and the role of my dynamic understanding of the laws of body in my emergence.

Summing up, all the narratives of my identity are not the truest narratives; truest are the "non-narrated"/"non-represented" affects and affections. My own narratives, which define my continual emergent identities, are not only the consequential discursive activity, but they are the fundamental forces in the emergence of my being. And my ethico-aesthetic individuation is not a cultural relation of friend and enemy /self and other but of creative emergence, which maximizes joyful passions for me. Such interpersonally composed social identifications, I believe, hold a new hope for the promise of meaningful humanity for all of us.

II. Identity as a Self-relational Interiority

Rather than defining identity through criteria imposed from without, I define it through a notion of self-relational interiority. Here the identity is figured as unactualized potential proper to subjectivity rather than external concepts which must then be interiorized. A sovereign subject is its own cause; and knows how to use "forces of the outside" to form his interiority. My main aim in this section is to take to task the traditional philosophical practice of defining subjective individuation [12] through criteria that are external to one's inner, subjective potentials. For, our essential identity is a practice of self-fashioning from within these potentials rather than a construction borrowed from some positive social or political project. Within the tradition of Western thought, I will (re)read Kant, Heidegger, Derrida and Foucault's notions of subjective individuations in a very brief way for my present purpose, in order to point out what remain problematic in their approaches to subjectivity. I will describe subjectivity as non-subjectivity[13] and show how non-subjectivity can be created by oneself without imagining any alterity.

Kant rejects the Cartesian model of sovereign subject which can independently know the truth of the world without the mediation of any external set of criteria– "universal laws." For Kant, the autonomy of the subject depends on the self-legislation of the moral law giving rules that one gives to oneself: "Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law" (Kant, 1995, 30). Kant frees the subject from surrounding social contents, but locates it in a transcendental position. Kantian transcendental self was centered by a rational uniform set of universal principles that the subject held independent of social stuffs. Kant's challenge to Descartes is that subjectivity is not self-contained but works with transcendentally imposed, and thereby external, universal moral laws–categorical imperatives.

Contrary to this priority of the subject, Heidegger's goal is to show that there is no subject distinct, a-priori, from the external world of things, because *Dasein* is essentially Being-in-the-world. Therefore, Heidegger combines the separated subject and object with the concept of *Dasein* which is essentially a Being-in-the-world.

[12]I am alternatively using the terms subjective individuation, subject and subjectivity, which all refer to identity in the present discussion.

[13]Subjectivity as non-subjectivity does not mean one term cancels the other but it means that subjectivity finds itself in a new relation with the subject.

Heidegger states that Being-in the world goes unnoticed in trite everydayness, but we are conscious of it when we are really concerned about something significant. On these terms, subjectivity is an epistemic condition set by the exteriority. Derrida questions the distinction between other-exteriority and me-interiority and the impossibility of any solid essence that would make up one's being. One's being is an indeterminable space of in-between-ness in the presence and absence of essence, a space that language, for instance, cannot ultimately resolve. He remarks, "It is because I am not one with myself that I can speak with the other and address the other" (Derrida, 1997, 14).

The problem with these writers, as mentioned, is that they treat subjectivity as an essence (being) rather than as an act of self-creation (becomings), giving undue emphasis to the exteriority of constructed epistemic conditions. Foucault suggests that the self is an externally manipulated instrument of subjection.In other words, subjectivity is an effect of human sciences and political power. Externally imposed power creates effects on my interiority. So, to understand my interiority there is required an understanding of exteriority, which then functions as an epistemic condition of self-understanding.

Descartes' idea of the sovereign self, which regulates the body, has been the target of much criticism. He minimizes the role of body, giving the mind autonomy in its exclusion of body as its other. In fact, mind is not a separate entity. Consciousness, as Damasio puts it in his *Descartes' Error*, is about of "minding the body." All the modes in which body is affected are determined by the nature of the body affected and the nature of the body that affects. The human body is affected by a 'mode' caused by external bodies, and human consciousness is constituted by an idea of that body. All affections are caused by the nature of my own body and external bodies to it. We do not need to relate it to any ideal ego. Subjectivity is a body's postulation to itself or other bodies in nature. That's why the mind is just an idea of body. Spinoza says, "An idea, which excludes the existence of our body, cannot be postulated in our mind, but contrary thereto. Our mind is the endeavor to affirm the existence of our body: thus an idea, which negates the existence of our body, is contrary to our mind. . . ." (Spinoza, 1995, 123). Kant was right to reject the Cartesian model of subjectivity but wrong to place the self in a transcendental position. As Spinoza makes it clear in the above lines, the self is totally ingrained in the modes of its affects—the body's affectivity is (its) nature. Heidegger, too, is right in his attempt to synthesize the subject and object separation. Yet, Heidegger misunderstands the nature of the subject's relation condition vis-à-vis the world. *Dasein*'s "Being-in-the-World" reveals our relational to the world–our community. This relation, however, is not of meanings but of affective states/intensities. The idea of *Dasein*'s "Being-in-the-World" is problematic in the frame of my political structure of the identity in two ways: first, it is silent about the possibility of the inventing new worlds by the self; and second, it overlooks the affective nature of the communities shaping our subjective individuations. Heidegger is also overlooking the self-relation to itself or self-relational interiority as the contents of our identity overtly depending self to others– "Being-in-the-World". We might have asked Heidegger, can we surrender our subjective existence to a chaotic alterity or theyness? The sense of belonging to

others, as Heidegger illustrates, makes us irresponsible to oneself [ourselves?] because being is more about belongingness than self-affectivity. Such a passive notion of self creates alienation, boredom and anxiety. Given this, I propose to recast Dasein's ontology in immediate tactile sensations (affects) that the body presents to us. Dasein–subjective individuation–is not Being-in-the-World," it is "Being-in-the-body beside the world." The manner in which my body affects and is affected by the ontic-world determines the ontology of *Dasein*. *Dasein* does not oppose any imaginary or real other but participate in the self-making process of its becoming. *Dasein* also determines the forms of the world for me. And again I reiterate that it's not Being-in-the-World (because the world does not exist prior to bodily affects) but it's through "Being-in-the-body beside the world" that my *Dasein* infolds its becomings.

Derrida assaults the traditional search for a sovereign subject as a center of consciousness, but too often stages his critique in terms of an imperialistic and hegemonic obedience to language. I can agree with Derrida that language works in the system of '*différance*,' but I reject the claim that *différance* can be the only content of identity. The content of identity for me is the mode of affect and each mode is a substance[14] (not a void language created in self). Language is only one, albeit a powerful, way these modes might be expressed. Here I go along with Habermas who says: "Thus, Derrida achieves an inversion of Husserlian Foundationalism inasmuch as the originative transcendental power of creative subjectivity passes over into the anonymous, history-making productivity of writing [language]" (Habermas, 1998, 178). I believe that without affects language cannot give possibilities of meaning to our feelings. Affect is the most abstract experiences because affect cannot be fully realised in language, and because affect is always prior to and/or outside of consciousness (Massumi, *Parables*). The body has a grammar of its own that cannot be fully captured in language because it "doesn't just absorb pulses or discrete stimulations; it infolds contexts. . ." (Massumi, 2002, 30). Lastly, I reject Foucault's idea of self as an effect of disciplinary society, a thesis which he himself discarded in his later works where he adopts an aesthetic approach to self. Foucault discusses the Greek notion of "caring for oneself" as an ethical way to the formation of the self. On this understanding, self is not the formation of the order of things from top (state) to bottom (people). The self can influence its immediate surroundings without any direct relation to any larger political institutions on the top of the ladder. In the 1980s, Foucault was aware of the nature of the ethical shift in the power dynamics in human society. That was the reason he abandoned his idea of self as a product of disciplinary society and embraced the aesthetic approach to subjectivity based on the idea of self-affectivity. In sum, Foucault yields to the fact that an independent force of our "inner nature" can find its own way of self-making, and he conceptualizes this process of self-making in relation to given power structures. Actually, that idea minimizes the self's capacity to transcend the possibility of force that resists it.

[14]Spinoza says that a mode is a substance. I am implying that the style that we give to our existence fashions what we are.

It's not exteriority that determines what I am, but my "AM" is beyond exteriority and beyond itself. What defines oneself is intrinsic 'passion' or FORCE, which always strives to actualize the potential of 'being otherwise.' Charles Altieri says, "The 'I' that emerges . . .does not fight for its imaginary substance by opposing itself to other people's identifications. Rather this 'I' depends on its ability to adopt itself to the various forces of perception and memory and reflection that in effect call into existence" (Altieri, 2003b, 204). And these forces are certainly available to us in different frameworks of [cultural] otherness, for instance, Muslim versus Christian, West versus East, and so forth. The nature of such actualizations does not follow any prior pattern/ knowledge of who one is. Its principle is affect, but an affect does not follow from any postulation of our innate nature or essence. The nature of our identity is stylistically different from 'prior' forms of existence, different aesthetically rather than epistemologically.

The nature of identity as a series of affective transactions still leads us to the further questions here in my present discussion: how can we perform ethical practices of the bodies as a sovereign subject without the imposition of political, moral, and hermeneutic codes in a political community? How can we transcend hermeneutics to define identity? I contest that it is with the exercise of the intensity of constitutive force inherent in our subjective interiority that we can create identity as singularity: "those intentional and voluntary actions by which men [. . .] seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries aesthetic values and meets certain stylistic criteria" shape our identity (Foucault, 1990b, 10). This deployment of inner force enhances our capacity to expand the possibilities lying within in our existential interiority without letting any positive social project limiting what we can potentially be; letting identity stand beyond "bio-politics." On this scheme, our identity is laid open to any possible becomings. It's not stagnated in any fixation. Identity is always in a process of becoming different–different from and beyond what it is. It always crosses the fixation of 'is' to become 'isn't'. Identity is always in making/becoming different, " . . .always retaining the capacity to be other than what it is" (Prozorov, 2007, 55) by "a dangerous and open-ended encounter with the outside, the 'folding' of the forces of outside inside the self, whereby the free subject is formed as 'the inside of the outside'" (Deleuze, 1988a, 118). Each movement, from inside to outside and vice versa, resists actualization. It always remains in movement; each movement is singular, self-contained, an unactualized possible. This is the picture of our identity as non-identity[15]. Thus the aesthetic nature of self-fashioning identity, as opposed to the identity as a construction of a positive social project, refutes any diagrammatic fixation of our essential identity. Identity is a movement, an unpacking the packs of becomings–the eternal conversion and remodeling.

Such type of identity as the affective becomings can be asocial and anarchical but it remains irreducible to any social order. A dynamic nature of identity is achieved through transgression rather than actualized in a utopian end. Therefore, identity is

[15]The two terms "identity" and "non-identity" do not negate each other. I understand non-identity as a new way of being identified i. e. identity as becomings.

not finding our place within some traditional or ethical code rather it is found in dissolving or changing the polities that embody our nature, and as such it is anarchical. Our identity is not the outcome or effect of any utopian social project but always transcends such axiomatization (or division) in order to define what it is. A sovereign individual transgresses any actual identity that the social diagram may impose on it. A ". . . sovereign [individual]. . .[is] the *transgressor in relation to itself*. Sovereign is s/he who is simultaneously inside the space of order as the source of its constitutive principles and *outside* it as something that cannot be subsumed under these principles. . . ." (Prozorov, 2007, 84). The sovereign individual thinks its own thought and actualizes its own conditions for new becomings. It unfolds the affective dimensions of experience and creates its own conditions for life. For, it expresses the particular structure of affects. Intensity and the involvement of our body with other bodies free us from the imaginary confinement of our ego as an identity. Identity is formed with tactile sensations of intensity; it finds its way through a moment of "unformed and unstructured" potentials in body, i.e. affect which prepares itself for action in a given circumstance by adding a quantitative dimension of intensity to the quality of sensations. When your body infolds a context and another body (real or virtual) is expressing intensity in that context, one intensity is infolded into another. By resonating with the intensity of the contexts it infolds, the body attempts to ensure that it is prepared to respond appropriately to a given circumstance. In this way, subjective positions emerge and dissolve in the transmission of affects. Without affect, contexts–social or political–cannot constitute ideas about them because they would then have no intensity. In short, affect plays an important role in determining the relationship between our bodies, our political environment, shaping our very identity. Therefore, our identity is an unrolling of affective transactions between our body and the other bodies we encounter in the world.

Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers for the very productive comments on my paper.

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IS THERE A CHINESE SUBJECT IN CHINESE SHAKESPEARES? READING *CHINESE SHAKESPEARES: TWO CENTURIES OF CULTURAL EXCHANGE*

Suoqiao Qian*

Abstract: This is a review essay on Alexander C. Y. Huang's book Chinese Shakespeares: Two Centuries of Cultural Exchange. The global traveling of "Shakespeare" and the globalization of Shakespeare studies correlate to the advance of Chinese modernity which was very much characterized by cross-cultural exchanges between China and the West. Prompted by Huang's book, the essay examines the cross-cultural issue of "Chinese Shakespeares" in three interrelated levels: "China" in Shakespeare, Shakespeare in China, and China and Shakespeare. After exploring the colonial legacy in Shakespearean studies relating to China and Shakespeare's reception in modern China, the paper applauds Huang's innovative attempt to go beyond the "Shakespeare in China" model by offering a fresh look into the cross-cultural relation between China and the West surrounding the traveling of "Shakespeare" over the past two centuries. In the meantime, it also highlights the problematic of Chinese subjectivity in Chinese-Shakespeare scholarship, and in Chinese cross-cultural studies in general.

I. "China" in Shakespeare

WHEN I WAS a graduate student in the department of comparative literature at UC Berkeley in the early 1990s, I was a "Graduate Student Instructor" for several years teaching English reading and composition courses for which I got to design the course themes with five literary texts of my own choice. But the department set forth several guidelines and rules for choosing the texts, two of which I remember clearly: one of the texts must come from an "underrepresented group" which means ethnic, minority, non-Western, a woman writer, etc.; and one of the texts must be a Shakespeare. To insist that Shakespeare be part (one fifth) of the readings in a compulsory freshmen course demonstrates to me a subtle and clear statement on the canonicity under multicultural challenge. I was by no means a Shakespeare expert, but coming from the 1980s cultural background in China, I was not unfamiliar with Shakespeare either. At least I had some rudimentary knowledge about Shakespeare as acquired from, say, *A History of English Literature* by Chen Jia.[1] But the Shakespeare text I chose for my courses had definitely taken on a Berkeley flavor—*The Tempest*.

*Dr. SUOQIAO QIAN, Associate Professor, City University of Hong Kong. Email: ctqian@cityu.edu.hk

[1]Chen Jia, *A History of English Literature*, Beijing: The Commercial Press, 1982. Though offering a "rudimentary knowledge of English literature" as the author put it in "Foreword," this book was taken as something like a "Bible" for English-major Chinese students preparing for graduate school examination. I am yet to see "A History of Chinese Literature" written in beautiful Chinese by a sinologist published in England or America to be read feverishly by undergraduate Chinese-major students in England or America.

The Tempest is certainly a very hot text in Shakespearean studies in the current multicultural environment. Traditionally, *The Tempest* had always been read as a "Prospero's play" in the sense that the theme of usurpation and reconciliation involving the dethroned Duke of Milan reveals the authorial voice and commentary on European politics during the Renaissance period. The play was set on an "island" where a crew of European explorers consisting of members of Prospero's former court were saved after a shipwreck presumably caused by Prospero's "magic." In the traditional reading, the colonial relevance of the play in terms of its setting and characters was not exactly totally ignored, in fact it was always footnoted that Shakespeare wrote the play probably having read the Bermuda pamphlets and was aware of Montaigne's essay "Of Cannibals." However, the significance of its colonial implications was generally glossed over and taken for granted. It was not until the 1980s that race and colonialism became serious issues in Shakespearean scholarship along with the advance of the post-structuralist and post-colonial critique. As Barker and Hulme point out, for instance, the source criticism by providing some historical materials for reference merely obscures the discursive meaning of colonialism as embedded in the text. When discussing the character of Caliban, traditional reading usually posits it as highlighting the Renaissance theme of nature vs. nurture. As such, Caliban's claim that "This island's mine by Sycorax my mother/Which thou tak'st from me" (I, ii, 333-334) is easily occluded since Caliban is after all a "savage" whose humanity itself is very much in doubt. But the intended closure to maintain the unity of meaning in traditional gloss still leaves unresolvable cracks in the text, for instance, as Barker and Hulme argue, in Prospero's sudden anger over Caliban's revolt, when he explains aside: "I had forgot that foul conspiracy/Of the beast Caliban and his confederates/Against my life: the minute of their plot/Is almost come" (IV, i, 139-142). Then, as the text goes, the previous dancing nymphs and reapers "heavily vanish."[2] Indeed, when such cracks are taken seriously, the real significance of colonial discourse will emerge, and traditional Shakespearean scholarship will "heavily vanish" like the dancing nymphs and reapers in the play.[3]

Since the 1980s, "Shakespeare's last play, *The Tempest* (1611), is the one most widely and most controversially linked to issues of colonialism and race," in Loomba's words (Loomba, 2002, 161). The text is read not only in terms of its New World colonial experience, but also as revealing the Old World Mediterranean geo-political histories.[4] In fact, the appropriation of *The Tempest* had begun earlier in Third World anti-colonial struggles while the post-colonial critique was merely catching up with the consciousness of the de-colonized peoples. In the anti-colonial

[2]Shakespeare, *The Tempest*, Ed. Rex Bibson, New York: The Cambridge University Press, 1995.

[3]See Francis Barker and Peter Hulme, "Nymphs and reapers heavily vanish: the discursive contexts of The *Tempest*," in *Alternative Shakespeares*, ed. John Drakakis, London and New York: Methuen, 1985.

[4]See for instance Jerry Brotton, "'This Tunis, Sir, was Carthage': Contesting Colonialism in *The Tempest*," in *Post-Colonial Shakespeares*, Ed. Ania Loomba and Martin Orkin, London and New York: Routledge, 1998.

struggles of African and Latin American peoples, Caliban was found to be a symbol of their oppression and was appropriated to be a heroic figure to rebel against the colonial domination.[5] Actually, it does not take much theoretical sophistication or political consciousness to identify the link between the play and the issues of race and colonialism, as well as Shakespeare's apparent racial and colonial bias against the European Other. I used to ask my students to do a simple exercise: just to list the terms used in the text by various characters to refer to Caliban. And the list goes like this: "a freckled whelp, hag-born, not honored with a human shape," "villain," "tortoise," "filth," "vile race," "a fish," "beast," "Indian," "devil," "savage," "cat," "monster," "a very shallow monster," "a very weak monster," "a most poor, credulous monster," "puppy-headed monster," "a most scurvy monster," "an abominable monster," "a most ridiculous monster," "a howling monster," "a drunken monster," etc. The question is: if Caliban was taken to be an "Indian," was Caliban also a "Chinese" in the imagination of Shakespeare and his European contemporaries? After all, as we all know, Columbus' original destination was India and China, and "Indian" was thus named because he thought he had already arrived there.

To my knowledge, such "Chinese" question has never been raised in any form of Shakespearean scholarship so far. The "Chinese" relevance in Shakespeare's plays, however, centers around the interpretation of the term "Cataian." There are two occurrences of the term "Cataian" in Shakespeare's plays, once in *The Merry Wives of Windsor*:

> Page: I will not believe such a Cataian, though the priest o' th' towne commended him for a true man.

And the other in *The Twelfth Night*:

> Sir Toby: My lady's a Cataian, we are politicians, Malvolio's a Peg-a-Ramsey, and "Three merry men be we."

In the two most famous Chinese translations of Shakespeare by Liang Shiqiu and Zhu Shenghao respectively, the Chinese readers would have no idea that "Cataian" has anything to do with the Chinese:

> 佩：我不願信任這樣的一個狡詐的人，縱然教區牧師稱贊他是好人。(Liang)
> 培琪：我就不相信這種狗東西的話，雖然城裡的牧師還說他是個好人。(Zhu)
> 陶：小姐是個騙子，我們是政客？(Liang)
> 托比：小姐是個騙子，我們是大人物。(Zhu)

[5] See Octavio Mannoni, *Prospero and Caliban: The Psychology of Colonization*, trans. P. Powesland, London: Methuen, 1956; Aime Cesaire, *Une Tempete*, Paris: Seuil, 1969; Frantz Fanon, *Black Skin, White Masks*, trans. Charles Lam Markmann, New York: Grove Press, 1967.

In the first instance, the literal meaning of Liang's translation is "a cunning person," while that of Zhu's "a son of bitch," and in the second instance, both translations mean "a swindler." In the first instance, Liang did offer a footnote explaining that the word "Cataian" refers to Chinese, a derogatory term for cunning heretics, originating from "Cataia" or "Cathay"—an archaic term for China. Chinese Shakespeare scholars rarely pay attention to or take seriously these Chinese references in Shakespeare's texts. One exception is Zhou Junzhang's "Shakespeare and Chinese," in which Zhou applauds the translations by Liang and Zhu for not rendering "Cataian" literally into "Chinese," for if so, "it would be quite misleading" (Zhou, 1994, 4). Zhou quotes George Steevens' annotation of "Cataian" as "a thief" or "a rogue" for his argument. But in fact, Zhou's claim was quite contradictory as he does not spell out why it would be misleading. On the contrary, Zhou tries to argue that Shakespeare's usage of "Cataian" was very much influenced by the cultural prejudice prevalent at the time in Europe. From Renaissance onwards, along with the development of capitalism and colonization, Euro-centrism was the dominant mode of cultural attitude and Shakespeare's derogatory reference to Chinese very much demonstrates such cultural prejudice and superiority.

In "Caterwauling Cataians: The Genealogy of a Gloss," Timothy Billings offers a sophisticated and illuminating reading of the meaning of "Cataian" in the exegetical tradition of Shakespearean texts. Billings would agree that Chinese translators did a great job for not rendering "Cataian" as "Chinese," but Zhou's claim was confusing as he was apparently unaware of the genealogy of glossing the term "Cataian" in English literary tradition. Billings's point is that "Cataian" in Shakespeare's time indeed did not refer to Chinese as such, and it was not until the eighteenth century that George Steevens established his authoritative annotation linking "Cataian" to a derogatory notion of the Chinese and his annotation held sway in the English literary tradition ever since. As Billings points out, Cataians at Shakespeare's time were not categorically represented as thieves, scoundrels or rogues in popular travel literature. "Elizabethans' predominant image of Cataia (Cathay, Cathaio, Kythai, etc.)—derived from John Mandeville, Marco Polo, and Frère Hayton, and filtered through encyclopedias and cosmographies such as those of William Watreman, Stephen Batman, and Sebastian Münster—was of an almost utopian kingdom of abundance, civility, craftsmanship, and stunning opulence" (Billings, 2003, 4). And the Cathayans were actually considered as "a white kind of people," courteous, rich and resourceful, and clever at craftsmanship. The geographical imagination of the Elizabethans put Cataia in an ambiguous position and there was a great deal of doubt as to whether Cataia and China were one and the same. In fact, many maps in the Renaissance period put Cataia and China as distinct entities. Therefore, Billings argues that the term "Cataian" at Shakespeare's time may not refer to Chinese or Asians at all. Rather, they refer to those Europeans who discourse about a far-away wonderland with unimaginable riches and exotica. Precisely because of the glaring and hyperbolic manner in which these big-talking European travelers constructed such a discourse of fantasy that the term "Cataian" began to take on the meaning of someone who is subject to lying, cheating, and scheming. As Billings's genealogy of glossing tradition of "Cataian" reveals, it was George Steevens in the eighteenth

century who invented the racially defamatory Eurocentric "Cataian" as "Chinese." As such, while deconstructing Steevens's colonial legacy in Shakespearean "China" scholarship, Billings successfully rids Shakespeare himself of that legacy.

But I am equally interested in the racist colonial legacy as in the original authorial intention. After all, given the veracity of Billings's claim, the fact is that it was Steevens's Shakespeare that held sway for over three centuries and is still relevant today. Using circumstantial references of his own day, Steevens pinned down the racial character of the Chinese in his Shakespeare annotation: "The Chinese (anciently called *Cataians*) are said to be the most dextrous of all the nimble-finger'd tribe; and to this hour they deserve the same character" (Steevens, 1778, 25). According to Billings, an important source for Steevens's ethnocentric stereotyping of Chinese must be the popular travelogue—*A Voyage Round the World* based on George Anson's expedition of 1740–44, where Chinese were portrayed as a race of liars. While outlining the genealogy of the glossing tradition, Billings reminds us that that tradition lingers even today, and he cites the annotations "Cataian" as follows: "the 1997 New Cambridge Shakespeare edition of *Merry Wives*: "*OED* suggests that, among other things, the word was used to mean a scoundrel, and that seems the appropriate sense here"; the 1997 *Norton Shakespeare*: "Chinese; but also ethnocentric slang for 'trickster' or 'cheat'" and "*Chinese; scoundrel*"; the 2000 Arden Shakespeare: "native of Cathay, trickster"; and the 2000 Pelican Shakespeare: "literally, a native of Cathay (China), a jocular term of disparagement, reflecting distrust for people from faraway countries" (Billings, 2003, 10). The caterwauling of "Cataians" is still going on. And in that regard, the Shakespearean notion of "Chinese" as produced and circulated today in the West is not that far from the character of Caliban, after all.

II. Shakespeare in China

In introducing and appropriating Shakespeare into Chinese modernity, Chinese scholars seldom pay much attention to what "Shakespeare's China" does in the cultural politics of Western cultural relations with its Other. This is perhaps not so much because the reference to "China" in Shakespeare's texts was marginal and seemingly insignificant, but rather Chinese modernity has its own subjectivity in terms of its cross-cultural strategies, priorities, deliberations, conflicts and trajectories. The history of Shakespeare reception and appropriation in China is tied up with the logics and twists and turns of the ongoing Chinese modernity project.

Like many Western novelties, the name Shakespeare was first brought to Chinese attention via missionaries in the mid-19th century. The first Chinese to watch a Shakespeare play was perhaps Guo Songtao (1818-1891), who attended Lyceum Theatre London when he was a Chinese diplomat there. By late 19th century, China's modernity was opened up irreversibly under Western and Japanese military encroachment. All kinds of Western ideas and literatures were translated and introduced to the Chinese scene. It was no coincidence that Shashibiya (莎士比亞), the Chinese transliteration for Shakespeare, was first coined by Liang Qichao,

probably the most influential Chinese Enlightenment thinker of the day. But the most important figure at the turn of the century in popularizing Shakespeare in China was undoubtedly the eminent translator Lin Shu, who translated, with the help of his collaborator Wei Yi, many Western classics into elegant classical Chinese. Lin did not translate any original works by Shakespeare, but rather adapted into Chinese *Tales from Shakespeare* by Charles and Mary Lamb, itself adaptations of the stories in Shakespeare's plays. Entitled *Yingguo shiren yinbian yanyu* (英國詩人吟邊燕語) (An English Poet Reciting from Afar), Lin's translation played an important role in the Chinese appropriations of Shakespeare's plays, as his texts served as the source scripts for many of Chinese performances of Shakespeare's plays in the form of "wenmingxi" (文明戲) in early Republican China.

During the Republican period, Chinese modernity was characterized in a sense by the advance and acceptance of *baihua* (vernacular Chinese) as the national language. More and more Western classics were translated into *baihua* Chinese. Shakespeare's plays began to be staged in China and his works continued to attract wider attention. Comparatively speaking, however, "Shakespeare" as a modern Chinese cultural phenomenon did not amount to the intellectual attention paid to such writers as Henri Ibsen or Bernard Shaw. The lack of Chinese translations of Shakespeare's works even became a topic of ridicule for Lu Xun who accused Western-trained returned scholars of not having done their job by failing to bring out a complete translation of Shakespeare's works. Liang Shiqiu, one of Lu Xun's opponents, took up the cudgel and spent thirty seven years to complete the translation of Shakespeare's plays. Another monumental, and perhaps more legendary, achievement for Chinese Shakespeare studies was the complete translation of Shakespeare's plays by Zhu Shenghao, a somewhat obscure editor of a Shanghai journal of a humble family origin who did and completed his arduous work of translation under poverty-stricken and precarious circumstances during China's War of Resistance against Japan. However, it was not until the 1980s onward during the Reform Era that there emerged a "Shakespeare craze" in China. Along with China's post-Cultural Revolution reform spirit, "Shakespeare" became a symbol for opening-up to the world receptive of Western cultural icons. A record number of Shakespeare's plays were put on stage, both in *huaju* and traditional Chinese *xiqu* forms. The First Chinese Shakespeare Festival was held in Shanghai in 1986 where 25 Chinese Shakespeare plays were staged during the fourteen-day festival. In 1994, an International Shakespeare Festival was held in Shanghai which attracted over 500 participants including Shakespeare scholars and actors not only from mainland China but also from Taiwan and around the world. Shakespeare studies were also being institutionalized in China where Shakespeare Society of China, including many regional and provincial branches, was set up and Shakespeare's works became standard texts in college textbooks, particularly for English major students.

A considerable amount of research has been done on the topic of "Shakespeare in China." Chinese-language works include, for instance, *Zhongguo shaxue jianshi* (Shakespeare in China: A Brief History) by Meng Xianqiang, *Zhongguo shashibiya piping shi* (The History of Shakespearian Studies in China) by Li Weimin, English-

language works include *Shakespeare in China* by Xiao Yang Zhang, *Shakespeare in China* by Murray J. Levith, *Shashibiya: Staging Shakespeare in China* by Li Ruru.[6] The problem with most of such research on "Shakespeare in China" so far is that "Chinese Shakespeare" was treated as if it were a natural extension of a "global Shakespeare" phenomenon. It just happened that Chinese cultural practices related to Shakespeare occurred in China. This geographical location only constitutes another province for the ever more globalizing Shakespeare vitality. Following this model, it seems that what researchers can do is to provide and chronicle positivistic information about Chinese cultural practices related to Shakespeare, so that such practices enlarge the global capacity of Shakespeare studies. In fact, for Chinese Shakespeare studies to be included in the world Shakespeare family was a most desirable goal for some Chinese Shakespeare scholars. Meng Xianqiang, author of *Shakespeare in China: A Brief History*, points out, for instance, that Shakespeare studies was esteemed as the Olympia of international scholarship, as if the "Shakespeare craze" in post-Mao China was like China's holding the Olympic Games in international scholarship.[7] On the other hand, Murray J. Levith's *Shakespeare in China* was published at all because the author claims that much of the "local" Chinese Shakespeare related information was not available in English. Even that claim, however, was not true. In short, there is no Chinese subject in Shakespeare studies following the "Shakespeare in China" model.

III. China and Shakespeare

Alexander C. Y. Huang's book *Chinese Shakespeares: Two Centuries of Cultural Exchange* attempts to surpass the "Shakespeare in China" model in Chinese Shakespeare studies. To Huang, the primary concern is not "Shakespeare in China" as such, but rather "China and Shakespeare." "The scholarship that seeks to cross borders loses its intellectual punch when it is able to consider only one perspective, or when it merely seeks to add to, say, the already long list of Shakespeare's global reincarnations," (Huang, 2009, 20) as Huang puts it. The central concern of Huang's book is therefore twofold to address the following two questions: "what does 'Shakespeare' *do* in Chinese literary and performance culture? Conversely, how do imaginations about China function in Shakespearean performances, and what ideological work do they undertake—in mainland China, Taiwan, and other locations?" (Ibid., 3) As such, the book offers us a fascinating and fresh look into the cross-cultural relation between China and the West surrounding the traveling of

[6]See Meng Xianqiang, *Zhongguo shaxue jianshi* (Shakespeare in China: A Brief History), Jilin: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe, 1994. Li Weimin, *Zhongguo shashibiya piping shi* (The History of Shakespearian Studies in China), Beijing: Zhongguo xiju chubanshe, 2006. Xiao Yang Zhang, *Shakespeare in China*, Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1996. Li Ruru, *Shashibiya: Staging Shakespeare in China*, Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2003. Murray J. Levith, *Shakespeare in China*, London: Continuum, 2004.

[7]See Meng Xianqiang, "Preface," *Zhongguo shaxue jianshi* (Shakespeare in China: A Brief History), Jilin: Dongbei shifan daxue chubanshe, 1994.

"Shakespeare" over the past two centuries. On the other hand, however, Huang's pioneering work further highlights the importance of the question as to what a "Chinese subject" entails in such cross-cultural studies.

The book consists of four parts with seven chapters entitled "Owning Chinese Shakespears," "Shakespeare in Absentia: The Genealogy of an Obsession," "Rescripting Moral Criticism: Charles and Mary Lamb, Lin Shu and Lao She," "Silent Film and Early Theater: Performing Womanhood and Cosmopolitanism," "Site-Specific Readings: Confucian Temple, Labor Camp, and Soviet-Chinese Theater," "Why Does Everyone Need Chinese Opera?" and "Disowning Shakespeare and China," respectively. Unlike previous studies based on the "Shakespeare in China" model, Huang's is both theoretically sophisticated and empirically enriching. Loosely chronological in order and focusing on case studies, Huang's discussion on the cross-cultural topic of Shakespeare and China spans "two centuries of cultural exchange," involving the works of intellectuals, writers, filmmaker, theater artists, such as Lin Shu (1852-1924), Liang Qichao (1873-1929), Lu Xun (1881-1936), Lao She (1899-1966), Huang Zuolin (1906-1994), Li Jianwu (1906-1986), Ruan Lingyu (1910-1935), Jiao Juyin (1905-1975), Yevgeniya Konstantinovna Lipkovskaya (1902-1990), Stan Lai (b. 1954) and Wu Hsing-kuo (b. 1953).

Huang's theoretical promulgations are laid out in the first chapter "Owning Chinese Shakespeares." On the cross-cultural practice of Chinese adaptations of Shakespeare, the most popular question centers around its authenticity. And this authenticity question is also twofold: whether these Chinese Shakespeares are still "Shakespeare" or "Shakespeare" enough, or whether they are "Chinese" or in what way they are "Chinese" and how much "Chinese." Such (in) fidelity inquiries may occur in both English and Chinese critical world, but the former is more likely a discourse among Chinese reception while the latter among English reception. Huang's entire book is in a sense to dispel such ghost of authenticity claims and to open up a cross-cultural conversation whereby meanings of such cross-cultural practices must be accounted for in the specific sites of cross-cultural encounters. In the current multicultural and post-colonial environment, "alternative Shakespeares" have attracted much critical attention. Post-colonial critics have explored the meaning and relevance of Shakespeare studies in relation to Latin America, Africa and India. But Huang points out that Chinese Shakespeares don't quite fit in with the post-colonial model of critique either, and argues that "it is precisely by virtue of being in an estranged, ambiguous relationship to the post-colonial question that Chinese Shakespeares can provide rich opportunities for reexamining the logic of the field" (Ibid., 27). Indeed, Chinese cross-cultural studies ought not to follow the logic of post-colonial studies, and should certainly go beyond the authenticity discourse. Chinese adaptations of Shakespeare necessarily produce cross-cultural hybridities that contribute to and formulate meanings in Chinese modernity. To be entangled in the question whether Chinese Shakespeares are authentic Shakespeare or authentically Chinese merely denotes two sides of the same coin: a Eurocentric concern. The assumption that there is a superior authentic Shakespeare for other cultural adaptations to emulate certainly smacks of a Eurocentric essentialism, while an obsession to look for essential Chineseness in Chinese adaptations of Shakespeare can

very well manifest Orientalist preoccupations. Either concern denies the Chinese subjectivity in the Chinese cross-cultural practices involving the appropriation of Shakespeare in modern China. Huang is sure to be lauded for setting out his theoretical framework on a critique of cultural essentialism in regards to cross-cultural studies on Chinese Shakespeares. Chinese Shakespeares "are not a binary opposition to canonical metropolitan English-language representations that are perceived to be 'licensed' and more faithful" (Ibid., p34), as Huang put it. Our critical work is not to look for "alternative Shakespeares" as such, since "any system of performance, like any mode of cultural production (for example, *jingju*), is not an alternative to a legitimate, naturalized, mode of representation (for example, English-language or *huaju* 'straight' performance)…it is more fruitful to pursue the question of 'alternative to what' than to substantiate authenticity claims" (Ibid., p. 34). Therefore, the critical task in Chinese Shakespeare studies should focus on the two-way exchanges: "By two-way transactions, I mean the processes that revise and enrich the repertoire of knowledge about Shakespeare and China" (Ibid., p. 34).

In the following six chapters, Huang examines such two-way transactions of Shakespeare and China by focusing several case studies over the last two centuries. While Huang's intention was not merely to provide some insider information about "Shakespeare in China," the coverage of Huang's discussions is quite extensive and impressive, and perhaps the most up-to-date in that regard. Huang's choice of cases for his inquiry avoids the linear and teleological developmental model of Shakespeare's induction into modern Chinese cultural history, and pays special attention to marginal appropriations, particularly Shakespeare-related rewrites, that are usually neglected Shakespeare-in-China-like accounts. For instance, Huang highlights the importance of the fact that it was Lin Zexu who first introduced Shakespeare in Chinese accounts, even though it was a mere reference. Taken into account the historical circumstances, however, the linkage between the introduction of Shakespeare and British colonial encroachment was obvious. In Liang Qichao's Kun opera (*kunju*) *Xin Luoma* (New Rome) (1898), Shakespeare appears as a character in the play. Such cross-cultural phenomenon usually did not occupy any place in any account of Shakespeare in China, but to Huang, this deserves serious critical attention as it carries much significance in understanding how Shakespeare, along with other European masters, was utilized by Liang as a moral authority in that specific historical juncture. Huang also takes Lao She's "New Hamlet" (Xin Hanmuliede, 1936), the earliest Chinese parody of Shakespeare's famous character, as "a milestone for East Asian interpretations of Shakespeare" (Ibid., p. 87). Written in the mid-1930s, Lao She's "New Hamlet" was a critical comment on the contemporary Chinese socio-political life when the nation was caught in between old and new values and intellectuals were caught in bewildering inaction in face of an ever aggressive Japanese encroachment. I believe Huang is at his best in the final chapter when he examines the performance and rewrites of *King Lear* by two contemporary Taiwanese artists Wu Hsing-kuo and Stan Lai (Lai Sheng-chuan). Both rewritings of *King Lear* demonstrated unique ways in which Buddhist motifs were utilized with a personal touch. "Lai's and Wu's rewritings of King Lear are two instances where performative conversations surrounding religious discourses and

personal identities take place" (Ibid., 197). If Huang's examination of Chinese Shakespeares in modern Chinese cultural history was genealogical in nature, his accounts on these two contemporary Taiwanese instances are definitely affirmative and appreciative. To Huang, Wu's and Lai's cross-cultural appropriations have successfully "disowned" the authenticity discourses on Shakespeare and China, for to these two artists, "Shakespeare" no longer carries any moral or historical allegories, but is mainly concerned with their personal reflections upon their identity (what Huang calls "small-time Shakespeare"), and being from Taiwan, it also deconstructs any essential discourse on the authenticity claim of Chineseness.

Huang's somewhat postmodern inclinations in his Chinese Shakespeares studies provide him with theoretical sophistication to surpass the informant model of "Shakespeare in China." His critical sensitivity to dispel essentialist authenticity claims on both "Shakespeare" and "China" paved way for real possibilities for two-way cross-cultural studies. But the question still remains: what kind of cross-cultural studies has been practiced on the issue of Chinese adaptations of Shakespeare? What can we expect to learn, both ways, from Huang's Chinese Shakespeares?

If we were to expect revelations and illuminations about the meanings of Chinese Shakespeares in the formation of Chinese modernity by following Huang's provocative promise to investigate "what does 'Shakespeare' *do* in Chinese literary and performance culture?" readers may find themselves somewhat disappointed. Unlike, for instance, Chen Jianhua's recent investigation on the discursive practices of Napoleon in the formation of the modern Chinese discourse of "revolution,"[8] Huang's examination on what "Shakespeare" does in modern Chinese culture is sporadic and insufficient to allow the readers to formulate coherent understandings about the formation of Chinese modernity as such in terms of "Chinese Shakespeares." Perhaps Huang would not even agree that there is such a thing as "Chinese modernity," because the very notion of "Chinese" has been sufficiently deconstructed along with the authenticity claims of "Chinese."

Huang's theoretical framework is grounded in what he calls "locality criticism." In countering the Eurocentric essentialism and Orientalism in terms of their ownership claims on Shakespeare and China, Huang's strategy is to raise two questions: "Whose Shakespeare is it? Whose and which China?" (Huang, 2009, 25) That question implies that not only are there different representations of China but also multiple "Chinas" depending on who's talking. While Huang insightfully sees the inapplicability of post-colonial criticism on the Chinese historical situation, as "China was never quite colonized by the Western powers in the twentieth century. In most parts of the Chinese-speaking world, Shakespeare has rarely been resisted as a dominant figure of colonialism," Huang goes on to claim that, "throughout its modern and contemporary history, China often played multiple and sometimes contradictory

[8]See Chen Jianhua, "Napuolun yu wanqing 'xiaoshuojie geming'" (Napoleon and "Fiction Revolution" in Late Qing), in his *Cong geming dao gonghe* (From Revolution to Republic), Guilin: Guangxi shifan daxue chubanshe, 2009.

roles simultaneously, including the oppressor and the oppressed."[9] In these politically charged claims, Huang seems to be conflating two distinct notions of "China:" a cultural Chinese Nation and a political Chinese State, though nation-state cannot be totally divorced. By "Chinese Shakespeares" then, Huang does not mean any "'national Shakespeares' such as India's or PRC's Shakespeare," but rather "the theoretical problems and multiple cultural locations of the ideas associated with China and Shakespeare," and these localities are site-specific: "'China' refers to a number of ideological positions (for example, the imaginaries of China) as well as a range of geocultural locations and historical periods that encompass late imperial China (1839-1910), Republican China (1911-1949), Communist China (1949-present), post-1949 Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the Chinese diaspora" (Ibid., p. 39). In other words, to avoid a teleological developmental model of accounting modern China and her adaptations of Shakespeare, Huang treats these "different Chinas" as separate "site-specific" entities only within which cross-cultural practices of Chinese Shakespeares can be conversed upon.

What kind of meaning can we then expect from Huang's reading these site-specific local practices of Chinese Shakespeares? Certainly not in any coherent sense that will contribute much to our understanding of "modern Chinese literary and performance culture." Chapter Five is entitled "Site-Specific Readings: Confucian Temple, Labor Camp, and Soviet-Chinese Theater," in which Huang discusses three cases in "mid-twentieth century" China: Jiao Juyin's production of *Hamlet* in a Confucian temple in 1942 during China's War of Resistance against Japan, Wu Ningkun's reading of *Hamlet* in a labor camp during the Cultural Revolution, and the Soviet-Chinese production of *Much Ado About Nothing* before and after the Cultural Revolution (premiered in 1957, revived in 1961, and again in 1979). At first glance, one may marvel at the author's daring in grouping such disparate cases together and wonder what kind of coherent meaning can be revealed. Then one soon realizes that disparity is precisely the coherence for Huang's readings. Huang understands and points out that twentieth-century China was a battleground for cultural politics, and theater-making is no exception. Heavily entangled in ideological wars, Chinese adaptations of Shakespeare were ideologically and politically charged, often a matter of life and death for those involved. In historicizing the politicization of aesthetics, however, Huang presents his observations of these three cases in their own specific historical periods and finds them, as-a-matter-of-factly, equally interesting and meaningful. Jiao's *Hamlet* was staged in wartime China and the Shakespearean character was appropriated to boost up national sentiment and China's self-esteem. "In this context, this wartime performance was already loaded with decidedly local connotations" (Ibid., p. 133). In other words, Confucian and nationalist Chinese appropriations of *Hamlet* produce "local" meaning in Huang's locality criticism. So does Wu Ningkun's reading of *Hamlet* as recounted in his memoirs *A Single Tear*. When in a labor camp Wu was persecuted and deprived of freedom, he managed to sneak in a Shakespeare and read himself into Hamlet. So Huang comments that

[9]Ibid., 26. So far as I know, there is only one instance in which China would be called "the oppressor" in modern Chinese history, that is, by those who call for Taiwan independence.

"Wu's reading of Hamlet emphasized the connection between particularities of his locality (suffering, injustice, politics) and those of Hamlet's" (Ibid., p. 141). In other words, Wu's suffering, injustice done to him and the politics involved present their meaning no more no less as fitting his "locality." Following that approach, one may not be surprised to find that Huang holds an equally cool and receptive stance towards Soviet-style Chinese production of *Much Ado About Nothing* first directed by Yevgeniya Lipkovskaya in 1957, which Huang applauded as one of those "stirring works that were enormously inspirational to the 50s-70s generations" (Ibid., p. 143).

One may wonder what constitutes Huang's criteria in choosing his case studies for his locality criticism. In terms of its historical significance and momentum, the post-Cultural Revolution Reform Era was certainly a golden age for Chinese Shakespeares. In Li Ruru's *Shashibiya: Staging Shakespeare in China*, for instance, we find only the first chapter devoted to pre-Cultural Revolution Chinese adaptations of Shakespeare while the rest five chapters devoted to the Reform Era. But that is not included in Huang's cases. Huang only touches upon the "Shakespeare craze" in the 1980s with the instance of the 1979 revival of *Much Ado About Nothing*. For Huang, that revival tells us something about "memory," about "recycling productions that created collective cultural memory" (Ibid., p. 157). This hardly says anything about an important episode of Shakespeare's intervention into modern Chinese cultural politics. By contrast, Li Ruru offers us a much detailed and nuanced account on the intricacies of cultural politics involving Lipkovskaya's first production of *Much Ado* and the consequent two revivals in quite different political contexts. When Shakespeare's plays were allowed to perform in China in the early 1980s, it was a very emotional experience for the audience who felt genuine excitement and hope. It signaled a new era and a new kind of political and cultural life. As Li put it, "The illusion conveyed by the comedy [Much Ado] paralleled our own high spirits and the mood of the whole nation…how we wished we might escape to 'the golden days of Merry England'" (Li, 2003 58-59). It is certainly not a matter of recycling collective memory, nor a "procolonial" affirmation. As Chen Xiaomei points out, Chinese appropriations of Shakespeare in the post-Mao China constitute very much a counter-discourse to the dominant ideology of the Party State. When *Macbeth* was premiered in 1980 in Beijing, Chinese audiences read their own Cultural Revolution experience into the play and induce meaning from it. As Chen tells us, "No theater-goers in 1980 China could have missed the implied message. Indeed, for the majority of the members of Chinese audiences that watched the Shakespearean world of intrigue and conspiracy in *Macbeth*, it was no doubt difficult to forget their terrifying experiences during the Cultural Revolution, a national catastrophe in which Mao and his followers persecuted numerous Party officials, state leaders, and old 'comrades-in-arms'" (Cen, 1997, 161). In other words, "Shakespeare" participated in modern Chinese experience as Chinese experience it. It was so in Lin Shu's time, all the way through the continuous Chinese modernity project which is still unfolding today.

Given Huang's genealogical gaze into specific sites of Chinese Shakespeares, it seems which case gets discoursed upon does not matter that much after all, except perhaps when he investigates Taiwanese postmodern personalized appropriations of Shakespeare with much appreciation and affirmation. When "China" is effectively

deconstructed into site-specific "localities," one wonders if there is a Chinese subject in "Chinese Shakespeares." If there is no Chinese subject in Chinese cross-cultural studies, such investigation becomes merely conversational. And as such, one needs to ponder: what is the effect and ethics of such "conversation" in a global environment where "Cataian" continues to be glossed in the legacy of "Caliban"?

Acknowledgement: I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments.

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Book Reviews

***The Extended Mind*. Menary, Richard. Ed. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press,2010). 382 pp. Paperback, ISBN-10: 0262014033.**

"WHERE DOES the mind stop and the rest of the world begin?" In their 1998 paper Andy Clark and David Chalmers raised this question and answered it provocatively: A cognitive system isn't just the brain and sometimes it is extended to include environmental entities; cognitive processes aren't all in the head and sometimes they are extended into the environment. Their argument has since excited a vigorous debate among philosophers and cognitive scientists. *The Extended Mind*, an anthology of 15 essays, presents a comprehensive analysis of, and the best responses to, Clark and Chalmers' hypothesis that if a cognitive system is extended to include environmental entities then the relevant cognitive processes are extended into the environment. Some of these essays clarify this hypothesis by offering further explications; others sharpen the issues involved in the hypothesis by providing the most recent criticisms; and still others attempt to develop the hypothesis by moving the debate in new directions. *The Extended Mind* is an overview of the latest research in the studies of the extended cognition. It serves as an introduction for those who are not familiar with the theory of the extended mind, as a valuable collection for those who are actively doing research on the extended mind, and as a thought provoking text for a graduate seminar in philosophy and cognitive science.

The study of extended mind is one of the main currents in the presently fashionable "4E+S" movement in cognitive science and philosophy of mind, where 4E+S refers to the embodied mind, the enacted mind, the extended mind, the embedded mind, and the situated mind. The 4E+S movement has grown strong enough to stand in sharp contrast to the reigning model of cognitive studies based on the computational theory of cognition. The anthology *Extended Mind* is a valuable contribution because it highlights two features of this intellectual movement: (1) functionalism is a philosophical foundation of the 4E+S conception, and (2) the enactive approach plays a pivotal role in 4E+S theorizing. Failure in recognizing or appreciating these two features often lead to misinterpretations and/or misunderstanding of the extended mind hypothesis and the failure have occurred in both pros and cons in the debate about the extended mind.

As the *Extended Mind* demonstrates, the debate revolves around Clark and Chalmers' main argument for the extended mind hypothesis that runs roughly as follows (chapter 2): If an organism and an environmental entity are coupled through their interaction to the effect that (1) the expected behavior would unlikely occur if the environmental entity were removed just as it would if part of the organism's brain were removed, and (2) that the environmental entity functions as a part which would be cognitive were it a part of the brain, then the coupled system is a cognitive system and the processes this system endures are cognitive ones. Most criticisms against the extended mind hypothesis target at the *coupling* principle and the *parity* principle apparently employed in this argument. Fred Adams and Ken Aizawa's essay (chapter

4) contends that Clark and Chalmers's argument commit to the so-called coupling-constitution fallacy to the effect that if an environmental entity is coupled with a cognitive agent then it constitutes a part of the agent's cognitive system. Robert D. Rupert's essay (chapter 14) employs something similar to Leibniz law of indiscernibility of 'identicals' and argues that neuronal processes and non-neuronal processes are not on a par because they are not sufficiently similar to be of the same kind—cognitive kind. In response to the criticisms both Clark (chapters 3 and 5) and Menary (chapters 1 and 10) accentuate and clarify the central commitment to functionalism of the extended mind hypothesis. The aim of the extended mind is to explain why some neuronal processes and some non-neuronal processes are so coordinated through their enacted interaction that they together function as a cognitive system. It is functionality and not location that matters when determining whether or not a process is cognitive. If a coupled process has a cognitive function then it does not matter where it is located—whether it is partly, or even mostly, located in the environment. A functionalist interpretation of the extended mind is the focus of Michael Wheeler's essay (chapter 11), where he argues that the extended mind is a kind of extended functionalism that takes non-neuronal entities and processes as constitutive of cognitive processes.

However, what makes the model of the extended mind an alternative to the reigning model of cognitive science is the enactive approach rather than the extended functionalism as the extended functionalism alone would be an extension of, rather than a competitor for, the standard cognitive science. Several contributors of the *Extended Mind* attempt to develop the extended mind hypothesis in the enactive direction. The key to the coupling of systems or the mechanism that creates a coupled system that constitutes a cognitive system in its own right is what Clark and Chalmers call "a two-way interaction" between human organism and the environmental entities. The two-way interactive link is cognitive because it is enactive in character. Epistemic actions enact the environment by making it aid and augment cognitive processes. Consequently, the environment is invited to play an active role in driving cognition. In other words, the environment is not simply waiting there to be cognized; rather, it can be enacted to participate in the process of cognizing. Robert A. Wilson (chapter 8) calls for the shift of focus from representations to activities of representing. John Sutton (chapter 9) suggests the complementarity principle that reconciles internalism and externalism and argues that internal memories and external memories can make complementary contributions to cognitive processes. Mark Rowlands (chapter 12) gives an account of extended consciousness on the basis of his notion of intentionality as a form of revealing activity that run through neural, bodily, and environmental processes. Since the enactive approach to cognition and mind seems a key to understanding of extended mind, an account of enaction is demanded. Such an account, however, is absent in the *Extended Mind*. The required account would have to articulate two crucial aspects of enaction: (1) to enact the environment for cognition is to make it continuously act/react on the organism and (2) to enact the environment for cognition is to establish some lawful relationships between the organism and its environment pertaining to cognition.

The idea of cognitive system as a coupled system enabled by enacted interactive link between the organism and the environment has two revolutionary implications for cognitive science and philosophy of mind. First, it makes claim about the elasticity of the mind—that the mind is no more permanent than waters; the mind is fleeting and portable or "ephemeral" as Robert Rupert describes it (chapter 14). The mind may be expanding and contracting alternately. It may expand, as in the case of perceiving, beyond the brain and beyond the body; and it may shrink, as in the case of self-reflecting, into the brain; all depend on the cognitive task and the system requirements it demands. This elasticity implication appears inconsistent with the received, reigning notion of the mind as an individual with stable, persisting, and long-standing properties and capacities (Rupert, chapter 14). In response to this problem, Clark (chapter 3) argues that the coupled system, though portable, is nonetheless reliable, while Menary (chapters 1 and 10) suggest a distinction between long-standing dispositional capacities and exercising of those capacities on various occasions. Both have the faith in Parmenides sitting behind Heraclitus; but this faith seems to impede any revolutionary move.

The faith in permanence embraces the belief in enduring subject. Who is the cognizer in the case of cognitive process performed by a coupled system built on enacted interactive link between the organism and the environment? For John Preston (chapter 15), this is the issue of first-person authority. If a coupled system consisting of Lu's brain, body, and an environmental entity makes a cognitive achievement, then according to Preston, it is Lu, the person, who makes the achievement and hence it is the person who should be given the epistemic credit for the achievement. Extended mind theorists split on this issue; some (e.g., Rowlands) agree with Preston while others (e.g., Clark and Chalmers) attribute the cognitive achievement to the coupled system. The latter is making a revolutionary move by pushing in the direction of abolishing traditionally established conceptual distinctions between the mental and the physical, between subject and object, and so on. Not only is the mind elastic, but the self/person is also elastic. Thus, the coupled system is the person at the point of coupling. There isn't such thing as a persistent mind or self-existing as a bare substratum. Moving from elastic cognition to elastic mind and to elastic self is not easy; *The Extended Mind* is instrumental in helping the reader make these moves smoothly.

Dr. ZHAOLU LU, Professor of Philosophy, Tiffin University, 155 Miami Street
Tiffin, OH 44883, USA. Email: luz@tiffin.edu.

《中國晚明與歐洲文學: 明末耶穌會古典型証道故事考詮 (*Late Ming China and European Literature: A Philological study on the Late Ming Jesuit Appropriation of the Classical Exemplum*). By Li Sher-Shiueh (Taipei: Taipei Lianjing, 2005). 437 pp. Hardback, ISBN 957-08-2828-5.

THIS BOOK rediscovers a crucial yet often unnoticed role of Jesuit missionaries as the earliest introducers of Western classical literature to China. The author begins his prologue by referring to the magnum opus *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages* of Robert Curtius. Such deliberate intertextuality of the two titles signifies the author's respect for the scholarship and inspiring works of Curtius. The author points out that his book is distinctive from the other in terms of research object and methodology. Li's monograph shares the same objective of his doctoral thesis to "offer a re-examination of the late Ming Jesuit Chinese writing in a literary perspective". The leading research question of Li's work is: "Was literature included in the Western knowledge introduced by Jesuits to late Ming China?" His following questions are: What is the content of such "literature"? Does it constitute a sort of evangelical poetics or translatology? (p.i) As Li's metaphorical use of "the storyteller" from Benjamin's article title (pp. 344-350) indicates, this book presents Li's well-documented and comprehensive investigation on three related questions: What kind of stories was told by the Jesuits? How did they tell these stories? Why did they tell them in this way?

The stories appropriated by the Jesuits are the classical exemplum, which is defined by French scholar Jacques le Goff - "a brief narrative given to persuade an audience by a salutary lesson" ("un récit bref donné comme convaincre un auditoire par une leçon salutaire") (p.4). In terms of their context and origin, Li further divides exemplum into two categories: the classical exemplum and the Catholic exemplum. The former category includes Greco-Roman stories that served secular rather than religious ends. An influential example of the latter is *Vitae patrum*, stories of the Northern African desert fathers in the 3rd century BCE. Its abridged version *Legenda aurea* edited by Jacobus de Voragine became even more widely circulated in Europe. Both versions were appropriated by the Jesuits in late Ming China. Li gives three reasons to explain why he is so intrigued by the translated exemplum: firstly, such appropriation marked the initial exchange between Chinese and Western classical literature; secondly, the Jesuits' attempts to pen Chinese written language in the form of *Apostolat der Presse* (apostolate of the press) were unprecedented despite the earlier Catholic appropriation of this pagan literature in the 2nd or 3rd century (pp. 330-344); thirdly, the Jesuits' application of chreia, a sub-genre under anecdotes, is exceptionally widely seen in the history of Catholic proselytization. Based on these points, Li firmly argues that the significance of the Jesuit appropriation of the classical exemplum in late Ming China should not be overlooked by anyone engaged in literary and cultural exchange between China and the West (pp. 5-6).

In the four following chapters, Li discusses respectively four categories of exemplum –fabula, chreia, mythos and legend. In Chapter 2, Li describes fabula as what Isidore of Seville calls "*loquendae fictae*", or "fictional speech" (p.46). Due to

its strong allegorical characteristics, fables had been widely employed in ancient times for public speeches until the late medieval and Renaissance rhetoricians challenged their ambiguous functions for biblical instruction and superficial entertainment (p.48). Li investigates how the Jesuits co-opted the Aesop's fables from three sources, i.e. *Phaedri Avgvsti Liberti Fabvlarvm Aesoptarvm* by Phaedrus (1st century), *Aesopic Fable of Bavrius in Iambic Verse*, and the Augustana collection in Greek prose. He finds two approaches of the Jesuit co-option: one retains the original intention of the story and the other creates new meaning by changing the plot or revising the implied moral values. In Henderson's words, the latter approach shows "the making of meaning" in Jesuit Chinese writing with allegoresis or spiritual interpretation (p.54). Li makes three discoveries in this part: firstly, the fables that were given new meanings by the Jesuits remain in the same pattern of the classical fables (p.55); secondly, the new meanings often come from the re-configuration of the story structure (p.55); and thirdly, these new meanings stem from three recurrent themes in the medieval European pulpits, i.e. *memoria mortis*, separating fact from fiction, and the last judgment (p.58). The first theme is addressed in Ricci's translation of the peacock fable in his *Jirenshipian*畸人十篇 (Ten pieces of the disabled man). In his Chinese collection *Kuangyi*況義 (To give meaning), Trigault illustrated the second theme in the fable of the dog, the meat and the reflection. It is noticeable that both missionaries had used the "Three Friends" fable to demonstrate the last judgment of God. Ricci's version in *Jirenshipian* (1608 AD) gives a concise definition of the three friends as *caihuo*財貨 (wealth), *qingqi*親戚 (kinsman) and*dexing*德行 (moral behaviour), while Trigault's translation (1625 AD) elaborates on the definition with a special term *degong* 德功, which is the reversion of an influential Buddhist term *gongde* 功德 (merits and virtues). Disregarding the linguistic differences, Li observes that both versions present the transformed meaning from general ethics to the ultimate concern in the secular world (pp.70-78). The appropriated fables all served a common purpose to deliver the sometimes far-fetched religious lessons while "re-aiming" (Harold Bloom) at the audience in a Chinese context (p.122).

Chapter 3 introduces chreia as a sub-category under anecdotes, which embodies the tension between history and fiction. To use Li's words in his article on the Jesuit use of chreia in late-Ming China, this type of moral anecdote "stands out as the most unrelenting challenge against historical truth". Li cites the definition of chreia by Ronald F. Hock and parallels this subgenre with "shishuo" 世說 from *Shishuo Xinyu* 世說新語, a collection of stories and discourses of literati written during the Jin period (265-420 AD) by Liu Yiqing. An apt example of the Jesuit translation of chreia is found in *Dadaojiyan*达道纪言 (1636 AD), a collaborative translation by the Italian Jesuit missionary Alfonso Vagnoni (1566-1640) and Han Yun 韓雲 (approximately1596-1649), a provincial official in Shanxi. This book is a collection of the Western political and ethnical apothegms from ancient Greek and Latin literature. The 356 pieces of dictum were categorized into the Confucian cardinal five relations - that between the ruler and the ruled (158 pieces); that between parents and

children (21 pieces); that between siblings (31 pieces); that between husband and wife (23 pieces); and that between friends (122 pieces). To find out why a large number of chreiai (approximately 750 pieces in total) had been translated by the Jesuits, Li investigates its historicity, fictionality and textuality, and attributes its wide use to the exemplum principle of *decorum*, or usefulness (p.180). Li concludes this chapter by identifying how historicity suffered a twofold loss in chreia – it is lost in the figures of speech of this genre as well as in the preaching role that chreia plays. Li finds it more paradoxical that the readers' perception of truth is strengthened at the loss of historicity. This finding indicates the usefulness of a distorted "history" to convey the universal truth (pp.186-187).

Chapter 4 discusses mythos, a category that shares the fictional feature with fable (p.189). Despite the relatively minimized number (less than 20 pieces) compared to the large proportion of chreia and fable, the mythos played a distinctive role in the writings of three missionaries, namely Ricci, Vagnoni, and Portuguese Jesuit Emmanuel Diaz. In Ricci's *Jirenshipian* 畸人十篇 (Ten pieces of the disabled man), Li finds the first Western classical myth in Chinese writings - the story of King Midas. It is about how the hidden secret of Midas' donkey ears was advocated by a magic bamboo flute. This piece of bamboo grew from a hole in which the king's barber made a whisper out of such burning truth. Ricci omitted the genealogical background of Midas and his enmity with Apollo, and changed a seemingly trivial detail. In the original story and its European variations, the flute was made of reed, but in Ricci's version it is a produce of the celebrated Chinese botanical species bamboo. For Li, this seemingly minor alteration not only demonstrates Ricci's domestication strategy but also emphasizes the allegorical meaning of natural phenomena (pp.195-199). Further discussions are conducted on the three myths in Vagnoni's Chinese writings (p.236) and Portuguese Jesuit Emmanuel Diaz's *Shengjingzhijie*聖經直解 (A faithful interpretation of the Bible) (1636), in which ten pieces of Greek myths were appropriated (pp.200-205). Three findings were drawn from these discussions. 1) Homer and other Greco-Roman myths were "rigidly rejected" despite the inevitable presence of mythical tradition in the late Ming Jesuits' writings (p.237). 2) the efforts to appropriate Greek myths demonstrate the religious syncretism in late Ming China (p.242). Thirdly, Diaz's view of mythos resembles the modern sense of myths, which, as Barthes defines, is a type of speech that serves our needs by changing its form, content and usage (p.243).

In Chapter 5, Li adapts Propp's folklorist definition of legend and analyzes the Jesuit appropriation of three widely-spread Greco-Roman legends: "Aesop and the Tongue", "Damon and Pintias" and "The Sword of Damocles". For Li, the appropriated translation of Matteo Ricci and Martino Martini not only indicate their sermon approach but also demonstrate the ethnical encounters of Chinese tradition and Western ideologies (pp.246-248). He finds the last legend a typical case of Jesuit appropriation of Western classical legends due to its wide currency in Western civilization and the sophisticated symbolic meaning of the sword in Ricci's version. As Li finds, the sword was given a threefold religious sense including the divine justice, the metaphorical Death and the secular sins of the King (pp.293-294). For the

Jesuit storyteller, this story depicts the unequal bipolar relationship between God and humans: the suspended sword demonstrates the wrath of God and human beings shall consequently owe and fear God (pp.291-302). Despite the Jesuits' endeavour to preach in a Confucian way, this theme contradicts the core Confucian ideas of *ren*仁 [compassion] and *tianrenheyi* 天人合一 [the harmony between heaven and humans]. Ricci's rewriting efforts did not meet his objective. For the Chinese listener, a non-believer scholar Gong Daoli龚道立, the most impressive message in this story is the "good and evil judgment in one's afterlife" (p.306). To sum up, Li finds that the Jesuits often began their preaching with anecdotes from Western history and illustrated their points with fictional Greco-Roman legends. For Li, legend situates on the spectrum between history and myth or between fact and fiction, but its narrative purpose could be described according to Propp's opinion that "[h]istorical significance is an ideological phenomenon" (pp.308-309).

From the four categories of exemplum, Li summarizes and accentuates the exceptional "Medievalism" (p.6) that characterizes the Jesuit appropriation of ancient Greco-Roman stories. If we take into consideration the spatiotemporal remoteness (China vs. Europe and Medieval times vs. Renaissance era), we find the fact that the Jesuits from Renaissance Europe preached in classical Chinese with medieval exemplum in late Ming China even more stimulating. It is in this sense that Li defines such "Medievalism" with Stephen Owen's term of "language system", which surpasses linguistic, cultural and tempo-spatial boundaries, and demonstrates a unique communication between Chinese and Western literature (pp.39-40). Li's book demonstrates the twofold motive of such "Medievalism". One is the cultural context of late Ming China with remarkable linguistic heterogeneity (pp.7-23) and the flourishing allegorical literature written by Ming literati (pp.83-85). The other is the deep influence of Western rhetoric tradition on the Jesuit preaching method, which is one key issue of Li's inquiry on the transformation from language to morphology (p.39).

This book demonstrates that the classical exempla were not faithfully recounted but purposefully rewritten in a unique style by the Ming Jesuit storytellers. Li incorporates the Ming Jesuits such as Ricci, de Pantoja and Vagnoni into "a particular missionary group of authors" due to their continuation of the classical tradition by "creating" chriic exempla of various kinds in Chinese to illustrate Christian philosophy. Why did this group choose to "trans-write" rather than translate? That is the key issue discussed in the concluding part of Li's monograph (Chapter 6), where Li scrutinizes the Jesuit self-perception of their co-option of Western classical exemplum (p.315). From Ricci's Chinese writings, Li observes that the Jesuits held a Platonic attitude toward literature. For example, the epics of Homer were absent in the appropriated Greco-Roman stories despite the intertwined relation between Homer and Catholicism. Ricci undervalues Homer and other poets because their poetry blurred the distinction between the Olympus Gods and "god-like" mortal heroes (p.323). Li uses a celebrated event to prove that Jesuit appropriation embodies their Platonic evaluation of art in human society. During his second visit to Nanjing in 1599, Ricci had a debate with the famous scholar monk Sanhuai 三淮 (1545-1608) on

the topic of appearance and essence. The latter insisted that substantial objects could be recreated in the speech about them. And Ricci gave his frequently cited answer: "If I can see the reflection of the sun or the moon in a mirror, … can I simply say that the sun or the moon is made by this mirror?" For Li, Ricci's retort apparently directs to the Platonic idea of mimesis (p.327).

Lastly but importantly, Li's monograph tackles Ming Jesuit narrative identity, which is extremely difficult to be nailed down regarding their somewhat chameleonic behaviour. They are generally portrayed in Chinese cultural history as the first introducers of material culture and Catholic missionaries engaged in rhetoric and hermeneutical activities. However, their mission to convert Chinese people was far from successful since statistics show that the converted Chinese account for only 100,000, which is rather a small percentage on the scale of the late Ming Chinese population of 175,000,000 (p.351). They carefully distinguished themselves as *wenren xueshi*文人學士 (the Chinese man of letters and scholar) and *xishi*（Western scholars) or *xiru*西儒 (Western Confucianists) (p.315). Such hybrid identity between China and the West was sustained also by their efforts to imitate the appearance and attire of monks upon their arrival and adapting to the mainstream Confucian scholar lifestyle later on (p.353). Li's book suggests a unique perspective to portray these Jesuits – they are above all "storytellers on the medieval altar" (p.352). By telling and appropriating the Western classical exemplum, the Jesuit creation of "exemplum literature" contributes to both Chinese civilization and Western tradition by enhancing the genre resources for Chinese literature and negotiating the "ancient enmity" between poets and philosophers described in the *Republic* (p.352).

Apart from its extensive scope and penetrating thoughts, Li's book is also noteworthy as the fruit of the author's perseverant search crossing both linguistic and disciplinary boundaries. The idea of this book was initiated in Li Shixue's high school years when he challenged the traditional view in the textbook of Chinese cultural history-the Jesuit missionary advocated mainly Western religious beliefs and material culture when they preached in late Ming China. Li started his first investigation during his postgraduate studies at Fu Ren University, Taiwan. He happened to find a series of *Tian Xue Chu Han* 天學初涵 [The Preliminary Ideas of Heavenly Studies] edited by Li Zhizao 李之藻 (1571-1630 AD) in the library of the faculty of humanities. Out of "a mysterious impulse" as Li described, he got hold of the book and began reading it. To his delight, he found rich literary values rather than scientific evidence in this compilation of many Aesop's fables and some other familiar stories translated into Chinese. After reading the whole series, Li composed his first article on the relationship between Greek allegories and late Ming Catholic preaching in China in a journal *Chinese and Foreign Literature*. Much encouraged by his supervisor Prof. Anthony C. Yu at Chicago University, Li decided to develop this idea in his PhD thesis. He spent thirteen and a half years in total on this research project – nine years on the extensive learning in Chinese literature and history, theology, medieval studies, and classical languages such as Latin and Greek; and then four and a half years on the composition of his thesis.

The next step of Li's incessant Odyssey is to explore the relation between the Jesuit translation and Chinese literature. I am confident that Li's reappraisal will break the perpetual principle of cultural essentialism in nationalistic literary theories that he aims to deconstruct.

Dr. YU HUANG, Post-doctoral Research Fellow, City University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong. Email: heidi.hy@cityu.edu.hk.